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Preface 
In the Crisis, Samuel Medary, an editor who published a controversial 
newspaper in Columbus, Ohio, during the American Civil War, op­
posed the conflict because he believed North and South could settle 
their differences peacefully. Government officials and the majority of 
the Northern population disagreed with him, and some called for, or 
took steps to achieve, the suppression of the Crisis. This account of 
Medary's effort to employ the First Amendment to defend his ability to 
publish an adversarial newspaper is not one of definitive achievement. 
Rather, it is a study of how Medary's failure coincidentally resulted in 
a degree of journalistic success. His story is an example of how a prin­
ciple that is uniquely American—freedom of the press—has evolved 
over time through continual testing of its practical application. 
Freedom of the press has not existed in its current form through­
out U.S. history. It has taken the experiences of people like Medary to 
broaden the parameters of press freedom. The nature of the First 
Amendment demands that such delineation be an ongoing process. 
There have always been and continue to be Americans who persist in 
defining freedom of the press in their own terms, testing its power— 
and proving its integrity. And it is in times of national conflict that 
such individuals most need First Amendment protection, for during 
these periods opposing comments are most likely to be viewed as du­
bious, even treasonous. Providing a safeguard for the right to voice 
unpopular opinion is why the Founding Fathers created the First 
Amendment. Without minority opinion, Americans would not have 
adequate information to make decisions about the best course of ac­
tion for themselves or their country. Majority opinion scarcely needs 
constitutional protection. 
This project began during the winter of 1990 when, as a Ph.D. 
candidate at Ohio University, I began searching for a topic to research 
vu 
Prefacevm 
in a journalism historiography course. My instructor, Patrick Wash-
burn, told me about Medary, and that his personal papers and a com­
plete collection of the Crisis were at the Ohio Historical Center in 
nearby Columbus. Washburn noted that Medary was an enigmatic 
character, and that an in-depth analysis of his case had not been at­
tempted. Although I had spent most of my life in Ohio, and had an in­
terest in Civil War history, I had never heard of Medary. But 
journalism historians Edwin and Michael Emery had. In their book, 
The Press and America, they write that charges of conspiracy were 
brought against Medary late in the war, and his case was "one of the 
most celebrated [newspaper] suspension cases outside of New York 
during the Civil War." They do not mention, however, why it was so 
celebrated or how it ended. 
During my research I found that Medary was not a journalistic fig­
ure of the magnitude of, say, Horace Greeley. Nevertheless, many his­
torians mention him, although usually in a negative vein. Because his 
sphere of influence was largely within a political movement that has 
been relegated to one of the dark corners of Civil War history, 
Medary's impact on the field of journalism has been dismissed. 
Medary's case, in which he allegedly committed conspiracy against 
the Union, was never tried. If Medary was the most visible editorialist 
for a peace movement that was constantly threatened, why had he 
been able to continue publishing throughout the war? And when he 
was eventually charged with conspiracy against the Union, why was 
he not tried and convicted? 
No historical project is completed without the guidance, assis­
tance, and encouragement of numerous individuals. I am particularly 
grateful to two men who served as mentors during this process. With­
out Patrick Washburn, this project would never have become a book. 
His advice that I pattern my narrative after that of historian Barbara 
Tuchman opened up a new world of scholarly inquiry to me. Without 
the support of Washburn and the inspiration of Tuchman, my re­
search would not have uncovered the significance of Medary's Crisis. 
And I owe a special debt of gratitude to Michael Kline, history in­
structor and colleague at the Zanesville campus of Ohio University, 
whose encouragement and advice throughout the writing process 
were invaluable. 
I thank the members of my dissertation committee at Ohio Univer­
sity, all of whom in significant ways aided the completion of this proj­
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ect. David Mould gave freely of his time throughout the summer of 
1992 to act, along with Washburn, as coeditor of each chapter. 
Mould's knowledge of Ohio history was of great value in spotting ar­
eas that needed strengthening. Phyllis Field and Robert Stewart also 
were very helpful. Field provided insight into various areas of the Civil 
War framework that required more depth; Stewart sharpened the 
prose. 
In addition, I wish to thank the numerous librarians and archivists 
who played an important role in helping secure the information neces­
sary to complete my research. In particular, Amy Underwood, at the 
Ohio University library in Zanesville, helped track down materials 
and processed many interlibrary loan requests. I received gracious 
and able assistance from individuals at the Ohio Historical Center Li­
brary, the Ohio State Law Library, the National Archives in Chicago, 
the Ohio State School of Journalism, the Historical Society of Mont­
gomery County, Pennsylvania, the Columbus Public Library, and the 
Cincinnati Historical Society. 
I also want to thank Charlotte Dihoff, Acquisitions Editor at Ohio 
State University Press, for seeing this project through. She, along with 
her reviewers and editorial board, made constructive comments that 
helped strengthen the manuscript. I am especially grateful to Nancy 
Woodington, whose precise editing improved my writing. Finally, I 
am indebted to my wife, Bev, who shouldered a heavy load of family 
responsibility and was always nearby with understanding and sup­
port. She also helped with research and proofreading and by posing 
important questions. Most important, she believed in my ability to 
complete the project. 

'Our Constitution Is a Beacon Light3 
As the miles raced by on May 20, 1864, the newspaperman on the 
train wondered what the day held for him. It was spring in Ohio, but 
as the small towns and farm fields sped past the window Samuel 
Medary found little in the scenery to cheer him. The two federal mar­
shals who accompanied him on the 110-mile ride from Columbus to 
Cincinnati were a reminder that this was no pleasure trip, but little in 
Medary's life of the previous three years had been pleasurable. 
As publisher of the Columbus Crisis, a dissident newspaper, 
Medary opposed the Civil War and the concomitant restraints on civil 
liberties, especially threats to limit the editorial comment of noncon­
formists like himself. As a result, Medary waged a "war within the 
war," a battle for his First Amendment right to print dissenting opin­
ion. Although this war was not so widely chronicled as such battles as 
Gettysburg, Antietam, or Vicksburg, Medary carried out his crusade 
in Columbus with an intense passion. 
At the end of Medary's train ride he faced Circuit Court Judge 
Humphrey H. Leavitt. A year earlier the same judge had sentenced an­
other activist, Clement Vallandigham of Dayton, to military prison. 
Would Medary suffer a similar fate? Would his greatest fears be real­
ized with the silencing of the Crisis and abridgment of his First 
Amendment freedom? And had his critics finally been proved correct? 
As it happened, Medary would not secure vindication in a court of 
law. In the court of public opinion, his struggle had a mixed reception. 
Six months after his court appearance in Cincinnati, Medary died. 
1
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With him were buried the answers to his questions, and although a 
bullet did not end his life, he was nonetheless a casualty of war. 
Unlike in the case of another press freedom zealot of nineteenth-
century America, Elijah Lovejoy, historians have dismissed any con­
tribution Medary might have made to the development of freedom of 
the press in America. Instead, they have branded him a partisan 
troublemaker who accomplished little of a positive, enduring nature. 
Typical of the many adjectives historians have used to describe 
Medary have been "caustic," "slashing," "misguided," and "con-
temptible."1 Although subscribers to his newspaper revered him, 
Medary's politics present a quandary that has made it impossible for 
Civil War scholars to assess him without prejudice. Despite being re­
spected during much of his lifetime, "To the present day [Medary's] 
name has remained under a cloud and his real contributions .. . [are] 
obscured by the smoke of sectional conflict."2 
A closer examination of Medary's career reveals an overlooked 
legacy. Beginning early in his life, Medary formed a personal vision of 
the United States that emanated from his devotion to Jeffersonian­
inspired republican values. He revered the individualism of Ameri­
cans and saw the nineteenth-century United States as a place where 
men should be allowed to secure their own place in society free of gov­
ernment restraint. Medary became a staunch supporter of Andrew 
Jackson because the Tennessean espoused a similar vision. Jacksonian 
followers saw themselves as upholders of the sanctity of the Constitu­
tion and as champions of the ordinary working people of America, es­
pecially in the rural South and Middle West. Throughout his career, 
Medary looked to the ideologies of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew 
Jackson. Their thoughts about America's potential became his guide­
book. He continually quoted both men and compared developments 
during his lifetime to their vision for the Republic. Although raised a 
Quaker, Medary parted from the sect during his teens and relied on 
religion only irregularly for guidance during the remainder of his life. 
At the outbreak of the Civil War many Middle Westerners, includ­
ing Medary, were convinced that the conflict would permit Eastern 
business interests and federal bureaucrats to dictate political and eco­
nomic policy to the rest of the country. Therefore, Democrats, many 
of whom continued to cherish Jacksonian ideals, staunchly upheld the 
preeminence of states' rights in the face of what they viewed as a bur­
geoning, and hence more oppressive, federal government.3 Medary 
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feared that the Civil War would shatter his vision for the Republic. In 
an 1826 article, "Newspapers and Periodicals," he had stated his be­
lief that the future of the country was secure because of the standards 
established by the Founding Fathers. Medary believed the Constitu­
tion was the greatest document mankind had devised. Under the 
pseudonym Rusticus he wrote, "Our Constitution is a beacon light 
which may ever direct us off the rocks and shoals of despotism."4 
The Civil War of 1861-65 was by far the most divisive and trans­
forming event the nation had undergone, threatening the very survival 
of the country. The war altered nearly every aspect of the nation 
Medary had come to know, and he feared the structural changes that 
the struggle was bringing about. In hindsight it is apparent that people 
like Medary had legitimate reasons for their concern. They were not 
merely alarmist, as they were depicted at the time. 
The reason for the unflattering nineteenth-century interpretation 
of Medary's efforts is that he associated himself with views that were 
unpopular, if not downright subversive. Northerners called those 
who espoused opinions critical of the Union "Copperheads." The epi­
thet referred to the poisonous snake of the same name that gives no 
warning before it strikes. Opposition Republican newspapermen first 
used the insult to disparage those who desired an accommodation 
with the South. Medary, no Republican, proudly carried the banner 
of the "Peace Democrat" division of the Democratic Party. Oppo­
nents were not, however, interested in differentiating between the 
Copperheads and Peace Democrats. 
Peace Democrats did not believe that armed confrontation was 
necessary to settle North-South differences; therefore, those in charge 
of the war considered them, at the least, unpatriotic. "These critics of 
the Lincoln administration are still viewed as men whose hearts were 
black, whose blood was yellow, and whose minds were blank."5 Re­
publicans perpetuated this assessment after the war when the aboli­
tionist point of view was seemingly vindicated by the Union victory. 
Unionists wrote the history of the Civil War from their perspective, re­
jecting the Peace Democrats' contradictory views. 
Historians have since added to the one-sided accounts by perpetu­
ating the nationalism that became dominant during the war. In the 
words of one political researcher of the Civil War, David Donald, 
"The historian has been 'a camp follower of the successful army.'"6 
As a result, the propaganda of the triumphant political party became 
4 Chapter 1 
ingrained in American history, and the public discounted any dissent­
ing contributions. Nearly fifty years after the conflict Republicans 
continued to remind the nation's electorate that during the Civil War 
Democrats had, in their eyes, been no less than traitors. By the time 
the Democratic Party rebuilt its reputation in the twentieth century, 
the contributions people like Medary might have made had been over­
looked. The passage of time has increasingly exposed the shortsight­
edness of these views. According to Eric Cardinal, the Peace 
Democrats were "one of the most misunderstood political parties in 
American history."7 
That they were misunderstood should have been no surprise. Al­
though military battles took place in only a limited area of the country, 
the Union's having instituted martial law transformed the entire na­
tion into a war zone. Through his strong and effective use of presiden­
tial power, Abraham Lincoln broadened executive authority in the 
interest of preserving the Union. With dissenters and border-state se­
cessionists threatening havoc in the North, Lincoln took unprec­
edented steps to deal with the danger. The administration jailed many 
agitators deemed threats to the preservation of the Union. Lincoln be­
came the only president in U.S. history to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus, citing a provision put in the Constitution to protect public 
safety during rebellions. "During the Civil War, the Constitution was 
put into a deep freeze."8 It quickly became apparent that preserving 
the Union and upholding constitutional civil rights were incompatible. 
From the earliest days of the war, members of the Lincoln adminis­
tration accurately saw that the press presented a problem for the mili­
tary. For the first time in the country's history, fresh battles could be 
current news. Reporters traveled with frontline troops, and their tele­
graphed dispatches quickly inflamed the Northern public into sup­
port for the cause. But in a war in which opposing sides prepared for 
battle in close proximity to each other, the telegraph that was a god­
send for reporters became a curse for generals. The Confederacy inter­
cepted telegraph messages or sometimes simply read Northern 
newspapers to learn of military plans before mapping strategy. At the 
same time, the vigorous peace movement, which was strongest in 
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, used politically aligned newspapers to 
reach followers with a strident antiwar message. 
In the years preceding the Civil War, party politics had given rise to 
hotly contested elections. In the South and the Middle West, a vigor­
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ous two-party system developed for the first time, and white males 
(who alone had the franchise) went to the polls in numbers previously 
unmatched. Loyal supporters examined candidates' political opinions 
in party newspapers. Because they were the most universally acces­
sible form of national communication, newspapers played an essen­
tial role. As political organs, they kept party disciples informed about 
national and state political developments. Even voters living in a re­
mote part of the country could keep up to date. Union leaders could 
not unilaterally suspend press freedom to facilitate their military cam­
paign. Democratic publishers, in particular, would not tolerate such 
restriction of an established freedom. 
Newspapers were forums for aggressive partisan commentary on 
public activities. They rarely changed beliefs, but editors reinforced 
readers' convictions with partisan interpretations of news stories. In 
most cases editors were both politicians and publishers. Many Demo­
cratic publishers did not agree that the government should be allowed 
to limit press freedom, even in wartime. To some, like Medary, the 
controversial nature of the war increased publishers' responsibility to 
conduct an open and critical debate. 
The Civil War also represents a transition period in the way news­
papers went about their business. Telegraph and wire services were 
replacing the traditional exchange system, in which each editor relied 
on the mail to extend the circulation of stories. In addition, the report­
ers' battle coverage helped revolutionize the focus of the nation's 
newspapers. From being subjective political forums, they became ob­
jective event coverage sheets. But periods of change are rarely easy. In 
a business that had come to enjoy its freedom, some publishers re­
fused to comply with government calls for self-restraint. The result 
was widespread unofficial attempts at press censorship. 
The disputes over the appropriate interpretation of the First 
Amendment that took place during the Civil War have not been re­
peated in U.S. history. The designers of the concept of freedom of the 
press had not made any provision for working with a diverse and in­
fluential press in a period of internal civil strife. The question, Should 
the press remain free when the safety of the nation is at stake? was an­
swered in conflicting ways by factions within the Union. Lincoln pro­
ceeded cautiously on the issue, but many members of the military and 
the civilian population did not. As a consequence, the struggle be­
tween the opposition press and supporters of the Union's resolute 
course of action erupted into an ongoing confrontation. 
6 Chapter 1 
No other war in U.S. history has seen more instances of prosecu­
tion of the press by military authorities or private citizens.9 Literary 
America, which mythologized the violence of the last half of the nine­
teenth century in the American West, devoted scant attention to the 
lawless activity that typified the civilian Middle West during the Civil 
War. During the war rabid Unionists damaged or destroyed nearly 
one hundred opposition newspapers.10 Unionists instigated many of 
these acts in retaliation for the dissenting opinions of the Democratic 
press. 
One obstinate newspaperman who wrote persuasively about and 
practiced press dissent as fiercely as any was Samuel Medary. He had 
been a lifelong public activist and had regularly involved himself in 
political controversy. Early in 1861, when he began the Crisis, 
Medary was already sixty years old. From his modest office in Colum­
bus he sought both to stop the fighting and to strengthen the rights of 
journalists in the North. 
Samuel Medary was a man of average height but substantial girth. 
His full beard and ample head of hair were totally gray in his later 
years and accentuated his dark, piercing eyes. Prone to bouts of de­
pression and intensely serious about his obligation to his readers, he 
was rarely seen to smile. Rather, a scowl dominated his full face. Pic­
tures of him—always in a suit and tie—indicate that he welcomed the 
depiction of himself as an elder statesman. Although a devoted hus­
band and the father of twelve children, he spent a great deal of time 
away from his family, opting instead to cast himself in the larger role 
of civic patriarch. His great esteem for those who made their living 
from the soil led him to identify his occupation as "farmer" on the 
1860 Columbus census report even though he lived in downtown Co­
lumbus and had never been a farmer.11 
Before the war, during his many years at the forefront of Ohio and 
national politics, he gained the respect, if not the admiration, of both 
friends and enemies. Medary left no doubt where he stood on an issue, 
and people were scarcely apathetic toward him. In this regard he typi­
fied politicians of his era: often brash, sometimes imprudent, seldom 
willing to compromise. To him, principle was everything, and his en­
emies warned, "There was no more bitter partisan than Medary. He 
was said to be willing to back the pen with his fists."12 He welcomed 
controversy—even sought it out—because he saw it as a means by 
which he could show others the error of their ways. 
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Medary's strengths were honesty, bravery, determined loyalty, 
steadfastness, and high ideals. But his faults included stubbornness, 
irascibility, arrogance, and intolerance for the opinions of others. Un­
like President Lincoln, whom he came to despise, Medary, once de­
cided, never budged from a principle. In his mind, flexibility or 
modification of one's creed represented weakness. He was a conserva­
tive politician who held that his positions were morally as well as po­
litically accurate. Known as "Old Wheel Horse" in Ohio Democratic 
politics, he had become prominent not only as a journalist but as a 
party boss and public speaker. His nearly four decades of political in­
volvement made him the unofficial doyen of the Ohio Democratic 
Party. Frank Mott acknowledged this status: "He was a vigorous and 
belligerent writer, who became the boss of Ohio Democracy" in the 
years preceding the Civil War.13 Fellow Democrats characterized him 
as "a vigorous partisan.... The bitterest of his political foes conceded 
his ability."14 That he had ample tenacity as well he proved during the 
years in which he published the Crisis. 
The Crisis, a newspaper whose name referred to the conflict that 
was imminent in 1861, was the antithesis of Horace Greeley's popular 
New York Tribune. Many throughout the Union read Greeley's pro-
abolition, pro-Civil War newspaper, which circulated more widely in 
Ohio than in any other state except New York and Pennsylvania.15 
Unlike opposition publishers, Greeley did not view the war as a threat 
to press freedom. He condoned the unprecedented measures Lincoln 
took to ensure order and security in the North. For Peace Democrat 
publishers like Medary, however, Northern war fever represented a 
greater threat to constitutionally guaranteed civil rights than did the 
conflict itself. 
The Crisis was a one-man operation. Medary used it as his pulpit 
to speak out on all the issues surrounding the conflict. He and other 
Democratic editors initially set out to halt America's involvement in 
civil war. But as the conflict progressed and Northerners stepped up 
attempts to restrict those who failed to support it, Medary became ob­
sessed with infringements on journalists' rights. He viewed assaults on 
press freedom as symbolic of the imminent demise of his vision for 
America. 
As a result Medary's name was anathema to staunch Unionists. In 
1864 the Republican Nevada Gazette summed up the contempt in 
which he was held in the North. Shortly after Medary's death, its 
8 Chapter 1 
editor wrote, "One of the devil's own children . .  . [has gone] home to 
his father's house."16 In three short years, Medary's notoriety had 
spread across the country. 
But Medary's efforts were overshadowed by two even more infa­
mous Peace Democrats: Wilbur Storey and Clement Vallandigham. 
Storey was the belligerent publisher of the Chicago Times, which the 
War Department shut down at one point because of blatant anti-
Union sentiments. The most famous Peace Democrat, however, was 
Vallandigham, of Dayton. Unionists despised him because of his divi­
sive peace-seeking tactics. Before the war and during his 1858-62 
stint in the House of Representatives, he published the Dayton Em­
pire. But in 1863 the War Department imprisoned and later exiled 
him to the Confederacy following a speech in which he challenged 
military restrictions on dissident public speech. 
These two men garnered sensational headlines while Medary pur­
sued his editorial campaign. In his 1951 book, Lincoln and the Press, 
Robert Harper acknowledged the impact of Medary's endeavor. 
Medary, wrote Harper, published "one of the most widely quoted 
Copperhead newspapers of the Civil War period," and "was the ac­
knowledged voice of the Peace Democrats."17 Although Medary 
never published his circulation figures, several Civil War historians 
have called the Crisis the most influential of the 154 Peace Democrat 
newspapers published during the war.18 
One reason for the impact of the Crisis was that it served as the 
clearinghouse for Peace Democrat ideas from across the nation. 
Through the exchange system, Medary extended the readership of 
stories from other Peace Democrat editors whose papers' smaller cir­
culation limited their influence. In addition, he wrote his own editori­
als in language that could be appreciated by both the learned class and 
the poorly educated immigrant laborers of the Middle West. The lat­
ter most feared changes in the country from the war because such 
changes threatened their view of the simple, individualistic American 
life. Concern over the Crisis's pernicious influence led postmasters in 
West Virginia, Kansas, and Missouri to halt its circulation in those 
states. 
Like the idealized agrarian common man Medary defended, Peace 
Democrat editors disputed the rationale Northern leaders used to jus­
tify war with the South. Medary favored continuation of a sectionally 
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diverse America and, like most Southerners, truly viewed the conflict 
as a war between the states. Today Peace Democrats would be consid­
ered racists because they believed blacks were intellectually inferior to 
whites. In the nineteenth century, however, their opinion was not un­
common, even among those who favored abolition. For Peace Demo­
crats the continuation of slavery was a political issue, not a question 
of morality. They opposed abolition by the federal government be­
cause they believed slavery was a tried and true local institution, and 
only individual states had the right to eliminate it. They also were con­
cerned that an influx of cheap black labor into the Middle West 
would put whites out of work. 
Another Peace Democrat fear was that after the war New England 
businessmen would dictate the economic and social future of the 
Middle West. Peace Democrats like Vallandigham and Medary were 
western sectionalists who "saw the Civil War transforming the federal 
Union into *a new nation."' They believed the war would end up "giv­
ing industry ascendancy over agriculture, extending rights to black 
people, ending the Upper Midwest's chance to play balance-of-power 
politics."19 Conservative Democrats constantly worried that blacks 
and profiteers would overrun Ohio. Medary's editorials in nearly ev­
ery issue of the Crisis fueled these fears. He counseled readers about 
the excesses of a heavy-handed government, self-serving financiers, 
and a jingoistic Northern public. 
Only in recent years have scholars begun to acknowledge that the 
Peace Democrats' activities served a worthwhile purpose. In A Re­
spectable Minority, Joel Silbey writes that the Democrats believed it 
was their duty to criticize candidly the party in power. The founda­
tion for argumentative press commentary had been laid during de­
cades of practice that antedated the Revolutionary War. As the Civil 
War progressed, the Republican-controlled government validated 
Democratic opposition by turning a blind eye to corruption within the 
federal government, incompetence by Union military commanders, 
and reprisals wrought on the opposition. Silbey argues that because of 
their stand the Peace Democrats made abuses of civil liberties less dra­
matic in the North than they would have been otherwise. In this re­
gard the Democrats served as a stabilizing agent in a democracy 
dominated by a too restrictive patriotism.20 
Peace Democrats acted during the conflict as a loyal opposition. 
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As adversaries they performed a function necessary to the survival of 
a democratic nation. In Mark Neely's words, "They helped prevent 
the U.S. Army from an increasing reliance on military justice for the 
sake of convenience."21 
Medary found justification for his style of journalism in the eigh-
teenth-century libertarian philosophy of the Founding Fathers. They 
perceived the press as "an agent of enlightenment and a gauge of lib­
erty." But what Medary also found, through harsh experience, was 
what Alexander Hamilton had previously conceded. In The Federalist 
Papers Hamilton had observed that a constitutional press guarantee 
meant nothing, because "its security, whatever fine declarations may 
be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend 
on public opinion."22 
The concept of a preeminent freedom of the press did not yet exist 
in the minds of most Americans, and the constitutional mandate be­
lieved by Medary to shield Peace Democrats had yet to be affirmed in 
the courts. The Civil War became a proving ground for the strength of 
the First Amendment. Overall, there existed among the U.S. popula­
tion sympathy for free discussion of ideas. But many Americans felt 
that there were limits to how far an opposition editor—especially one 
whose dissenting opinions were powerfully persuasive—could go. 
The reason for this curious state is that nineteenth-century federal 
courts maintained that press freedom cases fell under the jurisdiction 
of common law.23 Not until 1931, in Near v. Minnesota, did the Su­
preme Court begin exercising federal authority over the dissident 
press. In his book about the nineteenth-century relationship between 
federal courts and the press, Timothy Gleason says that at that time 
journalists enjoyed only limited legal protection for freedom of ex­
pression. Federal judges based their conservative view of press free­
dom on English judge William Blackstone's eighteenth-century 
opinions. In Blackstone's Commentaries, composed in the late 1760s, 
the judge had written that free men had the right to say whatever they 
wanted. He felt the prohibition of varying viewpoints would "crush 
freedom of the press." At the same time, however, Blackstone noted, 
"If he [a journalist] publishes what is improper, mischievous, or ille­
gal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity."24 
As dissident publishers quickly learned, the Civil War was not the 
safest time to be experimenting with the First Amendment. Inflamma­
tory public pronouncements often provoked vicious retribution. But 
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many, like Medary, remained dedicated to their cause and were will­
ing to face the consequences. The Constitution had addressed the is­
sue of government press suppression, but it had not spoken to the 
menace of military leaders or community mob action against newspa­
pers. Ultimately, such activities proved to be the main threat to the 
dissident press. 
Civil War press suppression, according to the civil-rights historian 
Michael Linfield, constitutes one of the darkest chapters in America's 
past. He notes that U.S. history is littered with instances in which 
people who have spoken out against the majority course of action 
have suffered dire consequences. Linfield documents that it has been 
common for "newspapers that offended those in power [to be] 
banned, their presses seized, their articles censored." At no time in 
American history did this occur more regularly than during the Civil 
War.25 Under these unpromising circumstances, Peace Democrats at­
tempted to exercise a view of press freedom formulated over years of 
practice. In the context of the day, Medary's journalistic philosophy 
was not as far out of line as his opponents depicted it. 
In the sixty years preceding the Civil War, the press in America had 
become not only a forum for party politics but a strong practitioner of 
independent, aggressive journalism. Most members of the press uni­
laterally opposed any attempts by government to control them. Peace 
Democrats simply practiced what other editors did as part of their 
calling to confront government decisions. After all, according to the 
Constitution, the press in America was free. But with the start of civil 
war, it quickly became apparent that it was not so free that it could 
disagree openly with the wartime government. The Northern major­
ity condemned Medary's vision of press freedom as too Utopian for 
the times. With the future of the Republic in the balance, any opposi­
tion was construed as disloyalty. Unionists argued that Medary and 
other journalists needed to practice restraint and to support their gov­
ernment during this peculiar time—not question it. Peace Democrats 
feared, however, that such behavior would encourage permanent re­
straints on journalism. 
How could Medary, in the Crisis, continue his highly visible dis­
sent in a hostile environment for such an extended period? Given his 
newspaper's high visibility, it seems especially odd that while other, 
lesser opposition papers were censored, the Crisis was not. The reason 
appears to be that although Medary went to his grave believing the 
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Union had subverted press freedom, his crusade helped accomplish 
something important. By carefully walking the tightrope between out­
right treason and legitimate press dissent, he effectively helped Peace 
Democrat newspapers broaden the boundaries of acceptable press 
dissent in America. 
By considering Medary an unrestrained member of the fourth es-
tate—as opposed to a seditious antagonist—a consistent Democratic 
press philosophy can be found. By testing his ability to write dissent­
ing opinion during wartime, and shrewdly justifying it, Medary 
helped extend the freedom of the press in the United States. From this 
perspective, his struggle constitutes an effort to define a freedom that 
journalists had yet to secure in fact. 
The Civil War was an American tragedy. Yet history has shown re­
peatedly that in the aftermath of a destructive event positive develop­
ments can arise. Only with the perspective of time, however, is the veil 
lifted from some contributions. Medary was certainly a man of con­
tradictions, but he was a journalist in contentious times. He was not 
simply a misguided figure, but a man who practiced a style of journal­
ism that allowed him to help define the limits of press freedom. 
One of the great goals of historians, according to David Donald, 
has been to find a "good villain" on whom to blame the Civil War. 
Different sources have held Radical Republicans, Copperhead Demo­
crats, and slaveholding Southerners responsible for the war. Although 
all contributed, none can be indicted as single-handedly causing the 
conflict. We "must stop thinking," says Donald, "of the Civil War in 
terms of hero-versus-villains and apply realistic political analysis to 
the great struggle."26 Medary was a political journalist who, although 
neglected and maligned, used the war to accomplish something of 
lasting value. In Shaping the First Amendment, John Stevens writes 
that without what he calls "True Believers," press freedom in America 
would not have achieved its current level. He points out that in any 
society most citizens are too busy getting along to concern themselves 
with ideologies. But there are always individuals who believe in their 
cause so passionately "that they seek out controversy . . . challenge 
community values.. .. Courting martyrdom, daring society to try to 
crush them."27 
Medary was one of these. 
"Unawed by the Influence of the Rich, 
the Great or Famous.. .the People 
Must Be Heard" 
In 1825 a twenty-four-year-old schoolteacher, his wife, and his child 
moved to Clermont County, east of Cincinnati, Ohio, where "the 
friendly folk of the village helped him open a school."1 The educator 
was Samuel Medary. That Medary first chose teaching as a profession 
is not surprising. Childhood friends recalled young Medary's passion 
for books. He had a great love of knowledge from an early age. As an 
outgrowth of his studies and childhood religious training, he formed a 
philosophy that rejected violence as a means for individuals to settle 
differences. He believed society's problems could be solved better if 
people relied on their intellects instead of resorting to savagery. In ad­
dition, he had a high regard for those who had set forth the concept of 
equal rights for all Americans regardless of their position in society. 
But most important, he admired the role the press played in ensuring 
that political leaders served the needs of those they represented. 
Medary gained this appreciation from his reading of Thomas 
Jefferson. 
A few years after his arrival in Ohio, Medary's vision for America 
was realized by Andrew Jackson's election. Medary's lifelong pursuit 
became to instill in as many Americans as possible his faith in 
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian doctrine. Throughout his life, Medary's 
judgments were based on these two men's ideas of what America 
should become. 
Each of Medary's mentors held some beliefs at odds with his. Jack­
son was no champion of press freedom, but he and Medary both 
shared a low regard for abolitionists. Jefferson condemned slavery 
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(yet kept slaves) and was an advocate of unrestrained journalism—ex-
cept when the press criticized his own political actions. Medary died 
fighting for an independent press, but he never criticized Southern 
planters for perpetuating the institution of slavery, nor did he support 
the First Amendment rights of the abolitionist press in his editorials. 
In the early nineteenth century, America was an immature demo­
cratic experiment. For all practical purposes, the "United States" ex­
isted only in principle. Many of the high-sounding concepts of the 
Founding Fathers that later became dogma were only words on paper, 
yet to be examined and proved. 
Samuel Medary was the son of a tenant farmer in Montgomery 
County, Pennsylvania. This area north of Philadelphia was part of the 
largest Quaker community in the United States. His parents' ancestry 
was Welsh; their families came to the New World with William Perm 
in 1682. Medary's parents raised Samuel in the Society of Friends and 
began his education at the Quaker Free School in Montgomery 
Square. Later he attended an academy in Norristown, Pennsylvania, 
and shortly before his twentieth birthday he began teaching in a 
Quaker school in Montgomery County. 
Although Medary later left the Friends, his Quaker upbringing 
had a major impact on the values he espoused throughout his life. 
Quaker practices during church meetings shaped his initial apprecia­
tion for the power of words. According to the communications re­
searcher Peter Senge, Quakers have traditionally shared with others 
"only those thoughts that are compelling (and which cause the 
speaker to Quake from the need to speak them)." This practice led, 
according to Senge, to a deeper appreciation of profitable dialogue.2 
The editorials Medary later wrote exhibited this contemplative 
approach. 
For the same reason, Quaker communities placed a high value on 
education as a part of their children's upbringing. Medary's teachers 
made certain that he learned to appreciate the pursuit of knowledge. 
According to Quaker philosophy, God "has given men intelligence to 
learn; [but] even the Children of Light [Quakers] must dig for wisdom 
as for silver."3 So at an early age Medary exhibited great interest in 
events that were shaping the new nation. William Chapin, a boyhood 
friend, recalled that Medary regularly and "eagerly went through the 
newspapers at Edward Jenkins' store." Chapin said Jenkins encour­
aged Medary in his love of writing and told him to submit some of his 
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pieces to the Norristown Herald for publication. At the age of sixteen 
Medary launched his newspaper career when David Sower, publisher 
of the Heraldy printed several of his articles and poems.4 
Another event during Medary's boyhood significantly shaped his 
view of the world. Basic Quaker precepts urge advocacy of demo­
cratic government. This conviction is an outgrowth of the Friends' be­
lief in universal grace. The doctrine states, "All persons are endowed 
with the ability freely granted by God to resist evil and do good if they 
are willing to exercise their ability." Quakers put this principle into 
practice by seeking to improve the world around them. They are per­
fectionists, people who believe they can and should always strive to 
make things better. When a Quaker disagrees with his neighbor, 
therefore, he determines to "protest, petition or exercise 'passive resis-
tance.'"5 When he became a newspaper publisher in later years, 
Medary resolutely applied both of these principles. Through his edito­
rials he continually sought to inspire readers to improve the world. In 
addition, he not only encouraged readers to practice nonviolent civil 
disobedience but also practiced it himself. 
During the 1820s this application of passive resistance led to a di­
visive struggle among the Friends in Pennsylvania. Around 1800 
many young Quakers became enthusiastic about the democratic revo­
lution that was sweeping America, especially after Jefferson's election 
to the presidency. The conservative leadership of the Society of 
Friends had not supported the Revolutionary War because of its con­
frontational strategy. As a result, when young Quakers embraced 
Jeffersonian democracy, Quaker leaders in Philadelphia chided them 
for compromising their spiritual ideals and adopting secular thought. 
Most of the rebellious Quakers lived in rural Montgomery County, 
and they countered by charging that their urban leaders had become 
too authoritarian. Many Montgomery County Quakers gradually 
broke away from the Philadelphia assembly and, under the leadership 
of Friend Edward Hicks of New York, established a separate assem­
bly. Years of conflict over the issue led to the Great Separation of 
1827.6 
Before 1827, however, many Quakers had already left Montgom­
ery County because they had tired of the infighting. Samuel Medary 
and his family were convinced that putting Jefferson's vision into 
practice could make the United States a paragon of democracy, and 
the Medarys were among the families who moved during this period 
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of disagreement. In 1820 they relocated to Maryland and then, a year 
later, to Georgetown in the District of Columbia. During this time, 
Samuel continued to teach and to satisfy his interest in politics by 
spending time in nearby Washington. But in 1822, in response to his 
dissatisfaction with the increasingly urban, aristocratic East, he set 
out to become a member of agrarian America. In that year he moved 
near to present-day Roanoke, Virginia, to teach school. 
Shortly thereafter he met English immigrant Eliza Scott, who was 
not a Quaker. His marriage to her a year later unequivocally com­
pleted his separation from the Society of Friends.7 This period also 
witnessed Medary's estrangement from other Quaker doctrines. Dur­
ing his two years in Virginia he witnessed plantation life and slavery at 
first hand. Unlike many Quakers who led the revolt against the "pecu­
liar institution" in the years before the Civil War, Medary was not re­
pulsed by black people's condition. Medary felt plantation owners 
were justified in keeping slaves because they had an economic need 
for such laborers, and blacks were intellectually incapable of manag­
ing themselves and their property. Landowners provided black fami­
lies with a sheltered life—in Medary's eyes, a fair exchange for their 
labor. It was the first sign that this man, who held such high ideals for 
Americans, such as freedom to earn their own way through sweat and 
perseverance and the ownership of land, had space in his vision only 
for people of European descent. Although the nation changed a great 
deal during his life, Medary's views never altered. 
Medary and his bride spent only two more years in Virginia. In 
1825 he decided to pack up his family's belongings and with his wife 
and first child move west of the Allegheny Mountains. The primary 
motivation for their move was probably the cheap land the govern­
ment was making available for settlement in the Middle West. How 
they arrived in the small village of Bethel, Ohio, just east of Cincinnati, 
seems more like chance, however. Apparently, while making their way 
along the Ohio River on a steamboat, a fellow passenger convinced 
them that southwestern Ohio was the best place for them to settle.8 
The influx of settlers from the East and the South quickly made 
Ohio a dynamic state. Medary liked what he found there from the 
very beginning. In one of his early writings after arriving in Ohio, he 
referred to the state as the "Great West." A few years later he wrote, 
"It is plain that Nature has marked the country [Ohio] as the seat of a 
mighty empire."9 Ohio was unevenly developed at the time, but 
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Medary quickly began to play a role in helping the area grow politi­
cally and culturally. Education was his initial work, but it did not 
serve as his occupation for long. Though he called himself a farmer, 
and was a spokesman for farmers, Medary never actually became one. 
Lacking capital to buy land or open a business, Medary looked to 
public service as a way to supplement the meager income he made 
from teaching. Between 1825 and 1828 he began building a reputa­
tion as a civic leader by serving as a county surveyor, a school trustee, 
a school examiner, and eventually the county auditor. His involve­
ment in these posts allowed him to demonstrate his ability to experi­
enced politicians who could help him launch a career in state politics. 
In these positions he demonstrated speaking and writing abilities that 
proved his value to the Ohio Democratic Party. 
In 1828 Medary realized the next step toward his goal to help de­
termine the country's future when he switched to the career to which 
he devoted the rest of his life. He resigned his teaching post and with 
Thomas Morris began publishing the Ohio Sun in Bethel. The two 
men founded the newspaper solely to help elect Andrew Jackson 
president. For the first time Medary had a public forum for his ideo­
logical position. The motto on the banner of the Sun declared that the 
publishers were "unawed by the influence of the rich, the great or fa­
mous [and that] the people must be heard, and their rights pro-
tected."10 The novice newspapermen intended to serve Jackson, and 
what they viewed as the underrepresented public, by carrying out this 
motto through the pages of the new paper. As a result, Medary cast 
his lot with the most controversial man to occupy the White House 
between Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln. Many like Medary 
loved Jackson, but others hated him because of the controversy he 
precipitated. Throughout his career the same could have been said of 
Medary. 
In his profession as a partisan journalist, Medary saw his future in 
terms of speaking for and defending the simple lifestyle of the inhabit­
ants of the agricultural and mechanical Middle West. His experience 
in the East had led him to be cynical about affluent businessmen and 
politicians, so he felt an immediate kinship with his new friends in the 
Buckeye State. He thought it was his responsibility to help them be­
come informed and, in the process, to guide them in making intelli­
gent decisions as members of the electorate. 
The two men made just enough money to keep the fledgling paper 
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going. In an effort to broaden their circulation, only a few months af­
ter its beginning they moved it to Batavia, also in Clermont County. In 
1833 Medary and Morris changed the newspaper's name to the Ohio 
Sun and Clermont Advertiser. While Medary was no printer, he 
learned the craft from Morris, who was. Medary "edited the paper, 
helped the printer, and attended to the delivery and mailing."11 From 
the very beginning, he also expressed strong opinions about the pur­
pose of American journalism. 
In an early Sun article Medary stated his perception of American 
journalists' obligation to readers. The United States, he said, had 
more newspapers and periodicals than any other nation in the world, 
and the number was increasing. Medary attributed this to the critical 
role newspapers played in the perpetuation of a dynamic society. 
"This speaks a strong language in favor of our free institutions," he 
wrote, and added, "A nation becomes happy and virtuous in the same 
degree that knowledge . . . [is] disseminated." Medary already em­
braced the view that newspaper editors were crucial to maintaining 
the vitality of a democratic government. He counseled readers that it 
was their responsibility to keep apprised of the affairs of government. 
Medary rhetorically posed the question, "The narrow-minded may 
ask, how are we to become informed of the circumstances of the yes­
terdays and todays?" In response he wrote, "An answer is at hand: 
read the newspapers."12 These early editorials indicate that Medary 
gave serious thought to the influence of his occupation. 
While Medary sought to become a source of information to the 
public, he also situated himself as a member of an early populist 
movement. He maintained his conviction that an enlightened citi­
zenry was essential. By being informed, citizens could remind govern­
ment leaders that it was their duty to serve all the people, social 
position notwithstanding. The editor's responsibility was to help the 
populace remain alert by keeping them informed. During the next 
four decades Medary involved himself more and more in the develop­
ment of state and nation and the increasingly influential function of 
newspapers. 
During the nineteenth century the word intellectual was used dif­
ferently from the way it is today. In the 1800s society classified indi­
viduals as intellectuals because of their ability to analyze issues and 
speak or write about them in an extraordinary manner. Intellectuals 
achieved elite status through their publicly demonstrated eloquence 
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and educational skills, whether in print or on the podium.13 Medary 
qualified for intellectual status as his involvement in politics and jour­
nalism grew. He became a public speaker in demand around the state, 
and he took his leadership position seriously. Throughout his life 
Medary acknowledged that the distinction of being a highly visible 
public-spirited figure carried with it a heavy responsibility. He wrote, 
"I do not consider any man worthy of public position, or the name of 
statesman, who is not ready and willing . .  . to express his views hon­
estly, and without fear, on all that concerns the public welfare."14 
But Medary also demonstrated in later years that he was not 
broad-minded enough in his thinking to grow intellectually or to 
change his opinions as new information became available. He did not, 
of course, attend college; his education was limited to his Quaker 
grammar schooling in Pennsylvania. Although more literate than the 
farmers and laborers he so esteemed, like them he was either unwilling 
or unable to entertain innovative political or social ideas. By the age of 
thirty Medary had formed a philosophical and political mind-set that 
altered little. His colleagues and readers always knew precisely where 
he stood because his position never changed. 
The ability to alter and perfect one's thinking was an intellectual 
characteristic that served Abraham Lincoln well during the Civil War. 
Medary's mental rigidity was a liability during the same crisis, but his 
approach was not unusual among political thinkers in nineteenth-cen-
tury America. According to the English clergyman Cornelius Cole, 
who traveled the country during the period, "Unflinching adherence 
to party is principle with them.. . and to forsake a party is regarded as 
an act of highest dishonor." For Medary, stubborn adherence to prin­
ciple was the only conceivable position, though the people and the 
country around him were constantly changing. Vacillation was cow­
ardice. The historian William Gienapp says, "New crises, different is­
sues and fresh political faces normally had little impact on most 
voters' partisan loyalties" during this era.15 
Medary's association with the dynamic Morris immediately pro­
vided an impetus for his career in both the publishing and the political 
arena. Although they later went separate ways politically, when they 
joined forces Morris and Medary were both ardent Democrats. As an 
established political practitioner, Morris served as Medary's early 
mentor. This was fortunate for Medary, because Morris was then 
probably the most influential public figure in southwestern Ohio. 
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From 1806 to 1833 Morris was a legislator in the Ohio General As­
sembly. He became nationally known as a lobbyist who wanted the 
seat of national government relocated from Washington to Cincin­
nati. From 1833 to 1839 he was a U.S. senator, and in that capacity he 
gained recognition for a senatorial confrontation with Henry Clay 
concerning slavery. The encounter endowed the Ohioan with the la­
bel "First Abolitionist Senator."16 Morris and Medary eventually 
parted company because of their differing views on slavery, but in 
these early years their Democratic fidelity encouraged Morris to help 
launch Medary's public career. In the late 1830s Morris forsook Ohio 
Democrats by joining the new Liberty Party, an early abolitionist 
group that attempted to end slavery as an American institution. In 
1840 the party nominated Morris as a vice presidential candidate on 
the Liberty ticket with presidential hopeful James Birney, but they did 
not gain adequate support to challenge William Henry Harrison. 
In initial issues of the Sun, Medary, as he did throughout his ca­
reer, staked his dream for the nation's future on Jacksonian democ­
racy. He promised that the Sun would "pursue a liberal and 
independent course, and . . . support General Jackson on 'principle 
alone.'"17 It was an exhilarating time for inexperienced political ideal­
ists like Medary. The Jackson presidential era brought to an apogee 
the democratic ideology of Thomas Jefferson that had so enthralled 
Medary.18 More pragmatically, Jackson's greatest contribution to 
American political life may have been that "he made people give a 
damn about party politics."19 Without a doubt, the new administra­
tion served as the turning point in Medary's life. 
Though they were from different backgrounds, the alliance be­
tween Jackson and Medary was genuine. Jackson was the first presi­
dent of the United States who was not a member of the well-to-do 
Eastern aristocracy. Both men were obsessed with seeing ordinary 
men's individual rights revered, and both were from the agricultural 
West. Over the next few years they came to know each other person­
ally and formed a lasting relationship of support and mutual admira­
tion. Medary viewed Old Hickory's election to the presidency as a 
victory for hard-working, simple-living people. Jackson had the full 
support of farmers and workingmen. For Medary, Jackson symbol­
ized the romantic American success story of an ordinary man ascend­
ing from a log cabin to the White House. 
Medary also admired Jackson because of their common 
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worldview. Both had grounded themselves in the doctrine of 
Jeffersonian republicanism, so Jackson's platform, which embraced 
similar conservative values, readily appealed to Medary. Jeffersonian 
standards followed the philosophy of the "Commonwealthman." 
Champions of this outlook "stressed civil liberties, individual au­
tonomy and a white male democracy." They were perpetually on the 
lookout for signs of corruption by public officials, a too powerful cen­
tralized government, and deterioration of the privileges guaranteed to 
citizens in the Bill of Rights.20 
Philosophically, nineteenth-century Jeffersonians advocated an 
uncomplicated, agricultural society because they feared technology 
would erode their rural ideal, threatening civil liberties. They wanted 
to live unrestrained by government intervention on land that they 
owned and from which they earned a living. Before the Civil War, 
"the heart of American democracy was local autonomy."21 The trend 
toward an increasingly centralized, more influential federal govern­
ment concerned them greatly. They were convinced the trend would 
generate corruption in public officials. So Jeffersonians insisted that 
the only way to maintain individual freedom was to sustain each 
American as an independent farmer or craftsman. They argued that 
such autonomy allowed each person to become more virtuous and 
permitted him to help realize the ideal republican community. To pre­
serve this societal equilibrium, supporters felt they had to be continu­
ally wary of attempts by any level of government to upset the stability 
of the situation. They viewed government as a struggle between the 
rights of property owners and those of individuals. Jacksonian Demo­
crats claimed that they were the last defenders of the balance between 
the haves and the have-nots in American society.22 
Jackson campaigned on the platform that the federal government 
represented concentrated power that he needed to restrict. In his 
mind, allowing the national government to grow unrestrained in­
fringed on individuals' civil rights. The new president made a regular 
practice of appealing to public sentiment on national questions, over 
the heads of those in Congress. He chose to use his veto power more 
than all the preceding presidents combined.23 As the nation's chief ex­
ecutive, Jackson believed it was his obligation to defend state sover­
eignty and restrict Congress's attempts to overstep its constitutional 
authority. He made a practice of reiterating his slogan, "Let the 
People Rule," as he quarreled with Congress and the Supreme Court 
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on issue after issue.24 Medary believed Jackson's doctrine not only 
constituted the appropriate approach to national leadership but also 
represented a step toward the kind of society that America should be. 
This was a logical extension of Medary's interpretation of Jefferson. 
For early nineteenth-century journalists Jefferson was the cham­
pion of an unrestrained press. During his lifetime he had repeatedly 
said the press was needed to make sure that government operated in 
the best interests of all men—not just a privileged few. Jefferson be­
lieved citizens needed to be aware of the events that affected their lives 
in order to safeguard themselves against the tendency of government 
to overstep its authority. He considered newspapers a necessary auxil­
iary to ensure the well-being of the political process.25 
Jefferson contended that if Americans were aware of what was go­
ing on, government need play only a small role in citizens' lives. He 
saw newspapers as the most expeditious means by which such knowl­
edge could be delivered to the people. Shortly before his death in 
1826, Jefferson wrote, "The press is the best instrument for enlighten­
ing the mind of man, and improving him as a rational, moral, and so­
cial being." Believing that the same tyranny that had characterized 
Europe could also arise in America, Jefferson said an informed citi­
zenry provided the only means for ensuring that despotism did not 
also eventually ravage the United States. Jefferson had relied on the 
philosophy of John Milton in formulating his position on the role of 
newspapers. Jefferson wrote that even if errors appeared in newspa­
pers or other forms of open public discussion, they served the purpose 
of keeping government representatives aware of the public's wishes. 
He added, "To punish these errors too severely would. .  . suppress the 
only safeguard of public liberty." In 1787, in one of his most famous 
statements, he wrote, "Were it left to me to decide whether we should 
have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without gov­
ernment, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter."26 
But Jefferson has also been described by Frank Mott as "the lead­
ing example in our political history of that uncomfortable phenom-
enon—the 'practical idealist.'"27 This perspective could lead to a life 
of upheavals. Just as Jefferson fought in the eighteenth century to per­
petuate free-speech ideals, so did Medary in the nineteenth century. In 
1838, as political skirmishing became increasingly intense between 
the Whigs and the Democrats, a Washington-based Whig newspaper, 
the National Intelligencer, sought by attacking Jefferson's political 
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record to undermine the tenets on which the Democratic Party based 
its credibility. Coming to his defense, Medary responded that the 
former president's standing in history was "as safe as the 'fixed star 
from . .  . earth's noxious exaltations [sic].9 "28 
Throughout his life, Medary cited Jackson as his guide in political 
matters, but it was Jefferson he consistently returned to for journalis­
tic inspiration. Jefferson could have been dictating the words when 
Medary, early in his newspaper career, wrote of the importance of 
newspapers in a democracy: "Every individual should be acquainted 
. .  . with the affairs of our own nation." To keep Americans up to date, 
"Our NEWSPAPER EDITORS are ever ready to inform us of the passing 
events, as far as the nature of their works and the public patronage 
extend."29 
Nevertheless, Jackson played the more significant role in helping 
launch Medary's journalistic career as well as in making the press 
more vital in the American political process. His election signaled the 
beginning of the modern political system in this country. Old Hickory 
used newspapers to make the new approach to politics possible. By 
strategically planting political items in small country newspapers, 
Jackson was better able to influence prospective constituents. During 
his campaign his managers collected and circulated positive Demo­
cratic material in a way that made it appear to be nonpartisan report­
ing. This tactic obtained wider circulation of news items, giving the 
impression that Jackson's political strength was growing swiftly.30 
Medary willingly, if perhaps naively, aided Jackson's strategy—and 
benefited from it as well. 
Although Medary continued to edit the Sun for eight years, he be­
came increasingly involved in state and national politics. During his 
successful campaign for the presidency, Jackson recognized that the 
Ohioan was one of his most reliable and able supporters. The biggest 
issue during Jackson's first term concerned renewal of the charter for 
the Second National Bank of the United States. As a Jackson confi­
dant, Medary dined with the president at the White House and sup­
ported Jackson's views on banking. For his part, Jackson acknowl­
edged that he had based an important feature of his 1832 banking 
veto message on an editorial Medary had written.31 In the statement, 
the president adopted Medary's sentiments when he "paid respects to 
the farmers and mechanics, and laborers who were seeking protection 
against governmental injustices." He continued in the same vein when 
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he said, "Government should provide equal protection for both high 
and low, rich and poor."32 
Two years later, on the coattails of his association with Jackson 
and with the support of the local Democratic Party (headed by 
Morris), Medary began making a name for himself statewide. 
Clermont County supporters sent him to Columbus as their state rep­
resentative in 1834, and in 1836 they elected him to the Ohio Senate. 
At the same time, Medary was strengthening his journalistic creden­
tials. In 1834 he began publishing a bimonthly agricultural magazine, 
the Ohio Farmer and Western Horticulturist?3 For the public and 
very Democratic Medary, the person who made his living from the 
soil deserved society's admiration. In the Ohio Farmer he wrote that 
his readers should esteem the "intelligent, independent, and happy 
farmer, who owned his land, [and] who was free from debt."34 
Medary's new venture was not an economic success, however. Its 
purpose was to enlighten Ohio's farmers about new agricultural 
methods and to provide them with information that would help them 
be financially successful. In hopes of making the magazine more vi­
able, Medary relocated his office and family (which now included six 
children) from Batavia to Columbus in 1835. In March of that year 
he noted, "Issuing our paper hereafter from the centre of the state . .  . 
we hope to receive additional aid, not only in correspondents to our 
columns, but in patronage also."35 Medary's wife was pleased with 
the move because her husband was spending more and more time 
in Columbus as a member of the General Assembly. But in 1836 
Medary ceased publishing the Ohio Farmer because he could not 
make it pay. 
Later that same year Medary's brother Jacob Medary Jr., who also 
had moved to Ohio from Pennsylvania, gave his brother an even 
greater opportunity to make a journalistic mark in the state. Jacob 
bought the Columbus-based Ohio Monitor and consolidated it with 
the Columbus Hemisphere. The Monitor, which had operated in Co­
lumbus as a Democratic organ since 1816, became the Western Hemi­
sphere under the ownership of the Medary brothers. Samuel's 
legislative connections and the acquisition of the most influential 
Democratic journal in Columbus helped thrust him into a leadership 
role in the Ohio Democratic Party. 
Columbus, which had been the state capital for only twenty years, 
was growing. Because of their proximity to water transport, Cincin­
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nati, with 30,000 people, and Cleveland, with 15,000, were already 
more developed cities. In the capital, however, the population barely 
exceeded 5,000, and public buildings associated with the city's focus, 
such as the statehouse, the state office building, and the penitentiary, 
had only recently been built. Aiding Columbus's growth was its loca­
tion on the National Pike, the only east-west route from Baltimore to 
the West. One traveler on the road observed that the capital city was 
"kept in a state of constant and lively animation by endless trains of 
wagons, horses and horsemen."36 
Within a year of his arrival in Columbus, Samuel exchanged his in­
terest in the Ohio Sun for Jacob's share of the Hemisphere. The 
Hemisphere's new sole owner changed the name of the paper to the 
Ohio Statesman. Medary published the new four-page newspaper 
semiweekly, except when the legislature was in session; during those 
weeks the Statesman became a daily. Initially it was filled primarily 
with party announcements, advertising, and accounts of legislative 
proceedings, but as time passed Medary began to add personal com­
mentaries. His aggressive style soon helped the paper become not only 
the most influential party publication in Ohio but the leading Demo­
cratic paper in the Middle West.37 The front page carried the slogan 
"The People—That First and Last, and Best and Noblest, as well as 
Safest Security of a Virtuous Government." 
Medary may have been a novice in his understanding of the politi­
cal process, but he quickly adapted to the notoriety and rewards that 
came from his new occupation. Recent historians have observed that, 
in reality, "Jacksonian Democracy gave power not to Tom, Dick, and 
Harry but to the shrewd, ambitious, wealthy, and able politicians." 
Medary did not merit all these adjectives, but he quickly learned that 
he could influence others through his publications and make a re­
spectable living courtesy of his political involvement. According to 
Edward Pessen, contrary to the Jacksonian party line, this was not the 
age of common but of uncommon men, who "controlled the major 
parties at every level."38 Although not so democratic as Jacksonian 
politics wished to appear, the new political structure increased politi­
cal participation to a level previously unknown in America. As a 
nonelite Westerner without established family or political ties, 
Medary made a great leap in influence during this period. 
During the Jacksonian era the president utilized the so-called 
spoils, or patronage, system to the point that it became standard 
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government practice. Instead of employing experienced civil servants, 
Jackson rewarded those who had helped him secure the presidency 
with national or state appointments. Patronage had certainly existed 
previously, but Jackson for the first time publicly and unabashedly 
supported it. Because the rewards were great, competition for jobs 
was intense. Medary both prospered and suffered from his participa­
tion in the patronage system. 
As a reward for his able party participation, Medary in 1837 be­
gan a ten-year term as Ohio's supervisor of public printing, while con­
tinuing as publisher of the Statesman. The Jacksonian friends Medary 
made while in the legislature facilitated his dual role. The combina­
tion of responsibilities put Medary in an enviable position, as he 
gained an intimate knowledge of politics in Ohio and in the nation. As 
state printer he had the authority to allocate high-paying state con­
tracts to other printers. That Ohio's Democratic Party leaders, not to 
mention the president, had come to look on Medary favorably started 
paying off for him. His status guaranteed him a prominent position in 
the party. Over the next decade he became the best known antebellum 
Ohio Democrat.39 Mott notes that Medary, as editor of the States­
man, became "almost a party dictator in Ohio."40 
Medary's privileged position was not uncommon for political pub­
lishers under Jackson. His state printing contracts meant that he was 
regularly paid for the publication of state legislative proceedings, 
laws, and post office documents. These jobs constituted a substantial 
source of income, and between his ownership of the Statesman and 
the printing contracts, Medary became both more influential and 
more prosperous. Because newspapers in this era were the only wide­
spread form of mass communication, he earned himself membership 
in the Democratic Party elite. An editor in this era was "lord and mas­
ter of a considerable group of loyal disciples."41 
Outside Washington, parties depended on editors to keep the po­
litical machines running smoothly. As a result, the Statesman and 
other party papers were blatantly partisan. To be otherwise would 
have meant loss of party support in the legislature and of future print­
ing contracts. The public was accustomed to the arrangement, and 
they looked to their party's organ for the preferred slant on party af­
fairs and all matters of public concern. Newspapers kept the continu­
ally shifting factions within the party together. This was especially 
 27 "The People Must Be Heard"
true of the popular Statesman, which had a considerable readership 
and influenced patronage decisions around the state.42 
According to Gienapp, political leaders were learning quickly that 
control of public opinion through newspapers—the only major means 
of communication—allowed them to "articulate issues, structure par­
tisan debate, and screen information." The publisher of the Toledo 
Blade wrote that the political press went beyond simply supplying the 
nation with information. Newspapers determined people's opinions 
as well. The Blade commentary concluded that a partisan newspaper 
"furnishes not only the materials upon which our conclusions are 
founded, but supplies the conclusions themselves, cut and dried, 
coined, stamped and polished. I t . .  . decides for us."43 
Between 1830 and 1860, an editor's dual position as party propa­
gandist and party leader allowed him to coordinate not only informa­
tion but party policy making as well. Because state lawmakers did not 
make much money, few served more than one or two terms. Medary 
was the one who provided continuity and party leadership for Ohio 
Democrats with his uninterrupted presence in Columbus. The jour­
nalism historian Gerald Baldasty says the state editor's intermediary 
position permitted him to function "as a reliable spokesman for the 
local, state and national divisions of the party. Indeed, the party faith­
ful demanded that newspapers serve such a role." Medary's influence 
was crucial because "newspapers were really the sole practical me­
dium for interstate and even intrastate exchange [of information] on a 
large scale."44 It followed, therefore, that publishers were the vital link 
in making this period politically vibrant. 
Ohio during the 1830s was the scene of bitter partisan infighting. 
Each party's organization played an important intermediary role in 
interpreting national policy. Otherwise isolated Ohioans looked to 
state party leaders to explain the national party stance and to recon­
cile local concerns with the national agenda. Beginning in 1832 the 
National Republican Party, soon to be known as the Whig Party, was 
formed as a coalition opposing Jackson's policies. The Whigs' hatred 
of Jackson served—in place of a positive program—to unite them. 
The Whig Party, to which Abraham Lincoln belonged for most of his 
life, decried Jackson's commandeering approach to executive author­
ity. It branded Jackson "a detestable, ignorant, reckless, vain and ma­
lignant tyrant."45 Alarmed by his leveling philosophy, wealthy 
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Southern plantation owners joined politicians like Henry Clay and 
Daniel Webster, who favored an expanded role for both state and fed­
eral government. 
A large number of Northern industrial owners also aligned them­
selves with the Whigs because they favored a tariff on imports to pro­
tect their interests. South Carolina, on the contrary, disputed the 
federal government's authority to dictate such measures to the states. 
This sentiment led to the 1832 Nullification Crisis, in which South 
Carolina called into question the president's authority to impose na­
tional policy (in this case, a protective tariff) on the states. The white 
minority in that state saw the action as a distressing first sign of legis­
lation to terminate slavery. 
Many Ohioans favored a tariff because the federal government 
had earmarked the revenue for internal state improvements, such as 
roadworks. Although Jackson vacillated on the issue, Medary 
staunchly opposed the tariff because of his states'-rights philosophy. 
By the 1840s the Whigs had also proposed a federally controlled 
banking system. They believed it would guarantee a sound national 
currency and a supply of credit adequate to meet the needs of the ex­
panding Middle West and of the East, which was progressing indus­
trially. The party gained additional influential supporters during this 
period, including the editor of the New York Tribune, Horace 
Greeley. 
During the Nullification Crisis Medary established a contradic­
tory pattern that he followed throughout his newspaper career. When 
one of his acknowledged icons (Jackson in this case) drifted from a 
previously stated conviction, Medary did not openly criticize him. 
With his reliance on federal authority over states' rights during the 
Nullification Crisis, Jackson departed from his customary state's-
rights position. But Medary refused to acknowledge that he was 
shocked by the change. He could not believe his state's-rights cham­
pion would propose such federal action. Medary exercised the same 
complaisance when Morris ran for the White House on the Liberty 
ticket; in later years, with party allegiances continually shifting, 
Medary repeatedly hewed to this inconsistent position. Although his 
political friends often found it expeditious to change their minds in 
the face of new realities, Medary suffered from a paralyzing inability 
either to change himself or to criticize his friends' inconsistencies. 
With major urban centers, a large immigrant population, and 
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many residents "sympathetic to the slave South, Ohio was in many 
ways a microcosm of all free states."46 As the state grew, its economy 
boomed. In several years between 1839 and 1849 Ohio ranked either 
first or second in the nation in corn and wheat production.47 The com­
bination of good farmland and the exploding population fed this 
growth. But while agricultural output flourished, surpluses drove 
down prices, and new markets were needed. The Ohio-Erie Canal 
provided the outlets that Ohio farmers needed. New York, Philadel­
phia, Boston, and Baltimore, as well as New Orleans, opened up new 
options for Ohio farmers and dairy producers. Henry Hubbart esti­
mates that in 1845 at least half the inhabitants of the Middle West 
(more than two million) depended on Southern routes to market their 
produce. He refers to this time as "the Golden Age of Ohio-Missis-
sippi River trade and steamboating."48 The new trade avenues rapidly 
changed Ohio's economy. From being an isolated, self-sustaining eco­
nomic region, it became a state that increasingly depended on market 
decisions made in distant places, such as New York or the South.49 
Growth also brought financial problems for Ohioans, however. 
Land speculation, inflation, increased state debt, and widespread dis­
tribution of shinplasters (counterfeit money circulated by illegitimate 
banks) occurred at the same time as an Eastern depression that began 
in 1837. Ohio's debt resulted from the state's financing of the canal 
system. But because of bank failures and counterfeiting, the public 
also lost faith in paper money. Businesses went bankrupt and banks 
foreclosed mortgages. Employers reduced workers' wages; some la­
borers lost their jobs. Farm families survived by eating only what they 
could raise themselves. Many in Ohio felt that the new financial and 
political order had betrayed them. 
The Democrats and Whigs in the state apportioned blame for the 
collapse strictly along party lines. Whigs favored continuing state 
banks and blamed Jackson's veto of the national bank for the eco­
nomic panic. Democrats hastened a decline in their influence by dis­
agreeing among themselves about banking. Consistent with his 
support of Jackson on the national bank, Medary and many other 
Democrats opposed the establishment of state banks. As a "Hard 
Money" advocate, he distrusted banks and blamed them for the diffi­
cult times. Hard Money Democrats regarded the accumulation of 
great sums of money in banks as the greatest threat to America since 
George III. They argued that "banks have been the known enemies of 
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our republican government from the beginning."50 In the Statesman 
Medary editorialized, "A farmer should shun the doors of a bank as 
he would the approach of the plague."51 The "Soft Money" Demo­
crats, however, favored a state banking system. The party remained 
split over this issue throughout the 1840s. 
Between 1830 and 1860 partisan politics occupied a much more 
important position in American society than it does today. By the 
1840s, both parties were using banners, badges, and mass rallies to 
market their candidates to the public.52 For the average citizen, the po­
litical party he supported represented his deepest personal values and 
expectations. People clung tenaciously to party doctrine "for ideo­
logical, social and symbolic reasons." Voters generally construed real­
ity in partisan terms. They followed their party's instructions in each 
election regardless of the merit of other courses of action and of other 
politicians. Voter turnout had never been higher.53 
During this era the Whig and Democratic organizations served as 
the transmitters and controllers of the struggle for political power in 
the United States. Although individual factions within these parties 
did not always agree on all issues, there were some consistent trends. 
Democrats called themselves the "let-alone party," and they labeled 
Whigs the "meddling party." True to their Jeffersonian roots, Demo­
crats believed in a laissez-faire government that was "light and 
simple." They also depicted the difference between the two parties as 
one of class choice. Democrats stated that they were the defenders of 
the common, laboring Middle Westerners and Southerners, while the 
Whigs represented Eastern, aristocratic Americans. For their part, the 
Whigs acknowledged that they thought every man had the right to 
seek his fortune and defend his property. But contrary to Democratic 
judgment, they did not think it was government's job to "protect the 
working man from his employer or the farmer from the merchant."54 
Democrats called the Whigs "Federalists." Whigs controlled the 
Ohio General Assembly during much of this period, largely because 
the Democratic Party had diffused its power by squabbling over bank­
ing. As a result, the Democrats were able to charge Whigs with re­
sponsibility for the state's economic difficulties. The Democrats 
insisted that a few wealthy, powerful men controlled the Whig Party 
and that they cared little about the plight of the laboring classes. 
Medary was a leader in this campaign of name-calling and accusation. 
In the Statesman he labeled the late 1830s "a dark hour of the democ­
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racy." He claimed that "the combined power of the banks and feder­
alism was publicly and insolently bidding defiance to the laws of the 
country." According to him, the only way to overcome these develop­
ments was for "[Martin] Van Buren . . . and the Pure Democratic 
Principles of a Jefferson and a. Jackson... [to] be our War Cry."55 
Jackson's presidency had been a watershed period for the populist 
views of the Democrats. For them, his 1832 reelection had repre­
sented a vindication of their vision for America. That election was the 
first in American history in which national conventions—instead of 
state legislatures or caucuses—chose presidential candidates. In line 
with this development, the Democrats favored a shift in the estab­
lished selection procedure for state judges and governors from state 
legislatures to popular vote. The Whigs opposed this, however, and 
the change did not occur for several years. This point of view also rep­
resented the Whig stance on the question of suffrage. Although the 
Whigs favored extending voting privileges, they hedged on allowing 
everyone to vote on all political offices. They based this view on their 
distrust of "the city rabble, the backwoodsmen, and the illiterates in 
general."56 On the other hand, the Democrats felt that all men, except 
those with black skin, should be allowed to decide who won political 
office. Because Jackson's followers ardently opposed the extension of 
suffrage to blacks, the Whigs, even if somewhat less than enthusiasti­
cally, supported it. 
Slavery persisted as the United States expanded geographically 
and political parties matured during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. It was the great contradiction in a country that supposedly 
prided itself on adherence to the doctrine of life, liberty, and the pur­
suit of property for everyone. During the first three decades of the new 
century politicians attempted to eradicate slavery from party debate, 
but as the country expanded westward the issue only intensified. With 
the acquisition of each new territory, the question of whether the re­
gion would allow slavery threatened its admission into the United 
States. The problem worsened during the 1830s because of the states' 
sovereignty issue (nullification) and the beginning of a religiously in­
spired reform movement. 
During the 1830s a perfectionist revival spread across the country. 
Reformers sought to eradicate several "sins" from America, including 
the sale of liquor, "frivolous" activities on Sundays (e.g., mail deliv­
ery), and inadequate treatment of the poor, the insane, and the blind. 
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Leaders of the movement opposed war as a means of settling disputes 
and deplored the continuation of slavery. Journalists took the lead in 
the heated debate. William Lloyd Garrison heightened the issue of 
slavery in the public's consciousness in 1831 when he began publish­
ing the Liberator in Boston. The antislavery paper signaled the begin­
ning of a passionate era of abolitionist sentiment.57 Other newspapers 
followed suit, and the abolitionist press began to play a major role in 
arousing public indignation about slavery. 
Because of their sentiments concerning individual and states' 
rights, and the abolitionists' alignment with the Whig Party (and later 
the Republican Party), Democrats opposed the antislavery movement. 
Once the parties had established their positions on slavery in the 
1830s, they consistently upheld them for the next three decades. The 
argument over slavery not only dictated parties' political positions but 
determined each state's loyalties during the Civil War. Abolition pro­
gressively broadened the chasm that split the country, not only be­
tween North and South but within states and political parties. 
Throughout this era, however, abolition was not merely a ques­
tion of whether one supported or opposed slavery.58 Medary, whose 
perspective was typical of the Democratic conviction, saw abolition as 
a constitutional question. He did not think the North, as represented 
by the federal government against the South, had the authority to im­
pose abolition on slave states or territories. And though many dis­
agreed with him and opposed slavery's continuation, most Ohioans 
shared his opinion that, free or slave, blacks were not the equal of 
whites. This view was typical of Northerners; in Ohio it was charac­
teristic of sentiments expressed since the state's earliest days. 
Although slavery had never been legal in Ohio, state legislators 
passed a series of Black Laws before 1810. Many of them remained in 
force until after the Civil War. They required that blacks provide docu­
mentation of their freedom plus $500 to prove they could support 
themselves before they could settle in the state. The laws denied them 
other rights that whites held, including suffrage, militia service, and 
jury duty. In 1827 the Ohio State Journal (later a Whig/Republican pa­
per) summed up the sentiments of most Ohioans when it observed, 
"Negroes . .  . [are] an idle, intemperate and dissolute race... . We will 
never consent to see the two races placed on an equal footing."59 
As the years progressed, however, blacks slowly gained more 
nearly equal rights. In 1842 an Ohio Supreme Court decision allowed 
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mulatto men to vote, and in 1849, when Free Soilers achieved the up­
per hand in the legislature, additional Black Laws were repealed. 
These moves represented aspects of the abolitionist struggle in Ohio 
during these years. Perhaps the most obvious, though supposedly hid­
den, manifestation of Ohio's involvement in the cause was the Under­
ground Railroad. There is evidence that it was operating in Ohio as 
early as 1815. 
Levi Coffin, perhaps the best known "conductor" on the railroad, 
was a Cincinnati Quaker who claimed to have moved hundreds of 
blacks along the rails. Eventually, more stations on the railroad ex­
isted in Ohio than in any other state, and the Buckeye State came to be 
known as the "trunk line" of the passage north to Canada. Many 
Presbyterians, Methodists, and Congregationalists were involved in 
these activities. A Presbyterian minister, the Reverend John Rankin, 
kept a lantern shining in the window of his house in Ripley, on the 
Ohio River, as a beacon for slaves escaping across the river. Rankin 
was called the "unofficial president of the underground railroad." 
Nearly every Ohio town boasted at least one house where fugitive 
slaves stayed before moving each night. 
During these years the antislavery campaign gained many notable 
converts. Among them was a Cincinnati attorney, Salmon Chase, who 
would go on to become Ohio's governor, a member of Lincoln's cabi­
net, and a Supreme Court justice. Beginning in the late 1830s, he de­
fended fugitive slaves against court-imposed attempts to return them 
to the South. Chase argued that despite the fact that slavery was legal 
in some states, "The federal government must divorce itself entirely 
from any responsibility to defend and protect the institution."60 
Nonetheless, in 1850 the federal Fugitive Slave Act aroused Ohio 
abolitionists to a new level of wrath when it made interference with 
the capture and return of fugitive slaves to the South a federal offense. 
In 1852 Harriet Beecher Stowe, whose father was the Reverend 
Lyman Beecher, head of the Lane Seminary in Cincinnati, published 
Uncle Tom's Cabin. The book was cited as converting more people to 
the antislavery crusade "than all the earnest preachers and lectures 
combined." After the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act, Oberlin and 
Western Reserve Colleges became hotbeds of abolitionist activity. 
Public fights between antislavery groups and their opponents became 
commonplace during public rallies.61 
For the most part, Medary remained unwavering in his opposition 
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to abolition agitation. He continued to maintain that slavery was not 
a moral issue. Consistent with the opinions about blacks that he had 
formed years earlier, he did not devote a great deal of space in the 
Statesman to the controversy and became agitated when Whigs used it 
for propaganda purposes. Prominent by its absence from his writings 
was acknowledgment of the existence of the Underground Railroad, 
although all Ohioans were aware of it. There was little he could do to 
alter the movement that was overrunning Ohio, but he remained vo­
ciferous in his opposition to the violence it caused. He blamed abo­
litionists for inciting the public to lawbreaking and maintained that 
the Constitution allowed slavery in those states that chose to practice 
it. The involvement of clergy especially infuriated him because he be­
lieved they should not involve themselves in political matters. He said 
Ohioans had no business sticking their noses where they didn't belong 
because they were only encouraging sectional animosities. After 1850 
continuing abolitionist activities in Ohio heightened slaveholding 
states' distrust of the North and drove a deeper wedge between the 
two sections of the country. 
As the controversy grew more intense, Medary wrote that the "ab­
stract question" of abolition should be a matter of discussion for 
"philanthropic societies," not political parties. In pragmatic, eco­
nomic terms, he opposed the relaxation of Black Laws in Ohio. He 
wrote that "turning the whole slave population of the South loose 
upon us would bring total destruction to the free white laborers and 
reputable mechanics." In the same article, he prophetically noted that 
the slavery issue "is likely to swallow up everything else in the party 
squabble of the future."62 
The impassioned activities of both abolitionists and antiaboli­
tionists appalled Medary. But contrary to his later Civil War pleas for 
his own press freedom, he remained silent on the First Amendment 
rights of abolitionist journalists. Always the politician first and fore­
most, his partisanship prevented him from challenging the abridg­
ment of abolitionist editors' rights, despite the fact that between 1835 
and 1845 antiabolitionists used force to silence many abolitionists 
and almost hanged Garrison when they led him through the streets of 
Boston with a rope around his neck. Two years later they did kill abo­
litionist editor Elijah Lovejoy in Alton, Illinois, after he ignored re­
peated warnings from foes. Despite their differing convictions, 
Lovejoy's murder horrified Medary. Medary vehemently opposed 
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senseless violence and killing. He maintained that discussion was the 
only way to bring opponents to solve problems. In the November 18, 
1837, issue of the Statesman, he wrote, "We have delayed our paper 
for the purpose of inserting the following statement of the tragical 
occurrence that took place [in Illinois]." He reprinted a letter written 
by Alton mayor John Krum that detailed Love joy's murder. Medary 
did not as a rule print stories that dealt with antiabolitionist activities, 
but he did oppose retribution throughout his life. He did not com­
ment further on the incident, other than to write, "This statement 
[Krum's] precludes all remarks from us, except as to the correctness of 
the statement."63 
Another reason for Medary's opposition to abolition was his faith­
ful support for Jackson. During the 1830s Jackson's and Van Buren's 
postmasters allowed Southerners to rifle through the mail and burn 
abolitionist literature. Jackson, a longtime slave owner and trader 
himself, did not question the institution of slavery. As early as 
Jackson's first inaugural speech, he made it clear that his egalitarian 
sentiments were limited to white men. In his first message he failed to 
include blacks, women, and Indians as beneficiaries of the new demo­
cratic age.64 
Jackson said that abolitionist material was "wicked and unconsti­
tutional," and he demanded that Congress pass a law to stop its circu­
lation. When its members did not do so, the president's postmaster, 
Amos Kendall, authorized Southern postmasters to burn abolitionist 
materials they found in the mail, "so Southern eyes were spared the 
painful sight of printed antislavery material."65 In 1836 Congress 
passed a gag rule, which continued in force until 1844, to stop the 
large number of petitions abolitionists were sending to the House of 
Representatives.66 Medary did not editorialize against these infrac­
tions of the First Amendment. During his years of publishing the 
Statesman, he did not write a single column about freedom of the 
press. His opposition to abolition, his support of the official Demo­
cratic stance, and his own ability to publish freely made him feel no 
need to comment on the right of journalists to dissent. Only when 
such restrictions touched him personally during the Civil War did he 
refer to the First Amendment to defend his practice. 
As Jackson left office, the president's departing remarks, in which 
he recalled democratic idealism, no doubt encouraged Medary to con­
tinue in his chosen profession. "Eternal vigilance by the people is the 
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price of liberty," Jackson warned, "for providence has . .  . chosen you 
as the guardians of freedom, to preserve it for the benefit of the hu­
man race." Medary increasingly featured himself as a public guardian 
with a platform from which he could help keep his readers attentive.67 
As the 1830s came to a close, Whigs began defending themselves 
against the Democrats' egalitarian posturing by declaring that, ac­
cording to the Whig definition, "all men were laborers." Senator 
Daniel Webster, an ardent Whig spokesman, "accused the Democrats 
of seeking to 'inflame the poor against the rich.'" In opposition to 
Democratic statements that less government was better, the Whigs 
maintained that their plan for equality centered on improved educa­
tion for all and on more—not less—"benign" state and federal legisla-
tion.68 Ohio Whigs countered Democrats during the 1840 presidential 
campaign by embracing for their own purposes the traditional Demo­
cratic rhetoric of the common man. 
The Whigs depicted their Ohio candidate, William "Old Tippe­
canoe" Henry Harrison, as a "log cabin and hard cider" president. 
They called him a man of the people. The Whigs branded the Demo­
cratic incumbent Martin "Van Ruin."69 This modified Whig offensive 
infuriated Medary. In a hostile editorial he charged that "such a sys­
tematic scheme of falsehood, from the highest to the lowest Federal in 
the state was never before witnessed."70 Like abolitionist publishers, 
however, Medary soon became aware of how seriously some oppo­
nents took his sentiments. 
During the race Columbus Whigs asked John Bear of Zanesville, 
Ohio, to rebut publicly Medary's repeated and widely circulated at­
tacks on Whig candidates. At a downtown Columbus rally support­
ing Harrison's candidacy, the "Buckeye Blacksmith," as the Whigs 
called Bear, spoke to the crowd in a downpour. Appearing in 
blacksmith's garb, with his face smudged as if he had just come from 
his forge, Bear carried a set of tongs to the platform. Laying a copy of 
the Statesman on the stage in front of him, Bear told the crowd he had 
dressed in such an outfit because he "had a very dirty job to do." He 
picked up the paper with the tongs and read a short section, which he 
labeled a "pack of lies." He then dropped the paper to the platform 
and wiped his boots on it. He concluded by calling for a basin of soap 
and water and washed the tongs in it. Bear's dramatic display brought 
thunderous applause from the crowd.71 
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But all criticism of Medary was not so harmless. His friends 
warned him that the campaign was becoming too caustic and he 
should be careful of the fervor of his sentiments. But the warning did 
not stop him, and one evening as he left the Statesman's office a group 
of militant Whigs attacked him. Medary was not badly injured, and 
the incident succeeded only in motivating him to work harder to dis­
credit the Whigs. Taking up the fight again soon after the incident, he 
said such political shenanigans threatened not only him but all Ohio­
ans. He rhetorically asked his readers, "Will you take warning from 
the dangers that surround you?. .  . BRIBERY, MONEY, and false . .  . doc­
trines are to deceive you and sack the citadel of your liberties."72 But 
his efforts on behalf of the Democratic party were unsuccessful. 
Harrison won the presidency; the Whigs carried the Ohio legislature 
as well. The Jacksonian-Democratic coalition declined in influence. 
For Medary, 1840 was a difficult year. With the Whigs in control 
of the legislature, further retribution was forthcoming. The General 
Assembly appointed a special senate committee to investigate his state 
printing position. Labeling him "Sam the Seizer," the Whigs wanted 
to find out why he had made so much more money than the previous 
state printer. In addition, they charged that Medary had used too 
much paper from each ream he had bought for the state for personal 
use at the Statesman. 
Despite their dislike for Medary, the Whig committee members 
found him not guilty. On the issue of paper usage, they found that 
Medary's appropriation of the outside quires of reams of paper had 
been a common practice of state printers for many years. They also 
discovered that state printers had habitually used a particular portion 
of each ream for incidental purposes around their shops. They had 
done this because the paper was not "suitable for public printing, nor 
for any other printing of an ordinary character." Concerning 
Medary's remuneration, the committee found that the state had paid 
him more because he had provided more services than the previous 
printer. In fact, instead of giving him too much money, Ohio had 
probably underpaid him for his work.73 
The preelection violence against Medary and the subsequent Whig 
investigation of his patronage benefits were only the first in a long 
series of public confrontations. His heightened visibility, his individu­
alistic editorial style, and his political influence had made Medary 
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more influential and bolder.74 But his prominence also made him a 
target. By his reaction to the two 1840 incidents, however, Medary 
demonstrated that political opponents would not easily dissuade him 
from his mission. He saw it as his responsibility not only to report on 
but to attempt to influence the issues of the day. He was certain his 
point of view on all the issues facing the nation was the right one. In 
the years to come, he continued to act on this belief. 
"When Freedom Is Permitted to . . . Violate 
Laws and Constitutions . . . It Becomes a 
Curse Rather Than a Blessing" 
During the 1840s and 1850s Samuel Medary increasingly found him­
self battling not only opposition party members but elements within 
the Democratic Party as well. One incident illustrates the sometimes 
ridiculous extremes party infighting could reach. It involved a contro­
versy about who should receive credit for originating the popular slo­
gan "Fifty-Four Forty or Fight." The saying became a rallying cry for 
Americans during the boundary dispute between the United States 
and England over the Oregon territory. 
Some of Medary's colleagues claimed that "Fifty-Four Forty or 
Fight" were his words, which was believable because of his commen­
taries in the Ohio Statesman. But others, such as U.S. Senator William 
"Fog Horn" Allen of Chillicothe, also claimed to have originated the 
phrase. Allen, a bombastic orator and the publisher of the Chillicothe 
Advertiser, fervently advocated the United States' annexation of Or­
egon. Herman Melville once wrote of Allen that in the halls of Con­
gress he was notable for "roaring like a wild beast." Allen was a 
"fanatic on the subject of fifty four," and, as a senator, occupied an 
even more influential forum than Medary. Medary, on the other 
hand, was more capable than Allen of grasping the essence of a con­
troversy and summarizing it in print. There is no conclusive evidence, 
however, that either man, or any of the others who claimed credit, 
single-handedly originated the phrase. It is more likely that it became 
popular through common usage.1 
Allen and Medary did not confront each other about which should 
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receive credit for the slogan, although both men's supporters argued 
long and hard in an attempt to prove that one or the other was the 
originator of "Fifty-Four Forty or Fight." But the protracted debate, 
silly as it might seem, symbolized more than who should receive credit 
for a slogan; it signified the beginning of a new era in Ohio politics 
during the 1840s. Medary and Allen became associated with two 
estranged factions within the Democratic Party. Neither man be­
trayed his Jacksonian ideals, but their increasingly antagonistic stands 
on sensitive issues drove a wedge between them. Eventually the 
Democrats' inability to reach consensus served as an added impetus 
for the Civil War. If the two factions had worked together, they might 
have been better able to prevent the violence that erupted around the 
country.2 
Because of his participation in both politics and journalism, be­
tween 1840 and 1860 Medary was involved in perhaps the most ac­
tive political period in U.S. history. The two decades witnessed the 
testing of the values he had claimed from his early years. In some cases 
political infighting and an evolving society led him astray from his 
standards and made him lose faith in his vision. As the country headed 
toward civil war, he was by no means alone in his reaction to events. 
He filtered his choices through a Democratic sieve, so they were not 
always popular. At times, his opinion reflected personal aspirations or 
allegiances; this was typical of the era. The world of the 1840s and 
1850s was a mix of the old and the new. It was changing quickly, but 
painfully. The events Medary participated in and the decisions he 
made foreshadowed the stance he took between 1861 and 1864. Al­
though he found compromise repulsive, during this period he used it 
to attain personal goals and realize political aspirations.3 
Consistent with his Jacksonian beliefs, Medary was a strong pro­
ponent of the American expansionist doctrine of Manifest Destiny. 
He had used the phrase in 1834 in the Ohio Farmer and Western Hor­
ticulturist. We do not know who coined the term, but Medary em­
ployed it in his writing before many other publishers. He promoted 
land acquisition wherever possible, regardless of the cost, and his 
stand on Oregon was consistent with his philosophy. In 1843 he 
called Canada a "pest" and helped convene an organization that ad­
vocated annexation of Oregon. In July of that year he was the prime 
mover behind a bipartisan (although Democratically controlled) con­
vention. Representatives from six Mississippi Valley states met in Cin­
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cinnati to draft a public statement on the Oregon question. The del­
egates chose Medary as their vice president. They then passed a reso­
lution which said America should not again allow England to 
desecrate North American soil with the "foot of monarchy." During 
the meeting Medary wrote that there was no doubt that Oregon be­
longed to the United States: "Our title is clear and unquestionable."4 
Although many Ohioans were moving west to find rich new farm­
land, Medary and others had another motivation for favoring annex­
ation of Oregon. Many Eastern and Middle Western businessmen 
wanted to acquire the territory as much for commerce as for settle­
ment. They believed that use of Oregon's harbors would stimulate 
U.S. trade with China. Medary probably came closer to agreeing with 
the Whigs on this issue than on any other, but only because his inter­
est in it was economic, not political. Oregon's prospects attracted 
Medary because he had recently begun investing in the fledgling rail­
road industry. In 1845 wealthy New York importer Asa Whitney at­
tempted to interest influential Americans in a plan to connect the 
Middle West with the West Coast by rail. Although the idea captured 
the public's imagination, Whitney was unable to gain support from 
Congress for the scheme.5 
Medary carried his Oregon agenda with him to the Democratic 
National Convention in Baltimore in 1844. As chairman of the Ohio 
delegation, he wanted to see acquisition of the territory made a plank 
in the party platform. Medary also took along a letter from Andrew 
Jackson supporting James Polk for the presidency. Jackson had asked 
Medary to read the letter if the delegates became deadlocked, as Jack­
son expected, over the nomination. Medary and the Ohio delegation 
initially pledged themselves to Martin Van Buren, but it soon became 
apparent that Van Buren's supporters could not marshal the neces­
sary two-thirds majority to nominate him. He hurt his candidacy by 
refusing to take a firm stand on the question of appropriating the 
Texas and Oregon territories. Both Whig candidate Henry Clay and 
Van Buren expected to win their parties' nominations, and they had 
agreed before their parties' conventions not to make annexation a 
campaign issue. In their opinion this seemed the shrewdest maneuver, 
as the acquisition of Texas and Oregon had become entangled with 
the slavery issue. The stance worked for Clay, and the Whigs did not 
take a definitive stand on annexation or slavery in 1844.6 But many 
Democrats could not tolerate the platform's cold caution on either 
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issue. Southern Democrats opposed expansionism because of the new 
free areas it would bring into the Union. Others, including Salmon 
Chase, represented a faction that wanted the party to add opposition 
to the continuation of slavery to its platform. 
Medary was irate that his own state's party was not presenting a 
unified front, especially when some of the defectors were abolitionists. 
In an effort to save Van Buren's candidacy, he attempted to suspend 
the two-thirds vote "manacle," as he called it, that was necessary to 
secure the nomination. He insisted that if the convention would "give 
us a candidate by a bare majority—we will give you a splendid fight."7 
Medary helped head off a move to put forward Michigan party leader 
Lewis Cass as the nominee. He then rose, and in what became known 
as the rowdiest political gathering of the period, read Jackson's letter. 
In it Jackson appealed to the delegates to support Polk and referred to 
him as "young hickory." The letter helped, but in fact Polk won the 
nomination because he supported expansionism. Afterward one del­
egate wrote Van Buren that, because of Medary's role at the conven­
tion, he "is the most firm, true, and energetic man in the whole 
world."8 Medary's early and highly visible support of Van Buren hurt 
his fortunes with the new administration, however, when Polk became 
the first dark horse to win the presidency. 
After the nomination, Medary, always a loyal party man, cam­
paigned for Polk in Ohio, but the majority of Buckeye State voters 
chose Clay. Medary's difficult relationship with Polk exemplified a 
tumultuous period in the Democratic Party. Twenty years after the di­
visive Democratic convention, political observers maintained that the 
infighting of 1844 was the beginning of the "ultimate downfall of the 
Democratic party." A former Democrat and member of Lincoln's 
wartime cabinet, Gideon Welles, said that after Van Buren's defeat, 
"Confidence and united zeal never again prevailed and parties subse­
quently took a sectional or personal character."9 
Medary hoped campaigning for Polk would impress the new ad­
ministration enough to earn him the U.S. postmaster generalship, but 
he was wrong. Although the Democrats were victorious nationally, 
the Whigs had won in Ohio, and state patronage positions, including 
Medary's job as state printer, went to Whig appointees. In his self-
appointed role of Democratic Party leader in Ohio, Medary pointedly 
wrote Polk that "fraud, forgery and the cursed Abolitionists ruined 
us,"10 but Polk was unsympathetic. 
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During this time Medary attempted the impossible task of sooth­
ing the factions within the Ohio Democratic Party. He saw his influ­
ence and notoriety slipping away, and he sought to regain the good 
graces of the new administration. He had publicly denied any interest 
in the federal postmaster's job. He said he wished for nothing "except 
that [which] is for the good of the nation generally." Polk's rebuff, 
however, signaled a downturn in fortunes and a depressing personal 
period for Medary. Several Ohio political allies attempted to help 
him. Nearly every Democratic state senator signed a petition urging 
Polk to appoint Medary, and Allen led an Ohio delegation of 
antibankers in a personal appeal to the president. But Polk would not 
be moved. A few months afterward, in an attempt to pacify Medary's 
followers and rebuild his own support in the Ohio wing of the Demo­
cratic Party, Polk offered Medary the job of Columbus postmaster. 
Medary was too proud to be appeased so easily. Hurt and despon­
dent, he charged, "Polk's administration will be worse than Tyler's." 
Because of the bickering over Medary and the postmaster's position, 
Polk refused to name any Ohioans to posts in his cabinet.11 
Medary became angrier and more melancholy after the incident. 
The whole sorry affair seemed to deflate his idealism. He would con­
tinue to be a public figure, but the belief that his Jeffersonian-style 
nation could be realized by the involvement of the common man in 
a benevolent political system had been badly bruised. For the time 
being he became vindictive and sought to improve only his personal 
position. 
In this mood he became convinced that the Democratic Party and 
the country had suffered a decline in fortunes, and that certain ele­
ments of the party were determined to destroy both his vision and his 
career. In a January 1845 issue of the Statesman, he set out to avenge 
himself on the Ohio Democrats who, he perceived, had turned Polk 
against him during the campaign. Medary deliberately and inaccu­
rately related that, before the election at the Columbus Jackson Day 
dinner, Democrats had offered toasts in support of Cass. He further 
wrote that the Democratic state convention had unanimously sup­
ported Cass. Fellow Ohio Democrat Edwin Stanton went to the 
Statesman to challenge these accounts, but Medary feigned ignorance, 
blaming one of his employees for the errors. Medary was lying, but he 
was able to mollify Stanton with his explanation. Stanton wrote a 
friend soon afterward, "Medary is true, though paralyzed."12 Stanton 
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believed Medary was caught in the middle of a difficult party struggle 
and, in his position as publisher of the state organ, was only trying his 
best to placate both sides. In reality Medary was still trying to work 
his way into favor with Polk. 
A few months later Medary impetuously sold the Ohio Statesman 
to a Soft Money Democrat, C. C. Hazewell of Massachusetts. By this 
time, Medary no longer cared whether his actions would ingratiate 
him with Polk or not. The sale added to the split in the Ohio Demo­
cratic Party, and within a few weeks Hard Money Democrats started 
a newspaper in Columbus called the Ohio Press to publicize their 
views. Medary's opinion of the national leadership declined further in 
1846 when Polk abandoned the fight for the northernmost boundary 
line in the Oregon dispute. The president feared a fight with England 
in the Northwest, so he forsook the Democratic platform and set 
about to secure a compromise, shuffling the responsibility for his deci­
sion off on Congress. In June 1846 the Senate passed a bill accepting 
the forty-ninth parallel as the permanent boundary. Medary and 
other Middle Western Democrats reacted with indignation. A States­
man story, guest written by Medary, ran under a headline that pro­
claimed: "THE FOUL DEED CONSUMMATED—OREGON CEDED AWAY!"13 
Although he had sold the Statesman, Medary had not totally dis­
tanced himself from influencing its tone. His short absence from his 
newspaper duties had made him realize that his fortunes were not go­
ing to improve in the existing political climate. And by giving up his 
journalistic position, he had lost the regular forum he had come to rel­
ish. Plagued by debt and hostile competition from the Press, Hazewell 
succeeded only in bringing financial difficulty and a loss of credibility 
to the Statesman. He was only too happy to sell the paper back to 
Medary on November 10,1846. 
By 1848 Medary had made progress in putting the Statesman back 
on a solid financial footing. He had done this, at least in part, by mod­
erating his own editorial position. Four years of turmoil had taught 
him that although he was a politician, he was a Democratic journalist 
first. He seemed to recognize that he had made some errors in judg­
ment by becoming too personally involved in political squabbling. As 
he returned to his editorship he took a more dispassionate stand. He 
more cautiously attempted to soften the extreme positions taken by 
factions within the Ohio Democratic Party. Because of his previous 
shifts on issues, some in the party felt he had betrayed his fundamental 
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allegiance, but many Democrats had made similar accommodations. 
Medary, who through his opinions had aligned himself with a group 
known as the Radical Miami Democrats, tempered his rhetoric on 
banking. In response, one Hard Money man charged that "all things 
are not right at the Statesman. . . . They are not as they used to was 
[sic]."14 
As an intermediary between the new Free Soil Party and old-line 
Democratic Party members in Ohio Medary was in a no-win situa­
tion. Antiexpansionist Whigs and Democrats who wanted to bar slav­
ery from new territories and states had formed the Free Soil Party. 
Traditional Democrats opposed such nationalistic fervor on what 
they viewed as a purely sectional question. Old-line party members, 
led by William Allen, called themselves the Conservative Scioto 
Democrats. In an attempt to preserve his ties with both groups, 
Medary said each new territory and state should be allowed to make 
its own decision about slavery. He also maintained his position that 
existing states should not be forced by the federal government to abol­
ish slavery. His attempts at arbitration were singularly unsuccessful, 
and he only alienated more party members, including his former con­
federate Allen. 
Ohio's Democratic leader, Ben Tappan, was an ally of Allen's. 
Medary's vacillation disturbed Tappan especially, since Medary's po­
sition as editor of the Statesman allowed him to wield important influ­
ence. Tappan told Allen, "Medary and company rule and direct all 
the movements of the Cass party, the state printing and your succes-
sion—not your reelection."15 Democratic governor Wilson Shannon 
wrote Stanton, "Sam Medary has it in his power to make Cass presi­
dent." But Stanton continued to support Medary. He replied that 
though he had doubts about Medary, he was confident of his support. 
He agreed that Medary would be "vastly influential . . . but a truer 
[Van Buren] man never breathed."16 Soon after, however, Medary 
openly switched his support to Cass because he was uncomfortable 
with Van Buren, who had become an antislavery presidential candi­
date on the Free Soil ticket. Also, Medary was comfortable with 
Cass's way of solving territorial slavery issues. Cass and Illinois sena­
tor Stephen Douglas took the stand that the inhabitants of each terri­
tory should be allowed to decide whether their state should enter the 
Union slave or free. They called their position "popular sovereignty"; 
critics called it "squatter sovereignty." 
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Medary's Quaker heritage had little influence on his positions dur­
ing these years. He did not oppose the South's right to keep slaves, nor 
did he dispute the government's authority to engage in a conflict with 
Mexico. He called it a "glorious war" and urged his readers to support 
it with men, money, and supplies. In both cases he went against pre­
vailing sentiment in Ohio. The Ohio congressional delegation and 
much of the state's press opposed involvement in a war with Mexico 
over Texas, but Medary continued in his passion for Manifest Destiny. 
Medary's support of expansionism and his belief that black people 
were not equal to individuals of European heritage indicate that he 
had in yet another way departed from the teachings of the Society of 
Friends. Quaker opposition to slavery dated back to the late eigh­
teenth century. Their antagonism to armed confrontation came from 
the founding doctrine of William Penn.17 Although Medary had in 
many ways rejected the teachings of his youth, he nevertheless made 
use of such religious expressions as "Christian Salvation," "leaders in 
sack-cloth," "manna from heaven," and "vision of a Prophet" 
throughout his writing.18 He did not attempt, however, to justify on 
religious grounds either his opposition to abolition or his support of 
aggressive political activities. 
When Democrats gathered in Baltimore in 1848, slavery contin­
ued to divide the delegates. Medary wanted to remain above the bick­
ering, and he wrote Van Buren that he wished to be excluded from 
party negotiations during the gathering. Medary had visited the presi­
dent more than once at the White House, and they corresponded 
throughout the 1840s. He advised Van Buren that he saw no reason 
to make the Wilmot Proviso (the congressional bill to limit slavery in 
new territories) an issue. Medary insisted that there were "higher, bet­
ter, safer, and less obnoxious grounds to take."19 Years of fighting 
had taught him that the proviso was inevitable—and an acceptable 
compromise. Pursuing the issue, Medary believed, would only detract 
from his journalistic ability and personal reputation. 
The majority of Ohioans agreed with Medary about Wilmot, but 
Van Buren did not. The former president controlled a group of New 
York Democrats called Barnburners, who had bolted from the Demo­
cratic convention. They joined the Free Soil movement and nomi­
nated Van Buren for president during a separate convention in 
Buffalo. Medary feared the schisms that the party would suffer, but he 
could no longer support Van Buren and his antislavery position. To 
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appease Southerners the Democrats nominated Cass, but the Demo­
cratic split handed the 1848 presidential victory to the Southern Whig 
slave owner Zachary Taylor. The 1848 election was the final triumph 
of the Whig Party. Abolitionist radicals, upset over Taylor's election, 
joined with the Free Soil movement and "dealt the Whig organization 
in Ohio a blow from which it never recovered."20 By 1856 the party 
had dissolved. 
During this period of national and personal confrontation and 
confusion, Medary turned his attention to private matters. Between 
1845 and 1851 he joined with other influential Ohio business and po­
litical leaders in promoting railroads. During this six-year period he 
helped incorporate and served as director of four new Ohio railroad 
companies. He managed the operations of the Franklin and Ohio 
River Company, the Columbus and Lake Erie Railroad, and the Cen­
tral Ohio Railroad Company. He also helped found the Columbus 
and Xenia Railroad, which in 1850 introduced train travel to Colum-
bus.21 With the growth of the rail industry, use of canals decreased. At 
the beginning of the Civil War more miles of track had been laid in 
Ohio than in any other state.22 Medary also was a charter investor in 
Columbus's first utility firm, the Columbus Gas Light and Coke Com­
pany. On the national level he helped Samuel Morse financially in de­
velopment of the telegraph. But throughout the 1840s and 1850s 
Medary also turned his attention to the nonprofit sector. He helped 
form the state agricultural board and served as its first secretary, later 
becoming the first treasurer and president of the Ohio State Fair. In 
addition, the Ohio General Assembly named him to help design and 
direct the construction of a new state capitol building.23 These activi­
ties helped take his mind off dissatisfying and disheartening political 
matters. 
But Medary was unable to divorce himself completely from poli­
tics. In the late 1840s he became enthusiastic about the revolutionary 
movement sweeping across Europe. He would have liked to see simi­
lar developments in Ohio, refusing to give up his dream of a society 
that could rise above its problems. In May 1849 he wrote, "There is a 
progressing, reforming radical spirit spreading over the civilized 
world, and let Ohio not be the last to partake of the regenerating 
spirit."24 In the pages of the Statesman he endorsed the leaders of 
the French Revolution of 1848, and in 1852 he supported the Cuban 
revolt. Consistent with his Jeffersonian ideals, he also lobbied the 
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legislature for a free public school system in the state. He built a large 
house on a sizable lot at 70 North Front Street in Columbus, and his 
family grew to include twelve children.25 
In 1850, during a cholera epidemic in the city, Medary worked 
with Columbus officials to improve sanitation standards. Until this 
time Columbus had had a reputation for being an unhealthy town. 
Livestock, especially pigs, roamed freely through downtown streets, 
and nearby swamp land served as a breeding ground for contagious 
diseases. Delegates had just begun meeting in the city to consider re­
vising the state constitution when the epidemic struck, forcing them to 
move their deliberations to Cincinnati. Medary had wanted the con­
stitution revised for several years, and in 1848 he publicly lobbied for 
a constitutional convention. He and some fellow Democrats who sup­
ported change were labeled members of the radical or "Locofoco" 
faction of the party. They wanted constitutional change to halt what 
they viewed as the Whig Party's encouragement of monopolies.26 A 
lack of state regulation had allowed banks and turnpike, canal, rail­
way, and bridge companies to speculate wildly on new construction. 
The legislature's authorization to disburse public funds for the 
projects fueled much of the speculation. Medary believed the General 
Assembly held too much unrestricted authority. Although he had in­
vested in the expansion of railroads, he decried the use of public funds 
for the practice, as it resulted in a drain on the state treasury and in­
creased taxes. To spread his views Medary again turned to the press. 
In May 1848 he began printing a weekly paper called the New Consti­
tution. In it he indicated that he took his cue from the revolutionary 
spirit that had inspired reformation in other parts of the world. In the 
first issue he wrote that "the time for change is peculiarly a favorable 
one."27 Although he continued to publish the Statesman, the new 
newspaper allowed him to make his crusade look more bipartisan. 
In an early letter to the editor of the New Constitution, a reader 
urged Medary to keep partisanship out of the constitutional revision. 
Medary said he agreed but added, "If men write freely and speak open 
and honest sentiments, and no others are worthy of publication, they 
will of course bear the character of some leading party."28 For nearly 
two years Medary almost single-handedly carried on a statewide pro­
paganda campaign in which he argued for passage of a constitution. 
One observer remarked, "No other man did so much to arouse public 
interest and insure the triumph of the cause."29 
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The original state constitution had been hurriedly and unceremo­
niously drafted in 1802, a year before Ohio had been admitted into 
the Union. Even more important, in Medary's view, the General As­
sembly had never asked the people of the state for their approval. He 
believed that the common man in Ohio was not being well served by 
the existing document. This consideration underscored the slogan 
that adorned the first issue of the New Constitution: "Power is always 
stealing from the Many to the Few."30 Medary insisted that that "gov­
ernment is best which governs least" and added that he wanted to 
make certain that the new document better represented the wishes of 
the state's populace.31 Some traditionalists in Ohio opposed a revi­
sion. In the New Constitution Medary told readers, "The fear of 
breaking in upon established customs, which pervades a certain class 
of our citizens . .  . subjects the principle, or rather those who use such 
arguments, to ridicule."32 
Medary contended that the constitution needed broad-ranging re­
vision, especially limitations on the power of members of the General 
Assembly. He insisted that the public must approve all increases in the 
state debt and that they elect state officials by popular vote.33 Medary 
argued that abuses in the legislature curtailed the rights of working­
men in Ohio, and his arguments fell on increasingly receptive ears. He 
editorialized that Ohio's political infrastructure had not kept pace 
with the state's economic growth and influence. He also maintained 
that there was a legitimate need for an updated constitution "suited to 
her [Ohio's] wants." Medary insisted that the Buckeye State could ful­
fill its potential only if its future were entrusted "to the intelligence of 
her people. The destiny of Ohio, is onward—UPWARD."34 His cam­
paign proved effective. In fall 1849 Ohio's voters affirmed by a three-
to-one margin that they wanted a constitutional convention in 1851. 
Others in the state besides Medary also had agendas for the revi­
sion, and Medary knew he would have to compromise. In the Ohio 
legislature of the late 1840s, the Free Soil Party, or, as they called 
themselves, Free Democrats, had gained control. This left conserva­
tive Democrats and Whigs struggling to win back influence. Although 
the legislature, with Democratic support, had repealed several of the 
state's Black Laws in 1849, blacks continued to be denied many rights 
until after the Civil War. Under the new constitution, however, blacks 
no longer had to post bond, register their freedom papers, or be spon­
sored by whites. 
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But Free Soilers wanted all of Ohio's Black Laws repealed, and 
they wanted their candidate, Salmon Chase, named to the U.S. Senate 
(legislatures still chose senators during this period). Chase had been 
instrumental in bringing the Free Soil and Democratic factions to­
gether, and the senate seat was to be his reward. Medary reluctantly 
supported Chase and the Free Soil Party agenda, in exchange for sup­
port of his program. To repay their Democratic backers, Free Soilers 
joined with them in agreeing to push for restrictions on corporate 
growth in the state and limits on the number of new banks.35 
Medary's support for the Free Soil agenda helped elect Free Soiler 
John Morse to the Ohio House speakership in 1850. In return 
Medary got back the state printing post. To achieve his dream of con­
stitutional change, he had compromised with political rivals, and it 
had paid off for him. 
The 1851 convention brought sweeping changes. The delegates 
adopted almost all of Medary's motions, including new restrictions 
on the General Assembly.36 As the most powerful body in the state, 
the legislature had had the authority to appoint all state officials ex­
cept the governor, while even the governor had no veto power over 
the General Assembly. That situation was unchanged under the new 
constitution, but the convention expanded the executive branch to in­
clude a lieutenant governor, a secretary, a treasurer, an auditor, and 
an attorney general. For the first time the public received the right to 
vote for the state's executive officers and for judges. Delegates also de­
cided that the legislature could establish no new laws of incorporation 
or create new counties without approval by their inhabitants. They es­
tablished a special fund to reduce state debt and agreed that all classes 
of property would be taxed equally in the future. They also banned all 
poll taxes. 
The Democratic Party, with majority representation, including its 
chairman and Ohio's next governor, William Medill of Fairfield 
County, dominated the convention. The Whig Party split over its 
stance on the revisions and proved ineffectual during the proceedings. 
Several reform groups also lobbied for the inclusion of "social 
change" amendments in the new constitution, but they were defeated. 
Medary and the other delegates wanted political change in the state, 
but there remained certain societal issues that they were not prepared 
to address. Despite many resolutions during the convention, the ex­
tension of blacks' rights to include, for example, suffrage, continued 
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to be denied. A Ross County delegate to the convention charged, 
"The irresistible inference . .  . [is] that the longer the two races occupy 
the same soil, the greater will be their repulsion and the stronger the 
prejudice."37 Supporters of women's suffrage and those who wanted 
to restrict the sale of liquor in the state came away from the conven­
tion disappointed. 
The new constitution (approved by only a small majority of 
16,000 votes, 235,000 ballots having been cast)38 represented a suc­
cessful effort by Medary and other Jacksonians to defend the state's 
agrarian social order against the onslaught of the industrial way of 
life. The corporate perspective was represented by railroad, canal, 
bridge, and turnpike companies. Many of its detractors charged that 
the new constitution did not address important issues and ignored de­
veloping economic patterns. But although the legislature has since 
amended the document many times, the 1851 constitution is still the 
law in the state of Ohio.39 As the designated convention printer, 
Medary had the additional responsibility (and no doubt, satisfaction) 
of printing the record of the official proceedings (2,000 pages) and the 
new constitution.40 
Meanwhile, in Washington, Senators Henry Clay, Stephen A. 
Douglas, and Daniel Webster sought to defuse the slavery controversy 
with a plan to remove it from national debate. With their Compro­
mise of 1850, they argued that each state should alone be allowed to 
decide whether it would allow slavery. Like Medary, the senators ar­
gued that slavery was strictly a sectional issue. After heated debate, 
the Northern bloc of Congress yielded to the Southern coalition and 
maintained the Union. As part of the plan, slave owners could reclaim 
fugitives without recourse to a jury trial. Territories captured from 
Mexico could decide if they would be free or slave. The federal 
government's only role was to ensure that the number of free and 
slave states remained equal. The compromise succeeded as a delaying 
mechanism, but it failed to defuse the issue. Few lawmakers were sat­
isfied with the compromise. Many Northern blacks fled to Canada or 
violently resisted recapture, and the argument over slavery went on 
into the next presidential nominating convention. 
In 1852 Medary returned as an Ohio delegate to the Democratic 
National Convention. Because the Northern and Southern factions 
of the party could not reach agreement about slavery, they were 
forced to compromise. Democrats accepted the 1850 bill as part of 
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their program, and another dark horse, Franklin Pierce, became their 
presidential nominee. They also decided to include Southern represen­
tation in the administration in the person of Jefferson Davis. Pierce 
named him secretary of war. The disintegration of the Whig Party, the 
realignment of the Barnburners with the Democrats, and the inability 
of Free Soilers to maintain their momentum ensured Pierce's victory. 
Medary had led a campaign to nominate Stephen Douglas in Ohio 
before the convention, but he recognized that there was inadequate 
support for the "Little Giant." Because Pierce was a Jacksonian 
Democrat, Medary was able grudgingly to accept his candidacy. 
In return for his support during the convention, Pierce in 1852 of­
fered Medary the position of minister to Chile. Medary declined. In 
the following year he abandoned publishing for a second time and 
again relinquished ownership of the Statesman. Apparently Medary 
turned down the Pierce appointment and sold his paper because he 
planned to run for a U.S. Senate seat. His interest in the newspaper 
went to Samuel Cox, who would later become a congressman. Cox 
earned the nickname "Sunset" from his ability to write flowing prose 
about twilight in the Statesman. Party leaders quickly recognized, 
however, that he was not equally adept at managing the Democratic 
organ. 
Meanwhile, Douglas was ascending to the heights of the national 
Democratic Party. Medary became an even more ardent Douglas sup­
porter after congressional passage of his Kansas-Nebraska Act. For 
the next few years he acted as Douglas's point man in Ohio.41 In 1854 
the Radical Miami Democrats set out to put Medary in the U.S. Sen­
ate, but the Conservative Scioto Democrats backed Allen. The seat 
had become available when, Chase, as an antislavery advocate, was 
unable to win reelection in the Democratically controlled Ohio legis­
lature. Publicly Medary denied interest in the seat: "I do not desire an 
election, and prefer to remain a private citizen and advocate them [is­
sues] in the ranks of the Democratic Party, as heretofore."42 He actu­
ally coveted the seat but was tormented by the fact that his win would 
further splinter the Ohio Democratic Party. Most Democrats believed 
Medary wanted the position. In any case, the General Assembly 
named neither Medary nor Allen to the Senate, nominating instead 
George Pugh, who represented a compromise between the party 
factions. 
By supporting Douglas's Kansas-Nebraska Act, Medary once 
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again demonstrated his obsession with states' rights. Despite wide­
spread bipartisan anti-Nebraska protests across Ohio, Medary did 
not change his position. In 1854 he wrote, "I would sooner scatter the 
Constitution to the winds . . . then [sic] stab democracy in the back 
and give lie to the hopes of freedom... by denying the people the right 
of suffrage."43 Douglas and Medary were alike in their infatuation 
with the West, encouraging its development through extension of rail­
roads and settlements. Douglas hoped to reach the White House by 
advocating an America that was locally governed. That Jacksonian 
rhetoric was music to Medary's ears. The problem was that neither 
Douglas nor Medary understood that slavery was no longer merely a 
political issue; it had become a moral question for the majority of 
Americans. To get the Kansas-Nebraska Act passed, Douglas agreed 
to repeal of the 1820 Missouri Compromise. The new law allowed 
slavery to exist in Kansas and Nebraska—if its residents voted to al­
low it. The possibility of slavery in the new territories bitterly antago­
nized large segments of the Northern population. But it mattered little 
to Medary that in Ohio he opposed a growing coalition made up of 
Free Soilers, anti-Nebraska Democrats, Whigs, and the new Know-
Nothing Party. Support for Douglas was worth the cost. 
Whig Party members decided to oppose slavery on humanitarian 
grounds. The Know-Nothing Party was an organization of young, ur­
ban, anti-Catholic professionals. They gained their name from their 
attempts to keep their agenda secret. Know-Nothings opposed immi­
gration policy because many of its beneficiaries were Irish Catholics. 
These poor unskilled laborers competed with blacks for low-paying 
jobs. To reduce the competition for such jobs, many Irish Catholics 
became proponents of continuing slavery. They joined with and com­
posed an influential voting block within the Democratic Party. In an 
effort to limit the opposition, Know-Nothings tried to halt immigra­
tion and intimidated immigrants in an effort to stop them from voting. 
This league of antislavery advocates became known as the "Fusion 
Party," and in July 1854 they joined in a state convention in Colum­
bus. The following fall they established the coalition as a power for the 
first time by winning a landslide victory in the Ohio general elections. 
The Democrats lost because Fusionists stigmatized them as the party 
that had annulled the Missouri Compromise and wanted to increase 
taxes on business. A year later, following the lead of other states, the 
Fusionists named their new political organization the Republican 
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Party. In the Ohio governor's race the Democrats nominated the in­
cumbent, William Medill, as their candidate, but sixty-nine delegates 
abandoned Medill and cast their lot with Medary as their candidate. 
The move to draft Medary eroded Medill's power base so that he had 
no chance for victory. Ohioans chose Salmon Chase as their next gov­
ernor while the Republicans gained control of the General Assembly.44 
By 1855 Medary saw that sectionalism and slavery were irrepara­
bly splitting the Democratic Party—and the country—apart. In Feb­
ruary, in yet another attempt to reunite Democrats, he reacquired the 
Statesman in order to give himself a leadership post. Shortly after re­
suming the editorship, Medary acknowledged that his party was in 
trouble but that he was going to do his best to help. He wrote, "There 
is indifference, dissatisfaction and disorganization . . . [but] our 
struggle now will be, to keep afloat, to rouse up . .  . the Democratic el­
ement of this state."45 
The following year the Democratic National Convention met in 
Cincinnati, and Medary served as a compromise chairman during 
part of it. Medary expected to see Douglas nominated for the presi­
dency, but the other delegates had a different idea. With Republicans 
depicting themselves as the antislavery party, and the Know-Nothing 
Party choosing a neutral ground, most Democrats believed they 
needed a candidate who was less controversial than Douglas, with his 
concept of popular sovereignty. Medary soon realized that Douglas's 
cause was hopeless and was forced to abandon his friend. The del­
egates finally chose James Buchanan on the seventeenth ballot. Doug­
las never forgave Medary for changing his allegiance, but Medary felt 
having harmony at the convention—as well as maintaining his own 
standing within the party—was worth the price. 
As convention chairman, it was Medary's job to announce to the 
delegates that Ohio would cast its votes for Buchanan. He acknowl­
edged that his heart was with Douglas but assured the delegates, 
"With this platform that you have given us . .  . we are willing to fight 
under any leader that this Convention may select for us."46 Buchanan 
personally opposed slavery, but he said Congress had no authority to 
legislate against it. He chose to avoid the issue of whether a territory 
could abolish slavery before achieving statehood. In the months that 
followed, Medary said little about either Buchanan or the race in the 
Statesman. He knew the ticket had a better chance for victory with the 
reticent Buchanan, but he also recognized that the Democratic candi­
date was not strong enough to resolve the issue of slavery. 
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Fortunately for the Democrats, Buchanan's opponents were Re­
publican John Fremont, Ohio's "Pathfinder of the West," and Know-
Nothing candidate Millard Fillmore. Each candidate took a different 
position on slavery, dividing the electorate. Fremont and Fillmore re­
ceived the majority of the popular vote, but Buchanan held a majority 
in the Electoral College. The 1852 election effectively brought about 
the end of the Know-Nothing Party even as the surviving Democratic 
and Republican Parties drew the lines of confrontation that would 
lead to civil war. 
Despite Democratic attempts to reverse the trend, during the 
1850s the country became more divided sectionally. Medary called 
for one "Union, no North, no South, no East, no West,"47 a goal 
hardly practical at this point. Many developments, including the 
opening of new land in the West, the introduction of homestead legis­
lation, and the extension of railroads, fed a materialistic and exploit­
ative mood. Commercial expansion in international trade and the rise 
of industry led to a demand for higher tariffs. With railroad lines run­
ning from New York to Chicago through Ohio, competition between 
Eastern and Southern interests for Ohio's products increased. The 
banking situation remained unsettled, and forgery, embezzlement, 
and counterfeiting were common.48 Medary continued to plead that 
the people of each state and territory be allowed to govern themselves, 
but slavery had become a national issue, and during 1856 and 1857 
controversy over it divided the nation even further. 
During the presidential campaign the Democrats had charged that 
the Republicans' sole objective was to see slavery excluded from U.S. 
territories. Buchanan's new administration included several Southern 
Democrats, and the new president's cabinet had the strongest 
proslavery bias of any in the nineteenth century. Shortly after 
Buchanan took office, the Supreme Court ruled in Dred Scott that 
Congress did not have the authority to order territories to permit slav­
ery. Buchanan hoped the decision would end the controversy, but it 
only worsened it. "Bleeding Kansas" became the flash point for pro-
and antislavery factions who were attempting to decide the future of 
slaveholding in the territory. Former Ohioan and antislavery extrem­
ist John Brown began roaming the territory, taking justice into his 
own self-righteous hands. 
Medary again tried to walk a tightrope in a major political 
squabble. Dred Scott irrevocably split the country and the Democratic 
Party into North and South. But the difficulty Medary faced politi­
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cally, as a mediator in the controversy, soon became apparent. South­
ern Democrats applauded Dred Scott, but the scope of the ruling ap­
palled most Northern Democrats and Republicans. The case marked 
a defeat for Douglas's popular sovereignty because it made it unclear 
whether state legislatures had the authority to prohibit slavery. Most 
Ohio Democrats, led by Medary's editorials in the Statesman, sup­
ported Douglas's conviction. Though he disagreed with the decision, 
Medary acknowledged his respect for the high court. He wrote, 
"Upon an intricate question, the best jurists in the world have . .  . con­
curred with the plain, common sense and reason which guide the 
humblest citizen."49 
In the midst of the chaos, Medary secured the national political 
post for which he had long yearned. He also soon learned that it was 
easier to be a partisan publisher than a full-time politician. More than 
once party infighting had snatched appointments from him, but to ap­
pease Douglas, Buchanan appointed Medary the third territorial gov­
ernor of Minnesota in 1857. Several prominent Ohioans, including 
George Pugh, Samuel Cox, and George Pendleton, had lobbied the 
president to appoint Medary to the post. In a letter to Buchanan they 
contended that Medary was right for the job because his "experience, 
courage, and devotion to Democratic principles are to [sic] well and 
widely known as to require no assurance from us."50 Medary gave up 
his editorship of the Statesman for the final time. Depending upon 
their political affiliation, newspapers in Ohio cheered or jeered the 
journalist's appointment. It was an occasion for fellow partisan jour­
nalists to show their feelings about their old colleague. In Cincinnati, 
for example, the Republican Daily Commercial used the appointment 
to attack Democrats in general and the Democratic Cincinnati 
Enquirer and Medary specifically. The Daily Commercial wrote sar­
castically that "Citizen Sammedary [sic] . .  . has fallen a 'bear or two' 
and accepted the somewhat less brilliant position of Governor of 
Minnesota." It continued, "There are few individuals of the human 
race more flagrantly dishonest, habitually mendacious or notoriously 
illiterate, than the editor of the Ohio Statesman."51 In Columbus, 
however, Medary received bipartisan support. The Republican Ohio 
State Journal congratulated Medary on his new post, noting, "No 
man has warmer friends . .  . [or] more bitter enemies.... We shall be 
sorry to lose him as an editorial opponent."52 Perhaps the Journal's 
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editor was relieved that the formidable Medary was leaving Colum­
bus. Although state Democratic papers applauded his appointment, 
they regretted the loss to Ohio's party leadership of "Colonel" Sam 
Medary (a title emblematic of his party leadership). In Cleveland the 
Daily Herald summed up the typical Democratic sentiment: "The 
'Old Wheel Horse of the Ohio Democracy' can illy be spared by his 
party in this state."53 
Although he relocated to St. Paul, Medary left his family in Co­
lumbus and returned to Ohio regularly. The new governor arrived in 
the territory without fanfare "by lumber wagon from Red Wing" on 
April 22.54 His main task was to oversee the transition of Minnesota 
from territory to state. He held the post for only thirteen months. Dur­
ing that time Minnesotans approved the new state's constitution and 
elected legislators and their first state governor. During the initial 
gathering of the legislature in Minnesota, Medary reiterated his oppo­
sition to the federal government's attempt to restrict states' sover­
eignty. In his address he said, "Let us hope that the question may soon 
find a satisfactory answer. The future peace and harmony of State and 
Territories can be best secured by each acting upon its proper 
sphere."55 
Medary's biggest problem during his interim governorship in Min­
nesota occurred in Washington, not St. Paul. Southern congressmen 
tried to block the admission of Minnesota as another free state. The 
last state admitted had been California in 1850, and it was free. 
Southerners challenged the imbalance that California's admission had 
permitted, as its admission gave free-state representatives an advan­
tage in Congress. The Southerners managed to delay admission of 
Minnesota into the Union until May 1858. 
Otherwise, Medary's time in Minnesota was not particularly note­
worthy, except that he found himself in the unusual position of being, 
at one point, one of three governors concurrently in office there. While 
Medary held the territorial de facto post, Minnesotans chose Henry 
Silbey as the state's first governor. And Charles Chase served as acting 
governor during Medary's trips back to Ohio. The one criticism of 
Medary by Minnesotans was that he was too often an absentee gover­
nor. With the conversion of the territory into a state, however, 
Medary's job was finished. Future U.S. attorney and longtime Ohio 
friend General Edwin Stanton congratulated Medary on his work in 
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Minnesota. Stanton wrote Medary that his administration "forms a 
striking contrast to the failure of other territorial governors High 
sounding pretensions have failed while you have succeeded."56 
In June 1858, his duties in Minnesota officially over, Medary be­
gan a short stint as Columbus postmaster. He held the post for only 
five months, but his appointment resulted in another controversy 
among Columbus Democrats. To appoint him to the position 
Buchanan removed Thomas Miller, who had bought the Statesman 
from Medary when he went to Minnesota. Because Miller was a 
friend of Congressman Samuel Cox, who, with most Ohio Demo­
crats, vigorously opposed Buchanan's support for Kansas's 
proslavery Lecompton Constitution, the president took pleasure in re­
placing him. Upon learning of Medary's appointment, the Columbus 
Gazette observed: "Astonishment and indignation was pictured upon 
the countenances of all the leading Democrats."57 
Good intentions notwithstanding, Medary and controversy were 
seldom separated for long. Early in 1858, to appease Southerners in 
his cabinet, the president had asked Congress to admit Kansas under 
the Lecompton Constitution. The Northern Democratic Party divided 
further when Douglas split with Buchanan by opposing Lecompton. 
Solely to maintain his relationship with the Buchanan administration, 
Medary cast his lot with the widely unpopular—even among Demo-
crats—Buchanan position. Medary, Buchanan, and the Kansas ques­
tion became indissolubly linked. 
In retaliation for Douglas's defection, Buchanan dismissed several 
of the senator's political friends from high posts in Washington. In the 
Senate elections that year—in which Douglas edged Abraham Lincoln 
to retain his seat—Republicans gained more positions in the House of 
Representatives than any other party. The results left Douglas in con­
trol of Northern Democrats and badly crippled Buchanan's influence. 
In an attempt at rapprochement with the Douglas camp, the president 
again named Medary to a territorial governorship, this time in Kan­
sas. Considering his recent duty in Minnesota, the Ohio State Journal 
observed that with this appointment Medary had "fairly earned the 
office of Administration Midwife to all the foetal states."58 By the end 
of the year Buchanan realized that he could not overcome the pro-
Douglas, anti-Lecompton forces on Capitol Hill. Accordingly, he sug­
gested that Medary draw up a new constitution that would allow 
Kansas to be admitted to the Union as a free state. He also charged 
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Medary with putting a stop to the violence that was raging across 
Kansas, although he failed to give him the means to do so. Medary, in 
a message to the Kansas legislature, called for a new constitutional 
convention. 
In the four years since Kansas had become a territory in July 1854, 
nine governors had served there, and voters had ratified three consti­
tutions in an attempt to bring peace to the territory. Medary knew he 
had a difficult task ahead of him. Upon accepting the appointment, he 
acknowledged that freedom to disagree with government had gotten 
out of hand in Kansas. He reflected that when freedom "is permitted 
to . .  . violate laws and constitutions . .  . it becomes a curse rather than 
a blessing to the people."59 
Under the first year of Douglas's rule of popular sovereignty in 
Kansas the slavery controversy had cost over two hundred people 
their lives and nearly two million dollars in damages.60 While politi­
cians argued over whether Kansas would enter the Union as slave or 
free, radical abolitionists took matters into their own hands. The 
gangs of John Brown and James Montgomery roamed the southeast­
ern part of the territory liberating slaves and killing slaveholders. 
Within a month of his arrival, Governor Medary received a plea from 
a group of Kansas citizens. In their letter, they implored, "In the name 
of high heaven we ask, are there no means in the power of the govern­
ment to effectually check the outrages of the banditti?"61 Medary 
promptly appealed to Buchanan for guns and ammunition to arm the 
poorly equipped Kansas militia. After several delays the president or­
dered the arms shipped, and Medary sent the militia to capture Brown 
and Montgomery. The bloodshed in Kansas shocked Medary, and he 
sought a peaceful solution. At one point, he attempted to appeal to 
Kansans' patriotism. He told them it was America's heritage that "we 
preach by example—we subdue by kindness and friendly relations— 
we convince by honest purposes and fair dealing."62 Shortly after­
ward, Medary offered the guerrillas amnesty if they would suspend 
activities, but they refused. Again and again militant abolitionists 
eluded arrest by fleeing into neighboring Nebraska. Violence pro­
voked by abolitionists in Kansas and Missouri continued until after 
the Civil War.63 
Meanwhile, in July 1859 Medary set about attempting to bring 
statutory harmony to Kansas. His experience in Ohio was useful as he 
directed the writing of a new Kansas constitution. By the end of the 
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month the document was complete, and in October Kansas voters 
ratified it. Although he was successful in getting a permanent consti­
tution approved, Medary's term in Kansas was far from pleasant. He 
continually complained that Buchanan was slow in granting him the 
authority and the means to carry out his tasks. The president kept 
hoping he could avoid alienating Southerners both in his cabinet and 
in Southern states. In a letter to Buchanan, Medary begged, "Can I 
not be furnished, this time, with men and means... ? I have exhausted 
all my own . . . and to cripple me still more Gen. Cass, Your Sec. of 
State, has withheld my salary for what I think wholly insufficient 
causes."64 
Despite his frustrations, Medary later ran for Kansas state gover­
nor in December 1860. But his veto in the preceding February of a bill 
to ban slavery in Kansas and his advocacy of Lecompton branded him 
as an advocate for slavery. Medary maintained that each state should 
be allowed to make its own decisions concerning slavery, but that a 
territory should not be granted sovereignty until it became a state. His 
explanation that he had based his decisions on states'-rights consider­
ations and his otherwise successful record as governor failed, how­
ever, to convince voters, and he lost the election to a Republican, 
Charles Robinson. 
The question of statehood for Kansas continued to be entangled in 
Washington politics. Medary stayed on for two years, finally resign­
ing the governorship, with statehood assured, in December 1860. His 
antiabolitionist sentiments notwithstanding, the partial peace 
Medary helped bring to Kansas earned him respect from both sides. 
The editor of the Lawrence Republican, for example, wrote that he 
bade the Ohioan farewell with regret despite their differences. In a 
front-page commentary, the editor wrote of Medary: "He has been 
uniformly prudent and conciliatory; has sought rather to guide popu­
lar sentiment, than to despotically defy it; has been as much of a Free 
State man as he could be and hold office under Buchanan."65 In Janu­
ary 1861 Kansas was admitted into the Union. In the aftermath of its 
admission, however, the Buchanan administration was a shambles, 
Democrats were even further divided, and the Union was beyond re­
demption. 
The path from Manifest Destiny to revision of the Ohio Constitu­
tion to the brink of the Civil War had been a rough one for a man as 
politically active as Medary. Twenty years of involvement in the 
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chaos of the political arena had elevated him to national prominence 
but tarnished his reputation. His dream of the establishment of 
Jeffersonian democracy lay in ruins. He had compromised principles, 
alienated longtime friends, and achieved national political office, but 
he had paid a high price. He was tired, disillusioned, and fearful that 
the great democratic experiment was disintegrating. He returned to 
Columbus to try to ward off the looming catastrophe by showing 
readers the error of their ways and changing their minds. 
"Steady Hands, Sound Heads and Warm 
Hearts, and We Shall All Be Right Again* 
At the beginning of 1861 Columbus had a population of 18,554. Leg­
islators debated in the impressive new capitol building at the corner of 
Broad and High Streets. Besides traffic on the National Road, twenty-
four passenger trains served Columbus daily. Until November 9, 
1860—coincidentally the same night Americans chose Abraham Lin­
coln sixteenth president of the United States—there was a splendid 
hotel across High Street from the capitol, the Neil House. On that 
night it burned to the ground. Firefighters might have saved the hotel 
if there had been a dependable water supply, but no municipal water­
works had yet been built, and nearby wells and cisterns could not sup­
ply enough water.1 
Columbus had come a long way since Samuel Medary had begun 
living there twenty-five years earlier. Nevertheless, many problems 
that he and other civic leaders had worked to correct, such as the lack 
of a dependable water supply, remained. Crushed stone covered some 
city streets, and construction had just begun on a horse-drawn trolley 
system, but rainstorms continued to turn the roads into quagmires. 
The city had recently completed a sewer system, but it often clogged 
or backed up, and filth collected in the gutters. The city employed in­
mates from the state penitentiary in a moderately successful attempt 
to combat the stench, but walking or riding on the streets was often an 
unpleasant, and sometimes an unhealthy, experience. 
The population of Columbus was an uneasy mixture of abolition­
ists and Southern sympathizers. The city contained both people who 
had come from Northern states, particularly Pennsylvania and New 
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York, and those who had emigrated from pre-war Virginia.2 With its 
long-established trade link with the South, Columbus abutted a part 
of Ohio that maintained solid Southern ties. Many beautiful homes in 
the city, with their enclosed gardens and large verandas, reflected 
Southern influence.3 During the Civil War, seven Ohioans became 
Confederate generals; hundreds more fought for the South. 
Across Broad Street from the capitol, at the corner of Pearl Alley 
and near the old National Hotel, stood a tavern called the Buckeye 
House. Its cooks and dishwashers were almost all black. Years after 
the war one Columbus resident recalled noticing that the kitchen per­
sonnel changed regularly. The Buckeye House had been a way station 
on the Underground Railroad.4 
At the corner of Gay and High Streets was an office building from 
which, on January 31,1861, the former governor of the Kansas terri­
tory and past publisher of the Ohio Statesman began distributing his 
fifth newspaper. There is no evidence that Medary was aware of the 
activities in the kitchen of the nearby Buckeye House. If he had known 
of the clandestine activity, he would most certainly have protested 
against it. At the time, however, he occupied himself with the ap­
proaching national crisis. Medary called his new weekly the Crisis to 
signal the nation's difficulties. Although the Civil War did not begin 
for another two months, for Medary it was already in progress. 
In October and November 1859 Medary was observing the election 
campaigns in Columbus. They were of particular interest to him be­
cause he feared that Ohio was about to be overrun by Republicans. 
But he was also curious because the two candidates for the following 
year's presidential election, Stephen Douglas and Abraham Lincoln, 
were stumping for their respective parties' state candidates. Even 
more important, the two men from Illinois were debating whether 
slavery should be a purely political issue. 
The Republican candidate was busy demonstrating his ability as a 
canny politician who personally abhorred slavery. According to 
Charles Sellers, Lincoln alternately "inspired Yankee moralists by op­
posing its [slavery's] further advance, [and] reassured conservatives 
by acknowledging its constitutional right to exist where it was." On 
other occasions he "appealed to old-timer racism by endorsing white 
supremacy . .  . and reservation of the territories for the homes of free 
white people."5 Earlier in the year Lincoln had said, "The underlying 
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principle of the Republican party was 'hatred to the institution of 
slavery; hatred to it in all its aspects, moral, social and political.'" 
Douglas, on the other hand, maintained that slavery "was not impor­
tant enough to risk the disruption of the Union." Republican newspa­
per editors responded, "Douglas does not recognize the moral 
element in politics."6 The same was true of Medary. 
Although Douglas and Medary had not resolved their differences, 
Medary believed Douglas's election might reunite the Democratic 
Party and hold the Union together. He also continued to hope that, 
with his stand on slavery and local government autonomy, Douglas 
was the man to rescue Medary's Jacksonian ideal for the nation. Nei­
ther presidential candidate could afford to ignore Ohio, as only New 
York and Pennsylvania exceeded it in number of electoral votes and 
representatives in Congress. Ohio's influence became even more 
pivotal after the withdrawal of the Confederate states' congressional 
representation.7 
In September 1860 Medary received leave from his post in Kansas 
to attend the national fair at Cincinnati and the Ohio State Fair in 
Dayton.8 The Democratic Party was in such a fragmented state that 
Medary did not even bother to ask for time off to attend the state 
Democratic convention of 1859 or, for the first time in twenty-five 
years, to make his appearance at either of the Democratic presidential 
nominating conventions of 1860 (Democrats held two that year be­
cause of the North-South party division). Kansas, of course, needed 
his attention, but, more to the point, he had convinced himself that 
the divided national parties and the men who were seeking national 
office could not solve the nation's problems. He was certain that the 
solution rested in appealing to the common sense of the public. 
The 1860 Democratic convention in Charleston had dissolved fol­
lowing the inability of the Northern and Southern contingents to de­
cide between Douglas and John Breckinridge. Northern Democrats 
then held a second convention in Baltimore and nominated Douglas; 
Southerners countered with Breckinridge. There were several possi­
bilities for the Republican nominee, including Salmon Chase. But 
Lincoln's position that slavery must be contained within the states cur­
rently allowing it pleased the delegates and won him the nomination. 
A third party, the Constitutional Union Party, hoping to avert se­
cession, selected John Bell of Tennessee as its nominee. With so many 
candidates and divided allegiances, Lincoln won with only forty per­
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cent of the popular vote. Medary made note of the new president's 
"default" victory when he wrote, "Mr. Lincoln . .  . became president 
merely by the forms of the Constitution, and not by public opinion."9 
Southern politicians considered Lincoln the "abolition President" and 
vowed to fight his attempts to overthrow their way of life. 
On December 20, 1860, Medary wrote a farewell to the new 
state's citizens in the Kansas National Democrat. In it he said that for 
the past three years he had experienced a "gloomy foreboding... that 
a crisis was approaching" in the country. He said he had spent most of 
his life as a newspaperman and felt he could best serve the public 
by continuing in that line of work. He returned to Ohio hoping to de­
fuse the volatile situation. Just before his departure from Kansas he 
wrote, "Editors, politicians, and divines, should write, speak, and 
pray for the one great, and necessary purpose—perfect peace."10 In 
Charleston, on the same day, the South Carolina legislature passed a 
bill stating, "The Union now subsisting between South Carolina and 
other states under the name of the United States of America is hereby 
dissolved."11 
Medary refused to believe that taking up arms was the answer to 
settling sectional differences. He felt that an open and thorough pub­
lic discussion of the issues—and adherence to his states'- and indi-
vidual-rights philosophy—could head off a confrontation. He saw the 
Union as a loosely assembled collection of states held together by 
compromise and conciliation. As emotions reached the boiling point, 
Medary's 1860 call for moderation in Kansas summed up his plea to 
the nation: "Steady hands, sound heads and warm hearts, and we 
shall all be right again."12 
On his return to Columbus he focused again on using the strength 
of the press to influence political decisions. Medary believed a news­
paper represented his best chance for heading off war. In his first issue 
he wrote, "I feel it a duty I owe my country and myself, that I should 
not be a silent spectator of the most dangerous controversy that ever 
impended over the American people." His political officeholding fin­
ished, Medary recognized that he faced a formidable task. He said, "It 
will take the combined efforts of the wise, the good and the patriotic 
to wrest the Constitution and the Union .. . from the dangers which 
threaten it on every side."13 He had entered the most inflammatory 
phase of his career. 
From the very beginning of his return to publishing, Medary 
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assumed an air of superiority toward fellow journalists. He implied 
that with his long experience he was privy to information and a point 
of view that allowed him a unique perspective. He pronounced, "My 
connection of thirty years with politics and the press gives me some 
claims upon the people for at least a candid hearing." He sought to 
use the role of elder statesman, to which he felt entitled, to fight for 
peace. Medary said the Crisis would be more than just an ordinary 
newspaper. He saw it as an enterprise that would serve as a historical 
record: "We do not intend to be a mere news publication, but one that 
will be of sufficient worth for preservation." He was confident that he 
was beginning a noteworthy venture. He encouraged readers to save 
all copies of the Crisis as evidence to future generations of the "scenes 
their fathers passed through. We present The Crisis as a true exponent 
of the times, which will be a ready reference hereafter."14 
As the new year began, fear that war was imminent permeated Co­
lumbus, but there also was hope that it could be avoided. Three days 
before Medary circulated the first issue of the Crisis, state Democrats 
met in the city in an effort to work out a political solution. During the 
meeting the delegates agreed to support Kentucky senator John J. 
Crittenden's compromise plan. It set forth a series of amendments to 
the Constitution that would forbid the federal government to impede 
slavery in Southern states or territories. Congress could not override 
the amendments, and the plan extended the Missouri Compromise 
line west to the Pacific. Medary supported Crittenden's plan because 
he saw the differences between North and South as unworthy of na­
tional strife. 
Secessionist state leaders felt the plan was too little and too late. 
Lame-duck president James Buchanan was unwilling to deal with the 
issue. The president found himself under fire from all sides because he 
had neither the courage nor the ability to mediate the situation. 
Buchanan claimed that the Southern states had no right to secede, but 
he admitted that the federal government could not legally prevent 
them from doing so. 
The president-elect vehemently opposed Crittenden's or any other 
compromise that condoned and extended slavery. Lincoln argued 
that acceptance "would lose us everything we gained by the election," 
and said he was not interested in surrendering to those he had just 
beaten at the polls. Saying compromise would lead to continuation of 
a slave empire, Lincoln urged fellow Republicans to "hold firm, as 
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with a chain of steel. If we surrender it is the end of us A year will 
not pass, till we shall have to take Cuba as a condition upon which 
they will stay in the Union."15 With this hyperbole Lincoln was saying 
that if he gave one inch on slavery, there would be no end to the com­
promises. Medary, who favored peace at any price, remained 
unconvinced that Lincoln's opposition was honorable. He charged 
that the new president disapproved of Crittenden's Compromise 
solely for partisan reasons. Medary claimed the plan "could save the 
Union but not the Republican Party." In addition, because "both 
could not be saved at the same time, they preferred their party and its 
platform to the Country and its Constitution."16 In part because of 
Lincoln's opposition, Crittenden's Compromise died. Six more 
Southern states seceded, and the Confederacy set up its own govern­
ment on February 7,1861. 
By current standards the Crisis was no tabloid. Five columns wide, 
eight pages long, with small print and single-column headlines, it had 
no pictures and lacked display heads. Unlike the other Columbus pa­
pers, it initially carried no advertising, although Medary began run­
ning advertising during the fourth month of publication. Even then it 
was not at all eye-catching, and Medary relegated it to the last two 
pages. A year's subscription cost two dollars, which Medary felt was a 
fair price. He wrote that a reader could "better pay two dollars for 
useful information in the Crisis than a hundred dollars taxes to sup­
port a wicked sectional war."17 He made no attempt to make a large 
profit from his new undertaking, choosing instead to devote himself 
passionately to the themes of peace and Jacksonian democracy. 
Medary contracted with the Richard Nevins Company, a half-block 
north on High Street, to print the paper. The Ohio Statesman, the 
state Democratic organ, continued to be published by Matthias Mar­
tin from offices in the same block. 
Medary promised that every effort would be made to make the 
Crisis one of the best weeklies in the country. He guaranteed subscrib­
ers he would keep it "clear of floating trash and full of the most useful 
matter to suit the fearful times that surround us."18 In his prospectus 
he outlined what readers could expect from the Crisis. He said it 
would include news of the week, public documents, speeches from 
both sides of issues, market reports, correspondence, and a summary 
of the proceedings of Congress and the state legislature. In addition, 
he planned to print agricultural articles, literary miscellany (poems 
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and short stories), and the "Boldest and Best political essays from the 
ablest men of the West." He confidently guaranteed that his new pub­
lication would include "everything to make a perfect newspaper and a 
complete record of the times." If his readers enjoyed the Crisis, he 
urged them to tell their friends, because he did not intend to employ 
agents to extend its circulation.19 
Initially Medary wrote almost all the material in the Crisis or re­
printed columns obtained from other Democratic papers. His office 
consisted of little more than a desk, chairs, files, scissors, pencils and 
paper, and in-and-out mail bins. He did not buy a printing press, hired 
no reporters or other assistants, and did not sell shares to stockhold­
ers; Medary was the Crisis. A prodigious worker, he noted in the first 
issue, "There is a great work before us, and we must not shrink from 
its performance." During the first year of publication he told his 
growing number of readers that he read as many as a hundred letters 
each day.20 The primary goal of the Crisis, according to Medary, was 
to address "what are to be the conditions of our dissolution and dis-
grace."21 He emphasized that he based his editorials on the highest 
tradition of American democracy. To accentuate the point, he re­
printed speeches made by George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, 
and Andrew Jackson. 
Medary feared that once war between North and South began, it 
would never end. About the prospect of civil war, he lamented, "Of 
all disorders we despise those among neighbors the most . . .  . We have 
ever shrunk with loathing from the man who dares so far forget God 
and humanity, as to advocate either local disorders or national blood-
letting."22 He felt that if he revealed all aspects of the dispute to 
Northerners (most of whom, he believed, opposed war), they would 
come to their senses before taking up arms. Medary stated repeatedly 
that if the North attempted to force obedience upon the South, it 
would destroy the essential characteristic of the Republic. That indis­
pensable trait, according to him, was voluntary compliance with a na­
tional consensus. 
As early as February 1861 Medary pleaded that following a great 
war only a military despotism would remain, and "our liberties would 
be sacrificed in the wreck."23 Throughout the conflict he maintained 
that the answer to settling the disagreement between North and South 
lay with the ballot instead of the bullet. His view of the United States 
was of a nation connected by free association, and he called for a con­
 69 "We Shall All Be Right Again"
vention of states to settle the differences. In the land of the free, he 
said, it was unlawful and immoral for the federal government to force 
compliance on the Southern states. 
When the new president took office in early March, Medary wrote 
that he was not certain where Lincoln stood on the issues. On the way 
to his inauguration, the president-elect had spoken in Columbus, but 
he had been circumspect. Medary noted that Lincoln's inaugural ad­
dress gave the president "too much elbow room . .  . to steer for any 
port. I will judge the new president by what he does rather than what 
he says."24 In general Medary blamed radical abolitionists and parti­
san Republicans for the threatening situation. He wrote an open letter 
to Republican newspapers in the Crisis in which he asked them to 
convince him that the possibility of this "awful war, disgraceful to the 
nation and age . . . [is] not wholly founded in party—merely party, 
and nothing else.nls He decried the influence of such politicians as 
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts. Medary claimed that 
Sumner "never intended to receive the South back into the Union, 
'peaceably, amicably, honorably, as states, part and parcel of this 
union as they once were."'26 Many Northern Democrats thought abo­
litionists were even worse than Southerners. At least the Confederacy 
conducted its rebellion in the open and with justification, unlike abo­
litionists. Democrats said abolitionists operated "like miners . . . 
trenching around the temple of liberty, surreptitiously working for 
war and not saying so. . .  . a dark enclave of conspirators, freedom-
shriekers, and Bible spewkers [sic]."27 
Medary worried as well about the influence of Eastern newspaper 
publishers. Of Horace Greeley he wrote, "The people have already 
been sufficiently humbugged by such men as Greeley. . .  . As he ap­
pears to be the conscience keeper of the Northern party . .  . it will be 
our business to look after him."28 Medary questioned Greeley's phi­
losophy of promoting industrialism at the expense of an agrarian soci­
ety, of opposing popular elections, and of supporting a protective 
tariff. In Medary's mind Greeley spoke for the untrustworthy aboli­
tionists. Beginning in 1860, when Greeley editorialized in favor of 
Lincoln and against slavery, Medary became convinced that Greeley 
had made himself the spokesman for all who sought to involve the 
North in war. In April, with the bombardment of Fort Sumter, 
Medary's worst fears were realized. 
Three days after the Confederacy fired the initial volleys in 
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Charleston harbor, Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteer troops for 
three months' duty. Ohio's quota for what most Northerners believed 
would be a short war was 13,000 men. On April 16 the Ohio General 
Assembly appropriated $1 million to arm and equip the state's sol­
diers. The minority Democratic members of the legislature delayed 
the appropriation for two days with debate, but eventually patriotism 
overwhelmed partisanship. Within a few weeks the General Assembly 
raised taxes and allotted an additional $1.5 million for use if the state 
were invaded and for relief to families of volunteers, the beginning of 
a huge financial burden.29 
The men of Ohio could have supplied 75,000 troops by them-
selves.30 At the center of Ohio, with its abundant highway and rail­
road access, Columbus served as a marshaling point for the first Ohio 
troops. Thirty thousand volunteers, in everything from silk top hats to 
homespun breeches, descended upon the capital from all parts of the 
state. Militia leaders set up a makeshift camp north of the railroad de­
pot in Goodale Park. But the tents could not handle the overflow, and 
many crowded into hotels and boarding houses. In the words of one 
resident, "Sleeping bodies were scattered everywhere throughout the 
city, on verandas, porches, sidewalks and steps."31 The president or­
dered Governor William Dennison to send the first organized troops 
to Washington to help defend the capital. At 3 A.M. on April 19, two 
thousand members of the First and Second Ohio Volunteer Infantry 
regiments, although barely trained and underequipped, boarded 
trains and headed east. 
One of Medary's sons, Charles, and a son-in-law volunteered and 
served as officers for the Union during the war. They both supported 
the editor's peace efforts, but their enlistment showed that Peace 
Democrats were as willing to die for their country as Republicans. 
Medary wrote of Peace Democrat soldiers, "They are true-hearted 
boys who will do their duty and ask no questions."32 Although many 
of them opposed the war, Peace Democrats readily volunteered for 
duty for several reasons. Many of their party leaders encouraged them 
as a way of restoring the country to the Jacksonian vision. The volun­
teers viewed themselves as going on a crusade and continuing the elec­
toral campaigns they had participated in before the war. Like many 
other Americans, a large number became infatuated with patriotic 
war fever. Others joined for less romantic reasons. Because the esca­
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lating sectional differences had affected trade between various parts 
of the country, leading to overspeculation in railroads and factories, 
Ohio's economy had suffered. Most men who made their livelihood 
from the soil faced dubious prospects. Others had become bored with 
the uncertainty of farming.33 The bounties that states later offered to 
encourage enlistment also gave many in the mostly Democratic work­
ing classes a way to pay off debts. 
Once the war began, Medary honored all soldiers in the field while 
opposing the politicians who had put them there. In a Crisis commen­
tary he pointedly wrote, "Politicians, you have crimes to answer for 
which Heaven will ask judgement."34 In May he began a weekly fea­
ture written by Ohio soldiers, called "Rough Notes from a Knap­
sack." Most of them wrote of the difficult conditions and boredom of 
camp life. Alongside this feature Medary ran articles that delineated 
the "very disgraceful treatment of the volunteers. "35 He wrote that the 
military treated Ohio troops poorly, that they were without shoes, 
lacked tents, and often were ill as a result. Medary editorialized that 
these revelations might be viewed as unpatriotic, but that it was his 
duty as a journalist to expose the abuses. He argued, "While the 
young men are in the field ready to do any service to aid in saving the 
nation," he must do his homework to "arouse the public mind to seek 
some means of settling our enormous troubles."36 In October he coor­
dinated a blanket drive in the Crisis for the troops. 
Hostilities had barely begun when it became apparent that win­
ning the war and allowing unrestricted continuation of a free press 
were conflicting goals. This was the first war that most newspapers 
could cover extensively at first hand. In addition, for the first time in 
the young country's history, a majority of the population could 
read.37 With husbands and sons, neighbors and friends going off to 
fight, the dilemma became how to keep those at home informed with­
out aiding and abetting the enemy. 
Following the end of the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1801, except 
for limited restrictions in 1846 and 1847 during the Mexican War, 
there had been little press censorship in America. But during the Civil 
War the fact that many on both sides opposed the war complicated 
matters.38 Even before the first major battles took place, civil-rights 
confrontations occurred behind the lines. While Middle Westerners 
like Medary considered what they should do now that war was under 
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way, more radical elements caused Union leaders a great deal of con­
cern. Border-state secessionists precipitated problems in Missouri, 
Kentucky, and Maryland by openly urging inhabitants to agitate for 
secession. 
In Maryland and Missouri the uneasiness exploded. During April 
a secessionist mob attacked a Massachusetts regiment as it passed 
through Baltimore on its way to Washington. The Lincoln adminis­
tration took aggressive action to restore order. The president sent 
troops to Baltimore, instituted martial law, and suspended the writ of 
habeas corpus in Maryland. In Missouri Governor Claiborne Jackson 
sought to steer his state into the Confederacy, but Unionists opposed 
him and an intrastate civil war resulted. General John Fremont of 
Ohio secured peace late in the summer when, without authority from 
Washington, he declared martial law and emancipated slaves in the 
state. Fremont established a precedent. Throughout the Union during 
the coming war years, military officials jailed those suspected of seces­
sionist activities and held them without trial. Later the same fate 
awaited dissidents who opposed the war effort and conscription. This 
led to the imprisonment of more than 15,000 civilians without due 
39process.  Democrats became especially disturbed when Secretary 
of State William Seward bragged that he "could arrest anyone in 
the U.S."40 
Peace Democrats decried the abuses, but in the early days of the 
war, with jingoism rampant, Union leaders ignored them. Lincoln re­
buffed Supreme Court Justice Roger Taney when he attempted to 
veto the president's suspension of habeas corpus. Taney was the se­
nior federal circuit court judge in Baltimore. He ruled in Ex parte 
Merryman that only Congress had the authority to set aside the writ 
of habeas corpus. Lincoln refused to obey Taney's order, however, 
and the Republican press defended his action. They said it was neces­
sary for the president to move quickly to deal with the threat against 
the Union.41 
By 1861 the telegraph allowed reporters to wire their editors de­
tails about troop movement and military strategy almost instanta­
neously. From the earliest days of the war, Northern newspaper 
reporters traveled with Union troops. The military became concerned 
about a public that soon knew more about war developments than 
some of its own generals. As the two armies jockeyed for position in 
close quarters, Northern generals discovered that Southern agents 
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were readily securing information about their plans and troop 
strength. Confederate informants did this either by intercepting tele­
graph messages or simply by reading Northern newspapers. General 
William Sherman complained, "To every army and almost every 
general a newspaper reporter goes along . . . reporting our progress, 
guessing at places . .  . inciting jealousies and discontent, and doing in­
finite mischief."42 Sherman was the most antipress general in the war, 
either prohibiting reporters from traveling with his troops or attempt­
ing to censor their stories. 
Following the First Battle of Bull Run, on July 21, 1861, corre­
spondents protested that the army censored reports of the Union loss 
when they attempted to telegraph stories to their editors. During the 
late summer and early fall of 1861, the Army of the Potomac sought 
to accommodate the press by agreeing to a voluntary plan of censor­
ship. Union officials told newsmen they were to report no military in­
formation without consent of the officer in charge of the area. After a 
short trial the agreement failed because some journalists, attempting 
to scoop their competition, repeatedly violated the arrangement. Sec­
retary of War Edwin Stanton ordered that provost marshals review all 
reporters' messages before transmission via telegraph.43 In 1862 the 
president further clarified the matter. At Sherman's insistence, he or­
dered that the commander in charge of a combat area had to autho­
rize all journalists in the field.44 Northern officials also pressed for 
censorship in nonmilitary sections of the country. 
Rampant paranoia quickly infected the North. Those in authority 
branded dissidents' activities treasonous. Conversely, when civil au­
thorities attempted to maintain security, dissenters brought charges of 
oppression. In Columbus Governor Dennison began reviewing tele­
graph messages, including those that the city's newspapers transmit­
ted, before allowing them to be sent out of the city. Medary protested 
a civilian authority's repression of the rights of the press, seeing it as a 
foreshadowing of what he feared most from a wartime government. 
He called Dennison's step "an act of usurpation wholly without au­
thority and inconsistent with the rights of citizens and the liberty of 
the press."45 Medary believed strongly that the right to dissent was 
constitutionally guaranteed, and he was certain that journalists could 
alter the course of the war by influencing public opinion. He began to 
understand that freedom to oppose was an issue that required exami­
nation and defense. In an early issue of the Crisis, he reprinted the 
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resolutions the Virginia legislature had issued in 1798 in response to 
passage of the restrictive Alien and Sedition laws.46 In April 1861 he 
wrote, "If men and presses are not to have the freedom of expressing 
an opinion . .  . we must arrive at repression gradually."47 
A group of New York City editors, including Greeley, had formed 
the Telegraphic and General News Association in 1849. During the 
war years this and several other loosely organized press associations 
became known as the Associated Press (AP). The arrangement saved 
money by pooling resources and sharing the cost of telegraphing sto-
ries.48 But because Medary felt the reporting was both shoddy and re­
flected an abolitionist or Unionist bias, he refused to subscribe to 
press associations. After the AP prematurely reported a Union victory 
at the first major battle of the war (Bull Run), Medary said he had 
proved his point. He wrote, "We are not surprised that characterless 
fellows [AP reporters] get desperate when an Editor interferes with 
their licensed falsehood and nonsense." He charged that they should 
confine themselves to "known facts" instead of transmitting "street 
rumors."49 
Medary stuck by the exchange system that journalists throughout 
the nation had depended upon since the 1700s. He used the privilege 
provided by the U.S. mail to swap the Crisis with other newspapers. 
From the earliest days of newspaper publication in America, the ex­
change system flourished because it permitted cost-free news gather-
ing.50 Critics of the exchange system called it "scissors and paste-pot 
journalism," but it was not necessarily the shady form of reporting 
some have labeled it. For decades press exchanges had given politi­
cians a ready-made way to distribute information to their followers. 
Exchanges were tr^ e most efficient means of reaching the electorate. 
The system also had inherent checks and balances, since editors could 
compare differing versions of the same story for accuracy.51 
Medary had cultivated the procedure during his earlier newspaper 
career, and he reinstituted his exchanges shortly after beginning pub­
lication of the Crisis. One of the most important duties of a publisher 
who participated in exchanges was to service his system. The editor 
who did not mail the latest copy of his newspaper each week to those 
on his exchange list soon found himself left out. Within a few months 
of its beginning, other editors began showering the Crisis with articles 
because they knew that when Medary reprinted them they would re­
ceive national exposure. Medary had to explain to fellow editors that 
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he could not reprint all the articles from the exchanges he received be­
cause of lack of space. His acknowledgments of the exchange articles 
he ran show that, because of its prominence, the Crisis became a na­
tional clearinghouse for Peace Democrat articles. Later in the war he 
appealed to editors of other newspapers who did not practice fair play 
when reprinting Crisis articles. Not giving the originating editor credit 
for writing a reprinted story was an abuse that few participants in the 
exchange system tolerated. 
Journalistically, Medary disagreed with the sensational approach 
that many Eastern newspapers practiced. Throughout the conflict, he 
continued to believe that a newspaper's purpose was to discuss and 
debate political issues from a partisan perspective. For the most part, 
he spurned the practice of devoting large amounts of type to recount­
ing breaking events. Medary perceived the Crisis as a weekly news 
commentary. There were four other newspapers in Columbus, two of 
them dailies. Readers had already heard or read about the most recent 
battle news. Medary attempted to gauge an event's impact, giving 
readers a Democratic twist and encouraging them to react appropri­
ately. The Crisis was unique in this regard. His refusal to carry battle 
news also indicated his revulsion at the war. 
Medary wrote lengthy editorials about the effects of the battles on 
the country's political health. He viewed the war as a protracted con­
tinuation of the political battles he had witnessed over the past 
twenty-five years, even calling the Crisis a "national political newspa­
per." According to him his editorial approach sought to speak to his 
readers' intellect, their reason. Rarely did he attempt to appeal to 
readers' patriotism. He said the public should not expect to be com­
forted by what they read in his publication. Although he often wrote 
eloquently, he made no apologies for his use of invective because it 
was time to "take off the gloves." The prospect of a bloody war made 
him furious. He wrote, "When a great country, and the fate of a 
mighty people are at stake, it is no time to retreat to our closets to pick 
words of delicate meaning, or to hunt phrases to sit on the ear of 
love."52 Medary did not attempt to be impartial. He selected material 
for the Crisis that authenticated his point of view; he interpreted 
events from his perspective. But according to the Columbus historian 
Osman Hooper, "There is no indication that he ever falsified a report 
or garbled a public document.... It was always possible for a reader 
to tell where the document ended and the interpretation began."53 
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The origin of the stories Medary used helped show in how many 
different areas of the country people read the Crisis. It also proved 
that the Crisis could count among its subscribers many who lived in 
Southern states. Letters of support from fellow editors soon came 
pouring in. In March one from the Kentucky Register noted that its 
readers should pay careful attention to what Medary had to say. It ad­
vised that because of his long career as a journalist he had endeared 
himself to all who sought to uphold the Constitution. The article 
added, "Candor forces us to admit when we remember the locality in 
which The Crisis is issued, that it is a wonder of self-denial, boldness 
and courage."54 During the same month Medary ran stories from 
newspapers in Charleston, Mobile, Memphis, and New Orleans. He 
also printed opinion pieces from political leaders and subscribers in 
both North and South. A letter from the Democratic Saint Louis 
Christian Advocate observed of Medary: "It is pleasant, refreshing to 
meet with a real live editor—one who 'speaks right on,' turning nei­
ther to the right nor the left."55 
On May 5,1861, the Republican Detroit Free Press first used the 
term "Copperhead" in reference to Northern newspapers that did not 
support the war. The reason the newspaper gave for choosing the 
snake's name as an epithet was that it was a serpent that people 
throughout the Middle West feared. According to authorities it struck 
its poisonous blows without warning. In the following months more 
Republican papers began using the term. Throughout the North, 
Unionists used it in reference to all ultraconservative people who 
sought an end to hostilities or a compromise with the South.56 Usually 
the targets of slander were Peace Democrats. Republicans made 
handy use of the Copperhead label to ensure that voters associated the 
term with traitorous activity.57 
After the beginning of the war, Democrats in Ohio divided them­
selves into two camps, Peace and War. Although maintaining their 
support of a convention of states to settle sectional strife, War Demo­
crats supported the Lincoln administration's waging of the war. Re­
publicans agreed with the War Democrats, and members of the two 
groups joined together to form the Union Party. Prominent members 
of this faction included the next two governors of Ohio, Mahoning 
County railroad executive David Tod and the former publisher of the 
Cincinnati Enquirer, John Brough. Joel Silbey refers to them as "Le­
gitimists," because they justified the war by saying it would save the 
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Union. Peace Democrats (Silbey calls them "Purists") believed that, 
short of a military victory over the Confederacy, there should be a ne­
gotiated peace.58 They referred to themselves as the "nonintervention­
ist party," and Medary was one of the most visible members of the 
group. Besides Medary, the group included many other Douglas sup­
porters. Purist leaders were Dr. Edson Olds, an ex-congressman and 
publisher of the Ohio Lancaster Eagle; Hugh Jewett, a state party 
leader from Zanesville; George Pendleton, a congressman from Cin­
cinnati; and Senator George Pugh. Other members included state su­
preme court justice Allen Thurman, ex-senator William Allen, 
Dayton's congressman Clement Vallandigham, and Senator Samuel 
S. Cox.59 The Peace Democrat movement sprang up throughout the 
North from New York to Wisconsin, but it was most widespread and 
influential in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. According to George 
Knepper, "In no state was Copperhead activity more visible or led by 
abler men than in Ohio."60 
Even after fighting began, Medary refused to accept that war was 
the only way to settle sectional differences. From his perspective, abo­
litionists and Eastern businesses were influencing decisions in Wash­
ington and therefore should be held accountable, with the Republican 
administration, for precipitating the fighting. In the Crisis he re­
flected, "For sixty years our Government was administered on the ba­
sis of National and State Independence, as defined by Jefferson. We 
prospered in peace and industry until we became the wonder of the 
world." The South was wrong in seceding from the Union, Medary 
asserted. On the other hand, because of the doctrine of states' rights, 
he sympathized with Southerners because, in his mind, the North had 
perpetuated wrongs against the South. He charged that the rebellion 
should not have surprised Washington politicians because "the equi­
librium of the National and State Governments has been broken."61 
The issues, of course, ran much deeper and the causes of the con­
flict were much more complicated and bipartisan than Medary de­
picted them. Abolition played a role, but causes for the war were 
legion and had been intensifying for years. Instead of pointing to 
moral, social, or economic issues, however, the historian Michael 
Holt maintains that political distrust was the primary cause of the 
conflict. "The Civil War represented an utter and unique breakdown 
of the normal democratic political process," says Holt. In the two de­
cades preceding the war, all white Americans, he argues, became 
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obsessed with protecting their latitude to govern themselves and their 
freedom from threats to that right. For them, aristocratic advantage 
and consolidated power were the principal menace. Holt adds that the 
breakdown of the two-party system into sectional, fragmented coali­
tions representing special interests further fueled the fire. Each section 
of the country believed its own ideology was best for the whole. When 
their particular needs were not met, many Americans came to believe 
that the political process no longer worked. Avery Craven contends 
that the differences were beyond being geographically sectional. He 
says, "Emotions developed about differences, which by 1861 made it 
impossible longer to reason, to trust, or to compromise."62 These were 
the real cause. Groups within each section decided that other areas of 
the country were seeking to undermine Thomas Jefferson's ideal re­
public. Holt says, "Where they differed was in the way they defined 
the anti-republican plot and in the steps they took to combat it."63 
Party politics did not take a back seat even though the war threat­
ened the very existence of the country. Men of all political persuasions 
supported the conflict, but they did not lay party differences aside. 
In the words of the ecjitor of the Cleveland Plain Dealer, we "would 
have preferred that the fight be carried on between the extremes in 
the North and South, but since it is our country that solution is not 
possible."64 
Consistently defending Democrats who opposed the war, Medary 
noted that their cause was honorable, but they are "suspected of dis­
loyalty because they are unwilling to give up their portion of [these] 
rights."65 Medary believed Republicans had made major mistakes in 
judgment, but because they controlled the nation they could impose 
their questionable logic upon the entire country. In retaliation he put 
forth a radical plan to head off what he viewed as an attempt to anni­
hilate the Jeffersonian ideal. He predicted that the Middle Western 
states would "most assuredly either set up for themselves [as a sepa­
rate nation], or form a friendly alliance with the South."66 It was a 
wild claim, but one he saw as no more preposterous than the existing 
division between North and South. If the country could not function 
as a nation, perhaps it would be best to subdivide it fully. He believed 
the men making decisions in Washington were wrong because they 
had violated the Founding Fathers' basic principle of popular decision 
making. He also charged that the Republican Party was "inadequate 
to restore order, retain its own strength or act in harmony on any 
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great measure of national health." He felt the fight for states' and in­
dividual rights aligned Ohio with the South against tyranny in Wash­
ington. Medary also believed the Confederacy should be allowed 
back into the Union on its own terms. Ultimately, he saw the Buckeye 
State as being capable of deciding the future course of the nation: 
"Ohio may yet by her position hold the destinies of this nation and 
people in her hands."67 
Publishers had conditioned the public during the prewar years to 
read newspapers to make sense out of the charges, countercharges, 
and wild rumors that swirled around them. Continuing in partisan 
alignments that they had adhered to in previous decades, readers be­
lieved the only place they could get the truth was from the paper that 
represented their interests. As such, a British observer called American 
newspapers during the war the "People's Press." He commented that 
"everyone above the level of a casual laborer read [newspapers, 
which]... expressed views and prejudices that people often shared." 
Because the public was eager for news about friends and neighbors 
who had volunteered, increased circulation made publishers more 
prosperous. Even soldiers in the field, who were often out of touch 
with the overall progress of the war, were ravenous consumers of 
the latest news. One officer wrote that his men were so hungry for 
news that they "would shoot their generals if newspapers did not ar­
rive soon."68 
Although it quickly established itself as the leader of the Peace 
Democrat press, the Crisis was far from alone in its antiwar rhetoric. 
In Ohio, Unionists branded the Cincinnati Enquirer, the Cleveland 
Plain Dealer, and the Dayton Empire, along with many other smaller 
papers around the state, Copperhead because of their peace-seeking 
editorial stance. Of the 154 peace papers that operated during the 
war, some of the most prominent were the Chicago Times, the New 
York World, the New York Journal of Commerce, the Indianapolis 
Sentinel, and the La Crosse (Wisconsin) Democrat. Other peace pa­
pers were published in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Pennsyl­
vania. Ohio was a leader in the effort, however. The reason for this 
was that, in Medary's words, "If there is a state between the Atlantic 
and Pacific where the freedom of speech has fuller play than another, 
it is Ohio."69 
On July 21,1861, the first major battle of the war took place thirty 
miles southwest of Washington at Bull Run (Manassas Junction). 
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Although both armies fought poorly because of inexperience, the 
Confederates drove the Union troops back toward the capital in dis­
array. Peace Democrats charged mismanagement and bungling on the 
part of Union generals. The Union loss and Lincoln's subsequent re­
quest for 500,000 more volunteers (to serve three-year commitments) 
lent weight to Peace Democrats' antiwar pronouncements. Contrary 
to what many Northerners had predicted, this would not be a short 
war. Meanwhile, the Democrats fought to stop the conflict from esca­
lating into what they labeled "total war." They opposed a conflict 
whose goal was not only to restore the Union but to destroy the 
South's way of life.70 Medary contested Lincoln's call for more men 
and extended service. He charged that the president did not have the 
authority to call for additional volunteers without prior authorization 
from Congress, which he had not secured.71 
The aggressiveness of the Peace Democrats' campaign aroused 
many Northerners' uneasiness. In the eyes of Republicans, opposition 
to the administration's war goals represented resistance to the war 
and the Union, and a backlash against Peace Democrats began to 
manifest itself during the summer of 1861. In June Medary reported 
that a mob had seized a Democratic farmer in Stark County because 
his "freedom of speech was not at all agreeable to the abolitionists 
thereabouts."72 On August 22, in Canton, the Stark County Demo­
crat became the first peace paper in Ohio to pay for its dissent. Ohio­
ans who could not countenance the antiwar, antiadministration 
movement decided to put a stop to a Peace Democrat newspaper. A 
mob led by Union Army lieutenant Edward Meyer attacked the 
newspaper's offices at night and left it in shambles. Meyer's father 
was the mayor of Canton, and, embarrassed by his son's actions, he 
convinced the city council to pay three thousand dollars in damages to 
Archibald McGregor, editor of the Democrat. 
Within a month most Ohio Peace Democrat newspapers began to 
feel the heat. Threats from Republicans to tar and feather Peace 
Democrats, ride them out of town on a rail, or hang them became 
common. In Marion irate Unionists threateningly hanged a copy of 
the Mirror. Shortly after that, adversaries attacked the offices of the 
Express in Jackson and the Forum in Bucyrus. A Democrat who wit­
nessed one such frightening incident wrote: "The Abolish had an illu­
mination here last night. . . . [They] visited the houses of prominent 
Democrats—hissed, groaned, and throwed stones through the win­
dows. Their conduct would have shamed devils out of hell."73 
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Medary deplored the attacks and charged that the abuse against 
Democratic editors was a sign of Republicans' guilt about the war. He 
wrote that if the leaders of the country made decisions for all people 
based on pure and honest motives, they had nothing to fear from 
newspapers. On the other hand, he argued that readers should be free 
to decide if an editor was leading them astray. "If [newspapers] speak 
the truth . .  . the people should be enlightened," he said. Medary 
added, "If they pursue a contrary course . .  . the great mass of the 
people will laugh at them, and, if they advocate t r e a s o n , . .  . the law 
provides an ample remedy." Medary agreed that he was no more 
above the law than any other publisher, but he insisted upon equal 
rights for both Republican and Democratic editors. In an August edi­
torial he wrote, "While the law guarantees freedom of the press, it 
wisely holds every person answerable for the abuse of the privilege."74 
Medary did not escape 1861 wholly unscathed. By early summer 
several Republican papers had labeled him a traitor. In September the 
Cincinnati Gazette wrote that Medary was a secessionist and charged 
that the existence of the Crisis "threatens a Civil War in the North."75 
Medary, of course, did not back down. Reprinting the accusations, he 
told readers that he had expected such charges. He refuted the attack 
by saying that papers like the Gazette, "which print false and sensa­
tionalized stories," became confused when men like Medary con­
fronted them with real facts. He told readers the Crisis scared such 
papers because "the language we use is so different from theirs that 
they take it for granted that we must be somehow dangerous to the 
well-being of society." He advised readers that they should expect op­
position papers to attempt to discredit the Crisis. Part of his purpose, 
he wrote, was to make Republican publishers uncomfortable. He ex­
pected retribution because "we have struggled fruitfully to supply our 
readers with a different kind of food for the mind."76 
The four other newspapers in Columbus during the Civil War in­
cluded two dailies: the Ohio State Journal, the state Republican or­
gan, and the Ohio Statesman, the state Democratic organ. Weeklies 
were the Crisis, the Capital City Fact, and the Columbus Westbote, a 
German-language paper. The Crisis, the Statesman, and the Journal 
had the largest readerships. But the weekly circulation of the Crisis ex­
ceeded the daily circulation of the Statesman and Journal combined.77 
For Medary, his chief local newspaper opponent was the editor of 
the Journal, Issac Jackson Allen. Throughout the war they traded 
barbs not only on political issues but also on business practices, 
82 Chapter 4 
patriotism, and journalistic integrity. Medary editorialized that free­
dom of the press was definitely alive in Columbus because the people 
of the city were tolerant of this "vile abolition sheet [the Journal]." He 
added that the Journal's editorials had "stunk in the nostrils of the 
great mass of the people."78 In few of the early issues of the Crisis did 
Medary miss an opportunity to attack the Journal's opinions. In April 
he insisted, "We have pretty well proved by articles . .  . in our columns 
that the editor of the Journal is a 'traitor' of the very worst kind."79 
Not to be outdone, the Fact, in an article the Journal reprinted, ac­
cused Medary in the fall of being a member of the Knights of the 
Golden Circle. This was supposedly a secret society of pro-Southern 
Ohio men who, according to Unionists, intended to set up a Middle 
West Confederacy by force and replace Lincoln with Jefferson Davis. 
Given the rhetoric of the Peace Democrats, it is not surprising that 
Republicans continually speculated about the existence of the under­
ground group. Although the Democrats repeatedly stated that they 
would not stoop to using Unionist tactics (i.e., armed intimidation), 
staunch Northerners doubted them. With Medary's reiterated state­
ment that the Middle West should declare itself a separate nation, it 
followed that Unionists would link him with this nefarious group. But 
Unionists never proved a connection between Medary and any sub­
versive Democratic group. 
Lack of evidence never stood in the way of accusation during the 
war, however. In October the Fact claimed that during testimony a 
Marion Democrat whom Union officials were trying for treason had 
made a startling revelation. Reportedly he had revealed that Medary 
was secretly the head of the Knights of the Golden Circle. The same 
man accused Martin, publisher of the Statesman, of being a member 
of the organization and using the Statesman's office for Golden Circle 
meetings. Replying to the charges, Medary said he was not a member 
and he did not believe the clandestine organization even existed. "It is 
our honest conviction," he added, "that the whole affair was con­
cocted by a few dishonest politicians to influence well-meaning men 
to vote against Democratic party nominees."80 Feeling that the accu­
sation had damaged their reputations, however, Martin and Medary 
brought libel and slander charges against the editors of the Fact and 
the Journal. In December the Fact's editor sheepishly admitted to a 
grand jury that he lacked evidence to support the charges. Both the 
Fact and the Journal ran retractions.81 
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As Medary recuperated from this attempt to discredit him, he be­
came aware that his task was even more difficult than originally imag­
ined. His initial attempt to convince the people through the Crisis that 
taking up arms was not the answer to the nation's problems had 
failed, and he now faced the alarmingly real challenges of legal and 
armed intimidation. He recognized that Unionists intended to use 
whatever means possible to prevent Peace Democrats from question­
ing the wisdom of enforcing the Union's will on the rebellious South. 
The events of the previous few months went contrary to every tenet of 
the democratic belief system he had spent a lifetime promoting. 
As Medary saw it, the war had initially been about states' rights. 
But he became convinced that Northern politicians had changed its 
focus. He began to think that the original rallying cry had been merely 
a smoke screen. The shooting war was Mr. Lincoln's fight, not his. 
His dispute was with the Union politicians who intended to impose 
their vision of America on Middle Westerners by redefining individual 
freedoms. His answer was to escalate his campaign of words, to get 
Democrats to the polls to throw the self-serving politicians out of of­
fice. In the fall his editorials urged Ohio Democrats to marshal their 
forces in an attempt to turn the tide of war by winning the November 
elections. The rallying cry of his campaign in print became "The Con­
stitution as it is, and the Union as it was." Medary was discouraged, 
but he also believed that his Crisis represented the best chance for the 
public to learn the truth about the war that corrupt politicians had in­
volved them in. 
"Our Troubles Thicken upon Us at 
a Whirlwind?ace" 
In June 1861 a regular reader of the Crisis wrote Samuel Medary ask­
ing if he might pay the two-dollar subscription cost by serving as a re­
porter. Medary answered that anyone was welcome to write articles 
and to send them to the Crisis, but he had no obligation to pay for 
submissions. But he assured readers that if he decided to publish an 
item, he would not charge the writer for publishing it. 
Medary also used the occasion to note that he did not agree with 
hiring correspondents and had no respect for newspapers that em­
ployed reporters and other "non-professional writers." He argued 
that the practice, which began in the 1830s, had proven to be a curse. 
He called it that because, in his words, "Correspondents, who write 
for a living . .  . are compelled to hunt for something, true or false, gen­
erally the latter, to earn their bread." He contended that hiring writers 
and paying them for articles had "nearly destroyed all the character 
newspapers ever had, both for sincerity and veracity." Journalism was 
changing, but Medary persisted in his belief that a newspaper's con­
tent should represent solely the values of the publisher. He wrote that 
as publisher of the Crisis he stood behind everything printed in its 
pages. He said, "If a man does not write what he feels and feel respon­
sible for what he writes, he abuses his own intellect, and does a gross 
wrong to the public." He reiterated that the purpose of his newspaper 
was to scrutinize issues and to preserve his observations as a record 
from which future generations could discover the truth. Medary 
firmly believed that he wrote for "the public good and with unselfish 
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ambition." He concluded that use of money to secure news corrupted 
the journalistic process and subverted freedom of the press.1 
He acknowledged that many sentiments expressed in the Crisis 
were unpopular while standing by his conviction that "coercion of the 
mind is worse than coercion of the body—as there is a writ of habeas 
corpus to release the latter, but no such writ to rescue the former."2 
With these comments he represented himself as more than a partisan 
journalist. He had strong opinions about the practice of journalism. 
His one-man Crisis operation indicates that he trusted no one to help 
him interpret events. By hiring others he might have expanded his op­
eration and influence, but throughout the war the Crisis remained a 
passionately personal undertaking. 
While Medary cited Thomas Jefferson as inspiring his faith in the 
preeminence of press freedom, he also drew encouragement and inspi­
ration from a Civil War contemporary, the Massachusetts lawyer 
Wendell Phillips, a constitutional theorist. By reprinting Phillips's 
statements Medary highlighted his peculiar ability to agree publicly 
with another man on certain ideas while differing with him on others. 
Phillips expressed an ardent free-press philosophy but at the same 
time favored abolition—a fact Medary failed to mention in the Crisis. 
The two men initially found common ground beyond their view of the 
press because Phillips was a harsh critic of Abraham Lincoln's admin­
istration. In addition, he opposed all attempts to suppress newspa­
pers. As a popular orator and writer, he admonished Americans that 
the mob execution of Elijah Lovejoy was a symbolic attack on the 
Constitution. Reiterating Jeffersonian ideology, Phillips wrote, "The 
community that will not protect its most ignorant and unpopular 
member in the free utterance of his opinions, no matter how false or 
hateful, is only a gang of slaves."3 
During the early months of the war Medary regularly cited 
Phillips's comments on press freedom to support his peace agenda. 
But as the war progressed he gradually distanced himself from Phillips 
because the New Englander moderated his stand so he could support 
the Union effort. If the Union is a ship of state, Phillips reasoned, "It is 
necessary to throw everything overboard that we may float. It is a 
mere question of whether you prefer the despotism of Washington or 
that of Richmond."4 Despite the apparent betrayal of men like 
Phillips, Medary refused to be swayed from his First Amendment 
stand simply because it was a time of national strife. To the contrary, 
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for him the war was only one means the abolitionist-influenced ad­
ministration used to stifle freedom. Others might fall for the strategy, 
but he refused. In a Crisis editorial he sought to defend his efforts, 
writing, "Our personal liberties mainly depend upon the preservation 
of our Constitution; from it we derive our r igh t . .  . to speak and pub­
lish and investigate the acts of public officers." He added that there 
was an immense amount of work to be done because guarding against 
politicians would keep all newspapers busy for a long time.5 
In fact, politicians' activities in Washington never ceased to give 
Medary cause for alarm. As the administration sought to deal with the 
Confederate threat, it set in motion principles that would affect the 
country long after the war. With the war effort initially going badly 
for the North, both on the battlefield and behind the lines, President 
Lincoln sought to centralize federal authority in the Executive 
Branch. On the battlefront he personally made recommendations for 
strategy, and he replaced generals when he believed they were not ag­
gressively carrying out these recommendations. Behind the lines he 
and other administration officials used the conflict as justification for 
increasing restrictions of civilians' rights. There was real concern in 
Washington that secessionist and peace movement activities could 
cripple the Union effort to win the war and maintain civil obedience. 
Medary saw Lincoln's assertive moves as a clear signal that the 
federal government intended to strip Americans of their personal free­
dom and way of life. The country was out of control; the war had 
gained a momentum all its own. At the end of 1861 he wrote, "Our 
troubles thicken upon us at a whirlwind pace." His efforts to head off 
fighting had failed, and he wrote of his dejected state: "The gleam of 
light of yesterday is turned to thick, impenetrable darkness today by 
some new turn in the wheel of events."6 
On August 7,1861, Medary and other Peace Democrats gathered 
in Columbus for their first state convention and argued about how 
they might oppose continuation of the war. Many of the delegates de­
nounced Lincoln's actions in dealing with dissension. Others could 
not bring themselves to support Medary's plan to seek an accommo­
dation with the South, nor could they fully support a resolution to ap­
peal to the administration to stop short of total war. The group that 
proposed this radical program was substantial, however, and it suc­
ceeded in nominating Medary for governor. But his candidacy was 
stillborn. Fellow Democratic leaders agreed with him in principle, but 
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they knew that at this point in the war most Ohioans saw his strategy 
as too extreme and would vote against him. Even Medary conceded 
that he could have a greater impact by continuing to devote himself to 
the Crisis. Declining the nomination, he stated, "We would prefer a 
couple of thousand new subscribers to any public station in the coun-
try."7 The convention settled on Hugh Jewett as a compromise candi­
date. He supported both the administration's efforts and the Medary 
faction's idea of holding a convention of states to settle the war. Al­
though the platform divided Peace Democrats, delegates left the con­
vention confident that because of rising public distaste for the war 
they could win in November. 
A month later, War Democrats and Republicans met in Columbus 
and held a coalition convention that resulted in the formation of the 
Ohio Union Party. Because of the bipartisan makeup of the conven­
tion, it had no choice but to nominate a compromise candidate. The 
delegates chose former Stephen Douglas supporter and War Demo­
crat David Tod for governor and Republicans for other important 
posts on the state ticket. The party's platform included pledges to sup­
port the war and the Union at all costs but made no mention of its po­
sition on slavery. 
Between the conventions and the election radical Unionists ran­
sacked more peace newspapers in Ohio. One of those was the Cler­
mont County Sun, the paper Medary had founded with Thomas 
Morris. Following the attack on the Sun, Medary commented, "It is 
something new in this land of freedom to carry elections by suppress­
ing newspapers, but such seems to be the tenor of the land."8 It is 
impossible to gauge the impact of such incidents on the election, but 
the Union ticket won overwhelmingly, capturing both houses of the 
legislature and the governor's seat. Tod, who owned coal, iron, and 
railroad companies in Mahoning County, was an experienced politi­
cian and businessman. During his twenty-four months in office he 
dealt aggressively with Democratic dissent in Ohio, turning Medary 
against him. 
Despite the Peace Democrats' loss at the polls, 1862 was an impor­
tant year for them. During most of the year the results of the war ef­
fort were mixed. Southern victories on the battlefield and growing 
Northern casualty lists substantiated Peace Democrat claims that the 
war was an enormous blunder. At the battle of Shiloh in early April, 
more than two thousand Ohio soldiers were either killed or wounded. 
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Increasingly the cost of the war in lives struck Ohioans personally. In 
battle after battle that year, mismanagement or bungled opportunities 
by Union commanders led to losses or incomplete victories. Stagger­
ing numbers of casualties accompanied each military encounter. The 
Confederate Army pushed Northern forces back from Richmond in 
the Seven Days battles. Union troops lost a second engagement at Bull 
Run and suffered through the bloodiest single day of the war in Sep­
tember at Antietam. 
Lincoln stripped Ohio general George McClellan of his command 
because he failed to pursue Robert E. Lee's forces following Antietam. 
At the same time the president used the partial victory to announce the 
Emancipation Proclamation. This document effectively altered the na­
ture of the war from a sectional conflict to a moral struggle to free the 
slaves. Lincoln's action outraged Peace Democrats. Medary charged 
that radical abolitionists, led by men like "General" Horace Greeley, 
had forced "Massa" Lincoln to issue the proclamation. The allegation 
was untrue, but for Medary the impact of Greeley's "Prayer of Twenty 
Millions" editorial affirmed Greeley's influence.9 In his column 
Greeley asked Lincoln to abolish slavery, and the president responded 
that he intended to do exactly that. Medary countered that Greeley's 
dream for the Union was quite different from his own. He said it "is a 
very different vision from that which our fathers gave us, and which 
our Democratic soldiers entered the army to fight for."10 
In the Crisis Medary charged that the only way emancipation 
would ever be carried out would be "under the iron rule of despo-
tism."11 It was bad enough that Americans were killing each other 
over an issue in which Peace Democrats believed the federal govern­
ment should not be meddling, but with the president's announced in­
tention of freeing the slaves on January 1, 1863, Peace Democrats 
refused to support the war in any way. They refused to sanction a 
campaign in which white men's blood was being shed to liberate what 
Medary called "wooly heads." Peace Democrats amended Medary's 
slogan to read: "The Constitution As It Is, The Union As It Was, and 
the Negro Where He Is."12 Hearing of Lincoln's decree, Medary said, 
"We have at last hit upon the lower round of our national existence." 
He declared the emancipation announcement a "Mexican Pronun­
ciamento; the moment is frightful."13 
Lincoln's concern for the slaves had been evident since the 1850s, 
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but his position on slavery evolved as the war progressed. The 1858 
Republican platform was the first in U.S. history to elevate slavery to 
a question of morality. It accentuated the fundamental philosophical 
difference between Republicans and Peace Democrats.14 Because 
Peace Democrats supported the Jeffersonian ideal that to be indepen­
dent an individual needed to hold property, they considered blacks, 
few of whom owned land, inferior. During his 1858 debates with 
Douglas, Lincoln voiced his conviction that the Declaration of Inde­
pendence never sought to guarantee freedom for white men only. 
Contrary to Medary's convictions, Lincoln cited the Declaration of 
Independence instead of the Constitution as the guiding philosophy 
behind his political thought. He said he agreed with Douglas that 
black people were not his equal in many respects. But, "In the right to 
eat the bread, without the leave of anybody else, which his own hand 
earns, he i s . .  . the equal of every living man."15 
Early in the war, however, Lincoln had held a position on slavery 
not unlike Medary's. Lincoln believed that the Constitution forced 
him to uphold the right of Americans to possess slaves. In August 
1862 he wrote Greeley, "If I could save the Union without freeing any 
slave I would do it."16 Eric Foner and Olivia Mahoney maintain that 
this is the hallmark of Lincoln's political technique. He was successful 
because of his ability to be flexible and to show a capacity for growth 
on issues. He acknowledged that the war dictated events to him; he 
did not dictate to the war.17 Lincoln always made certain there was 
public support for a cause before throwing the weight of the federal 
government behind it. He exhibited this strategy on the issue of eman­
cipation when he changed his mind about making it an issue worth 
fighting for after initially declining to do so. In the words of Foner and 
Mahoney, "Lincoln understood that the war had created a fluid situa­
tion that placed a premium on flexibility and made far-reaching 
change inevitable."18 The president decided to issue his proclamation 
because he came to believe that the prospect of ending slavery would 
motivate the Northern public to win the war. 
Peace Democrats meanwhile refused to alter their view of emanci­
pation. They saw it as a political scheme to erode the working-class 
white man's freedom. Before Lincoln's pronouncement Medary 
feared the end of slavery because of the impact it would have on tradi­
tional American society. In a Crisis column he wrote, "The great mass 
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of our people regret the existence of slavery and would rejoice to abol­
ish it." But "those who endeavor to abolish slavery . .  . however con­
scientious they may be, are endangering the liberties of their country 
and promoting rebellion," he added.19 
Medary could not see white control of blacks—"creatures 
apart"—as morally wrong. In March 1862 he theorized, "The negro 
is a negro and not a white man . . . negro slavery is no slavery at all, 
but the normal condition of the African."20 As a traditional Jackson­
ian Democrat, he refused to consider the issue from a humanitarian 
perspective. He was unwilling to change his opinion on the issue even 
though the majority of Ohioans had. Medary looked at emancipation 
as another parfof an abolitionist political conspiracy to strip white 
Americans of their constitutional right to life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of property (happiness). In the July 4 issue of the Crisis he warned 
readers about the perils of emancipation. He wrote that "a man of 
more discernment than notoriety, told us fifteen years ago that the 
people of the Northern states would someday lose their own liberties 
in a vain endeavor to give liberty to the negroes."21 Even more impor­
tant, Medary was certain that emancipation would permit cheap 
black labor to overrun Ohio, robbing farmers and laborers of their 
jobs. This had been a concern of the working classes in the Middle 
West for several decades. It manifested itself as violent opposition 
both before and during the Civil War. 
Beginning in the 1850s, labor leaders in the North had used blacks 
as strikebreakers in an attempt to reduce white laborers' wage de­
mands. At one point during the war, one Republican displayed an un­
usual understanding of the Democratic revulsion toward abolition. 
He wrote that, contrary to Republican claims, Democratic concern 
over abolition had nothing to do with principles or patriotism but was 
purely economic: "It is not a question of loyalty, but.  . . one of bread 
and butter."22 In the summer of 1862, fear of emancipation precipi­
tated renewed violence among the laboring classes in the North, with 
anti-Negro demonstrations and riots in many cities. In July a distur­
bance broke out on the Toledo docks after mostly Irish stevedores re­
fused to work alongside contraband blacks. Some of the most serious 
violence occurred in Cincinnati. One white observer there remarked, 
"The levees yesterday were so dark with negroes that pedestrians 
found it difficult to peregrinate without lanterns."23 Shipyard owners 
had hired blacks to replace striking Irish dockworkers. Soon after­
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ward, black neighborhoods became targets of white rioting. The vio­
lence continued for several days, and many houses in Shantytown, the 
Negro section of town, burned. Struck with "negrophobia"—fear 
that blacks were overrunning the North—out-of-work laborers also 
took out their frustration on blacks in Chicago, Detroit, and New 
York City. And without anticipating the inflammatory ramifications 
of its action, the War Department transported several railroad cars of 
black laborers to southern Illinois to help harvest crops. (Because so 
many farmers had become soldiers, crops were rotting in the fields.) 
Upon the blacks' arrival, however, violent opposition forced military 
commanders to return them to camps south of the Ohio River.24 
During 1862 Medary dealt with emancipation and freedom of the 
press in nearly every issue of the Crisis. He despised abolitionists, 
maintaining that they were at the root of the country's racial and 
therefore sectional problems. He missed few opportunities to depict 
them as the most evil individuals in America. According to Medary, 
they were "infidels in black coats and white neck ties, with Bibles in 
one hand and bowie knives in the other."25 Early in 1862 he cam­
paigned for Ohio to be excluded from being "a harbor for free 
'niggers'" (a pejorative he regularly employed). More than 30,000 
people signed a petition that was sent to the Ohio legislature opposing 
emancipation, but with the General Assembly under Republican con­
trol, no action was forthcoming.26 For Medary the issues of emancipa­
tion, of Northerners dying for a questionable cause, and of the 
indebtedness politicians were imposing on Middle Westerners to sus­
tain the war were inextricably linked. In a Crisis commentary he la­
mented, "Tens of thousands of white men must bite the dust to allay 
the Negro mania of the president." He added that "a half million 
more are called for and millions of debts are yet to be saddled upon 
the people to carry out this single Negro idea."27 
The moralistic editorials of abolitionist editors made emancipa­
tion a rallying issue. "Seldom if ever in American politics has an issue 
so polarized the major parties."28 In Congress during 1862, ninety-six 
percent of all Democrats voted against measures that would have af­
firmed emancipation, while ninety-nine percent of Republicans fa­
vored them. With a majority on Capitol Hill, Republicans could easily 
pass bills to free the slaves, but they moved cautiously, fearing Middle 
Western repercussions at the polls in the fall.29 The Republicans might 
as well have proceeded, because Peace Democrats brought up the 
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issue at every opportunity. They referred to Republicans as the "party 
of fanaticism," which "intended to free 'two or three million semi-
savages' to 'overrun the North' . . . and 'mix with their sons and 
daughters.' "30 It was negrophobia at its worst. 
Another federal mandate in 1862 further heightened the tension 
between Middle Western Peace Democrats and the Lincoln adminis­
tration. By summer, when it became apparent the war would not end 
quickly, Lincoln again called for extended three-year enlistments for 
Union soldiers. Unlike the year before, however, the combined effect 
of the peace movement and discouraging war news made it difficult 
for Ohio to meet its new minimum. Recognizing the obstacle, the 
president quickly issued a draft order to county militias in the early 
fall to fill the quotas. Peace Democrats vehemently objected to what 
Medary called the "dread command." They opposed a military draft 
for three reasons: (1) it represented another governmental infringe­
ment on individual liberties; (2) the president's presumed authority to 
take the action, without Congress's authority, was another violation 
of the Constitution; and (3) it established a network of provost mar­
shals to whom the War Department had granted authority to enforce 
the draft. After violent confrontations greeted recruitment efforts, the 
president granted the provost marshals additional control. In so do­
ing, he proclaimed, "All persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, 
resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid 
and comfort to the rebels" subjected themselves to martial law.31 
In July Congress backed the president's steps to deal more force­
fully with civilian interference with the war effort by passing the Trea­
son Act. It declared that any person who aided a rebellion against the 
United States or its law would be tried for sedition. Those convicted of 
the charges would be imprisoned "for a period not exceeding ten 
years . .  . [or by] a fine not exceeding $10,000." Medary labeled the 
act another poorly veiled attempt to restrict freedom of the press. He 
added, however, "We shall, like a good and loyal citizen, do our best 
to not violate one single section. If we do, we shall take it back when­
ever the Ohio State Journal [the state Republican organ in Columbus] 
will point it out."32 One historian says the act "resembled in every 
way but name the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798," but it was never 
used by the Union government to prosecute newspaper publishers 
during the war.33 
County officials, who were in charge of recruiting, began offering 
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bounty money to induce local men to enlist, but this enticement led to 
widespread corruption. Some men collected bounties in several coun­
ties, and wealthy draftees who did not want to fight paid poorer men 
to substitute for them. Others accepted the bounty money, only to 
desert. The substitution policy further convinced Peace Democrats 
that the rich and influential occupied favored positions in America. It 
proved to them that the blood on the battlefields was being shed pri­
marily by the have-nots in American society, and that this was a rich 
man's war but a poor man's fight—a view shared by poor Southerners. 
Yet even bounty money was an insufficient lure in many areas. The 
militia draft met with fierce resistance throughout the Middle West. 
Opposition mobs wounded a draft commissioner in Wisconsin and 
murdered two enrollment officers in Indiana. Democratic leaders, led 
by such men as Lancaster's Dr. Edson Olds, made many public 
speeches urging obstruction of recruiting efforts or exhorting already 
enlisted men to desert. They counseled men that by changing the focus 
of the war from saving the Union to freeing the slaves, the administra­
tion had absolved them of dying for the North. In July Governor Tod 
retaliated. Using power granted him by the War Department, he had 
Olds arrested and sent to Fort Lafayette in New York harbor. State 
officials arrested eleven other Ohioans for similar activities during 
1862, including William Allen, who spent several weeks incarcerated 
at Camp Chase in Columbus. Medary printed letters from the impris­
oned men and decried the fact that military authorities were holding 
them in deplorable conditions without filing formal charges.34 Before 
the end of the year, it was necessary to deploy troops in all the Middle 
Western states to enforce recruitment. 
Medary was able in the Crisis to influence subscribers' opinions; 
Republican newspapers did the same for their readers. The partisan 
reading habits that publishers had ingrained in the minds of the popu­
lace persisted throughout the war. Parties' devotees looked to their re­
spective newspapers for an "accurate" interpretation of reality. 
Because their versions varied, partisan newspapers spent much time 
attacking each other. 
Medary vigorously tried to prove his views and undermine opposi­
tion newspapers. He consistently blamed Republican papers for in­
flaming a jingoistic spirit among Americans. He reprinted stories from 
Republican papers to show that they practiced poor journalism and 
therefore could be depended upon only to mislead their readers. In a 
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December 1861 editorial he informed readers that his writing was un­
like that seen in Republican papers. He wrote, "Our purpose has not 
been to indiscriminately publish the 'news,' as it came to hand, nine-
tenths of which is either pure fiction or so distorted by the writers for 
some ignoble purpose, that it is little better than falsehood." He ad­
vised them that they could rely on the honesty of the Crisis, since its 
purpose was "to cull from this mass of contradictions what comports 
with the facts, and may be thus relied upon with some certainty by the 
reader."35 
Under the headline "Why the Public Mind Is Bewildered," Medary 
told readers why he believed the "cheap, sensation press had become 
disgraceful to American journalism." He argued, "It was the 'yellow­
covered' cheap literature that first sapped the morals of the rising gen­
eration, and prepared the public mind for a worse species of moral 
ethics in cheap newspapers."36 He regularly chided Republican news­
papers for speculating on the progress of the war and for printing un­
substantiated rumors about Peace Democrats. Medary was not 
imagining that these things happened. Many newspaper editors 
across the political spectrum relied on nonprofessional sources to ful­
fill readers' appetites for news about the war, and there were extensive 
abuses. Besides publishing Associated Press dispatches and exchange 
stories, editors routinely published stories from freelance correspon­
dents and civilian letter writers. The reporters often wrote more opin­
ion than news. "There was much speculation, hero-worship, gossip, 
exaggeration, bias and misinformation."37 In addition to ongoing edi­
torial commentary, it was common for Confederate sympathizers to 
plant rumors in Republican papers concerning Peace Democrat activi­
ties. Northern secessionist conspirators, who were considerably more 
pro-Southern than Peace Democrats, were often behind such subver­
sive activities.38 They hoped that by encouraging distrust in the North 
they could perpetuate divisiveness that would aid the Southern cause. 
Regardless of the source of their information, Republican and 
abolitionist papers competed fiercely with their Peace Democrat 
counterparts. Both sides seemed bent on determining how low they 
could descend in assailing each other's rhetoric and activities.39 Be­
cause Peace Democrats were not in power, they paid a higher price for 
dissent than their Republican adversaries. A few Republican newspa­
pers even encouraged readers to use force to close Peace Democrat pa­
40pers.  The campaign against the dissident press grew in ferocity 
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during 1862 as civilian attacks were aided and abetted by official gov­
ernment action. A new phase of censorship began in February 1862 
when the president placed the U.S. Postal Service under the jurisdic­
tion of the War Department. This made it possible for military officers 
to restrict the use of the mail by dissident papers in their districts. In 
addition, the War Department granted officers the authority to enter 
and close the offices of newspapers that they deemed guilty of ob­
structing the war effort. Military leaders even gave battlefield com­
manders the right to stop peace papers from being received by men 
under their command.41 
In June federal troops arrested the Democratic editor of the 
drcleville (Ohio) Watchman, John Kees, for antiadministration sen­
timents. Troops shut down his newspaper and sent him to prison in 
Washington, were he remained until 1864. In the same month the 
postmaster in Wheeling, West Virginia, A. W. Campbell, banned the 
Crisis from the mail in his state. Campbell, who was also publisher of 
the Republican Wheeling Intelligencer, accused Medary of "disloyalty 
to the government of the United States."42 By this action Campbell 
took revenge on Medary for repeated editorial comments that West 
Virginia was not legally a state. When Virginia seceded from the 
Union in 1861, many individuals in the western counties near the 
Ohio River remained loyal to the North and formed a separate state. 
Union strategists were happy to keep the Baltimore & Ohio railroad 
line, which ran through this part of Virginia, in Northern control for 
military reasons. Medary considered creation of the state unconstitu­
tional and erroneously but repeatedly called the new state "Western" 
Virginia. 
The War Department took additional action against an Ohio 
newspaper in October when provost marshals arrested Archibald 
McGregor, editor of the Stark County Democrat. They confined him 
for a month at Camp Mansfield but filed no charges. After the inci­
dent Medary commented, "The whole Republican press is jubilant— 
what a crew of modern devils these abolitionist editors are."43 Despite 
McGregor's arrest, the Democrat continued to go to press under the 
direction of McGregor's wife, who refused to back down from her 
husband's antiadministration rhetoric. Two weeks after taking over 
his publishing duties, she remarked in an editorial, "The administra­
tion is drunk with power, addicted to tyranny, [and] characterized by 
imbecility."44 Medary pointed to Mrs. McGregor's work as a sign of 
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the unwavering courage of Peace Democrats in Ohio. He wrote, "Let 
tyrants blush—a noble wife, a true woman is filling her husband's 
post admirably."45 
During the war, opponents of Peace Democrat editors suppressed 
or destroyed the property of nearly one hundred newspapers.46 Peace 
newspaper editors throughout the country suffered from the actions 
of either civilian groups or military authorities. Unionists attacked pa­
pers in New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New York, Iowa, 
Kansas, Missouri, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana.47 Civilian mobs usually 
destroyed presses and type and burned paper and furniture from the 
newspaper offices. Peace editors were forced to rebuild their shops at 
a time when most were barely getting by anyway because the content 
of their newspapers limited advertising and circulation. Many went 
out of business because they could not find financing. Others did not 
rebuild because their constituency was so poor that it was not worth 
their while. 
Despite constant threats, dissident editors refused to moderate 
their opposition. In December 1862 Medary assailed Governor Tod 
as a "political scalawag." He was outraged at the governor's order to 
halt distribution of the Peace Democrat Cleveland Herald along 
Northern railroad lines in Ohio. Medary noted that Tod's directive 
was most notably being enforced along the tracks served by the Cleve­
land & Mahoning Railroad, of which Tod was president.48 In nearly 
every issue of the Crisis, Medary repeated his conviction that the 
events of the previous few months were part of a general conspiracy. 
He charged, "The cursed abolitionists,' Greeley and his crowd, 
are slowly destroying the nation in order to change the status of the 
Negro."49 
Month after month, Peace Democrats and Republicans charged 
and countercharged that each was to blame for continuation of the 
war. As part of the campaign they accused one another of political in­
trigue. Republicans made particularly effective use of this tactic as the 
party in control at the federal and state level. They hoped to convince 
the public that Peace Democrats were engaging in subversive activities 
in order to wrest political control from them. 
Peace Democrats, on the other hand, condemned Republicans for 
using emancipation as an excuse to prosecute the war and subvert in­
dividual liberty. Both parties exaggerated their effectiveness in affect­
ing the course of the war and suspected the other of plotting or 
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carrying out insurgent activities. Their suspicions were the logical 
consequence of the years of political combat preceding the war. Each 
party believed its own vision of the future of the Republic and feared 
that political opponents were undermining it. 
Jean Baker notes that American political culture had bred mistrust 
from the eighteenth century on. "After the revolution, Americans re­
tained an apprehensiveness that became the distinguishing character­
istic of their republicanism," she writes. Following the Revolutionary 
War, many Americans wanted only a civilian militia. The warnings of 
conservative writers had convinced them that in times of peace, 
a standing army would become mercenary and victimize the public. 
In the years before the Civil War both parties printed pamphlets 
cautioning Americans to be on guard against the tyranny of a stand­
ing army.50 
Peace Democrats wholeheartedly supported the existence of an 
army to fight frontline battles, but the presence of such military per­
sonnel as provost marshals in noncombat areas indicated to them that 
the federal government was attempting to extend its control over the 
Middle West. Before the war the only representatives of the federal 
government that most Ohioans had contact with were postmasters. 
The provost marshals, however, outsiders who were assigned areas 
throughout the Northern states, became a visible token of the per­
ceived oppressiveness of the Lincoln government. The War Depart­
ment had originally assigned them to enforce the militia draft. But 
with the widespread dissent, the administration broadened their au­
thority to include many other duties, most of which were left to their 
own interpretation. Many marshals were vindictive. Some "interfered 
with elections, arrested local Democrats, sent troops to destroy oppo­
sition presses, monitored church services, released slaves, and con­
ducted military trials."51 
Medary became convinced that with each new measure to deal 
with dissent in the Middle West, the president was laying the ground­
work to make himself dictator of the United States. Lincoln had 
heightened Peace Democrats' fear when, during the first eighty days 
of his administration and before Congress convened on July 4,1861, 
he had taken unprecedented steps. Without congressional approval, 
he blockaded Southern ports, increased the size of the regular army, 
ordered the disbursement of government money, and suspended the 
writ of habeas corpus in Maryland. Medary pointed out that the civil 
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wars in Europe that had preceded the American conflict had all re­
sulted in authoritarian regimes. He said, "Power in the hands of one 
so utterly incompetent as Mr. Lincoln will cause the people to stand 
aghast at the premonitions of disaster . . . that threaten on every 
hand." This was only to be expected, because "the crazy and reckless 
brains of the country [the abolition press] control him."52 
At the same time that the administration declared martial law in 
the Middle West, restraints on commerce brought another economic 
depression to Ohio. The War Department hoped to choke supply lines 
to the Confederacy and shorten the war. Trade between the Ohio and 
Mississippi Valleys had begun in the 1790s and had grown markedly 
during the years preceding the Civil War. With the Mississippi River 
blockaded, however, Southern markets for Ohio produce were no 
longer available. Medary blamed New England business interests for 
these difficulties. He claimed the trade barrier was bringing absolute 
bankruptcy to the Middle West: "The blockade is killing us, instead 
of injuring the South."53 Medary always underscored the negative ef­
fect of political action on working people. He wrote in nearly every is­
sue of the Crisis about the "terrible suffering" the administration's 
policies were bringing to the laboring class. He sadly observed, 
"Thousands are out of employ and many [are] starving to death."54 
His emphasis on the workingman's plight was another indication 
that Medary continued to see the war as a sectional conflict. Unlike 
Republicans, he viewed sectional strife as existing between not only 
North and South but between New England and the Middle West as 
well. New England interests, he felt, were dictating the country's eco­
nomic policies. It did not help their image in the eyes of Middle West­
erners that sixty percent of abolitionists were from New England.55 
Medary called New England businessmen "Lords of the Looms." In a 
typical anti-Northeast editorial, he declared: "The West will not bleed 
at every pore because well-preserved and fanatical New England de­
clares that such is her patriotic duty."56 Medary told readers that New 
England's greed had originally driven the South out of the Union. 
Now it was attempting to make the Middle West its slave and servant. 
As evidence he cited the railroad monopolies and the president's new 
taxes and tariffs. He saw them as benefiting companies in the East at 
the expense of the agrarian Middle West, and his accusations were 
not totally without foundation.57 "The war was largely financed in the 
East; the East got the lion's share of government war contracts . . . 
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they were shifting their investments from trade to manufacturing." 
And most New England business leaders were Republican.58 
A majority of people in the Middle Western states shared 
Medary's long-standing belief in the superiority of their region. Be­
tween 1820 and 1860 most publications referred to the area as the 
Great West—"An Experiment in Humanity." According to David 
Donald, "This opinion persisted through . .  . scores of private letters, 
stacks of sermons and piles of newspapers and literary journals" 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Many in the up­
per Ohio Valley honestly believed that "the Great West is destined to 
produce 'an enlarged and improved edition of . .  . the species man.'" 
Politicians from the area did not ask for leadership positions in the 
nation's political affairs; they demanded them. Middle Westerners, 
therefore, were easily offended when their vision was threatened. And 
they typically viewed Eastern industrial interests as instigating the 
slights.59 
To oppose New England's domination Medary repeated his 1861 
call for Ohio and the neighboring states either to establish a separate 
confederacy or to align with the South. Such an alliance would reopen 
Mississippi River trade routes and would force New Englanders to 
admit the error of their heavy-handed ways. Such a concept may seem 
fantastic today, but it troubled the president, who responded by plac­
ing great emphasis on the Western command of General Ulysses S. 
Grant. Lincoln closely monitored Grant's efforts to capture Vicks­
burg so the Union could control trade on the Mississippi River.60 
Peace Democrats were not concerned only about the material in­
fluence of New England interests, however. They had convinced 
themselves that the Puritan-Evangelical standards dominating New 
England religion lay behind the administration's steps to limit free­
dom. New Englanders, that is, were trying to impose their religious 
principles on the rest of the country. The Democratic Cincinnati 
Enquirer joined with the Crisis and other Peace Democrat papers in 
claiming this as a motivation. The Enquirer's editor, Washington 
McLean, said Ohioans opposed such views. New Englanders were 
"narrow and short-sighted . . . and they are intolerant, illiberal and 
cruel in their method of carrying them [their plans] out."61 Peace 
Democrats were exaggerating the influence of New England churches 
on Washington's thinking, but Robert Kelley feels that a sense of 
moralistic Republicanism did in fact guide the war effort. He notes, 
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however, that Union leaders built their perspective on more than a set 
of religious values. They drew their convictions from traditional Fed­
eralist and Whig thought, which championed a more unified national 
community. Unlike Peace Democrats, Republicans had updated their 
vision of America. Its origin notwithstanding, nationalism caused 
conservative Democrats grave concern.62 
Republicans more and more frequently referred to the Union as a 
nation, as opposed to a collection of states. The war was changing 
America's character. Nationalistic fervor threatened the Jacksonian-
Democratic ideal of individual and states' rights and the agrarian, 
Middle Western way of life. In addition, it undermined the lifestyle 
and freedom of the idyllic Jeffersonian yeoman farmer. The Republi-
can-controlled federal government needed a consensus to win the 
war, but Peace Democrats contended that the states preceded the fed­
eral government in existence and therefore in authority. Peace Demo­
crats viewed federal hegemony as a way for Washington politicians to 
ravage civil liberties. The established prewar Jacksonian-Democratic 
mission remained clear. Centralized federal authority represented the 
greatest threat to liberty, and Democrats' mission was to oppose its 
growth. Since Andrew Jackson's first presidential campaign, Demo­
crats had stressed that they "had to be fearlessly vigilant against the 
encroachment of power." They believed the struggle between central 
and self-government would always characterize the American politi­
cal experience.63 
As 1862 progressed, Peace Democrats increasingly opposed the 
administration's activities. In May, Medary cautioned Republicans, 
"Would to God, that the authorities were fully sensible to the great 
blunder they have made [and] of the slumbering volcano under-
neath."64 The reparation that leading Peace Democrats had in mind, 
however, was not violent in nature. They foresaw their party turning 
the tide by means of the ballot box. As Medary looked forward to the 
1862 elections he counseled subscribers, "In this state of despair there 
is only one hope left [a Democratic initiative]." He urged readers to 
support Peace Democrats, who stood for returning the country to its 
previous state. He exhorted them to join together in turning "every 
man out of office who is in the least tinged with abolitionism . .  . and 
all the 'isms' that curse the nation."65 
From the Democratic perspective the franchise was the greatest de­
fense against infringement on constitutional liberties. Peace Demo­
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crats had taken a beating at the polls the previous year. On July 4, 
1862, they met in Columbus for a state convention, which, they be­
lieved, presented an opportunity to reverse the nation's fortunes in the 
face of the overwhelmingly bad war news for the Union. The conven­
tion gained strength when several War Democrats reunited with the 
Peace faction of the party. They deserted the Union Party after war 
weariness began taking its toll. Although the news from the battlefield 
was bad enough, Medary did everything in his power to convince 
readers that the war was going even worse. In the Crisis he noted that 
after only a year lack of progress on the battlefield had tempered early 
optimism in the North. The promise that a superior Northern force 
could compel the Confederacy to rejoin the Union had become a pipe 
dream. In the words of Louise Stevenson, "the immediacy of privation 
and death began to outweigh the abstract goal of freedom" for the 
Northern public.66 
In nearly every issue of the Crisis Medary called the conflict a 
"monstrosity in every sense" that had no end in sight. He composed a 
list of the war's effects on everyday life in Ohio. "The resources of half 
the old Union [are] fastened up . .  . prices of commodities doubled, 
taxation quadrupled . . . and the bastard government administered 
but on the caprices of reckless 'wire-pullers' [lobbyists]."67 Moreover, 
Medary and other leading Peace Democrats maintained an exhaust­
ing schedule of speaking engagements in which they delivered their 
extreme rhetoric to large crowds. The messages appealed most to Irish 
and German Americans, who feared the loss of their jobs to cheap 
black labor. The many Southerners who had immigrated to Ohio and 
become known as "Butternuts" had brought their anti-Negro bias 
with them to the state. Many in these groups lacked access to current 
information and were poorly educated or illiterate, so their leaders 
brought the news to them in highly volatile, highly biased language. 
"They tried to scare people into voting for them."68 It often worked. 
During the state convention Peace Democrats depicted themselves 
as the only genuine defenders of the Constitution. Resounding de­
nouncements of the strong-arm measures the administration was us­
ing to deal with opponents of the war characterized the gathering. 
According to the speakers, such actions would help prolong the war. 
The delegates also claimed that the proposal to emancipate the slaves 
was unconstitutional. They did admit, however, that they could not 
hold President Lincoln responsible for all these actions, condemning 
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abolitionists for taking over control of the federal government and 
blaming them for discouraging Lincoln from following his (pre­
sumed) conservative inclinations.69 The delegates appointed Medary 
to the Committee on Resolutions and put together a platform that 
proposed withdrawing the Union Army from the South and arranging 
an armistice. Medary joined with many others in the party who 
openly criticized the president. They argued that Lincoln should be 
impeached, either for violating the Constitution or "for incompetence 
and idiocy."70 
Shortly after the Peace Democrat convention adjourned, Union 
party members in the General Assembly restructured the state's 
congressional districts to head off the anticipated Peace Democrat 
resurgence. Their gerrymandering, however, could not stem the 
tide of Peace Democrat feeling that swept across the Middle West in 
late 1862. 
With Ohio families receiving more bad news about casualties 
among relatives and friends almost daily and with the worsening eco­
nomic situation, Peace Democrats were able to score a major victory 
in the November elections. Allen, Vallandigham, and Medary had 
provided strong leadership during the campaign. Peace Democrats 
won fourteen of Ohio's nineteen congressional districts, and Medary 
proclaimed it "the turning point of the war." Peace Democrats even 
succeeded in electing Dr. Edson Olds, still a prisoner in New York, to 
the Ohio Senate. Medary ecstatically called the achievement "the 
greatest 'revolution' since the political triumph of Andrew Jackson [in 
1828]."71 He published a triumphant edition of the Crisis with a ban­
ner headline: "Unparalleled Democratic Victory at the Capital of 
Ohio." In the story beneath he wrote, "The whole city breathes free 
and easy . . . [because] the free negro and shoddy corruption went 
down in one fell swoop. . .  . Free press and a white man's government 
is [sic] fully established by this vote."72 It was the first Democratic ma­
jority victory in Ohio since 1853. Indiana, Illinois, and half of Wis­
consin also went to peace candidates and became openly anti-Lincoln 
in 1862.73 To account for their defeat Unionists blamed bad news 
from the front and the inability of many Republican soldiers to vote in 
absentia. But two major disappointments cast a shadow on the Peace 
Democrat victory: (1) No gubernatorial elections had been held in any 
of the Middle Western states. If the seats had been available, Peace 
Democrats would probably have secured even greater influence. (2) 
Vallandigham lost his bid for Congress. 
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The Ohio legislature's gerrymandering had failed, except in Val-
landigham's district. Medary had scolded Vallandigham in 1861 for 
being soft on congressional bills to fund the war, but shortly thereaf­
ter the two men formed an alliance based on the shared goal of a 
peaceful resolution with the South. In the 1862 campaign Valland­
igham was running for reelection to the House of Representatives 
against Union war hero Robert Schenck. During his campaign 
speeches, the disabled general proudly displayed the wound to his 
right wrist that he had received in August as a commander at the Sec­
ond Battle of Bull Run, but his heroism alone was not what won him 
the election. Legislative redistricting had placed him in a congres­
sional district more predominantly Republican than the one 
Vallandigham had previously represented.74 After Vallandigham's de­
feat, Medary branded the Republicans' remapping "disgraceful devil­
try" and added, "The abolitionists have only this satisfaction. They 
beat him [Vallandigham] by legislation, not by voting."75 
The election victory empowered Peace Democrats, since their fac­
tion had converted most Ohio Democrats to their point of view. They 
repeated their call for conciliation with the South and restoration of 
the Union to its presecession structure.76 The Peace Democrats' politi­
cal resurgence gave a boost to the Crisis. In November Medary re­
marked that subscriptions were increasing steadily. But despite the 
rising cost of ink and paper he declined to raise prices: "We will here­
after be the cheapest paper published. We owe no debt, receive no pa­
tronage and ask for no credit."77 Medary was funding much of the 
operating budget of the Crisis out of his own pocket, and it was strain­
ing his resources. On a Columbus (Franklin County) census report 
from 1862 he reported a thousand dollars in personal holdings but 
listed no business assets.78 Although he viewed himself as politically 
linked with like-minded Peace Democrats, he proudly clung to the 
fact that he published the Crisis independently. He owed no one for 
the labor or benefits of his undertaking, and he intended to keep it 
that way. 
In December Medary wrote that he received daily additional re­
quests "from the Atlantic to the Pacific" for subscriptions to the Cri­
sis. He noted that after two years of publication the Crisis enjoyed the 
largest circulation of any newspaper in Columbus.79 Medary claimed 
that he operated the Crisis solely for the people and added that he 
would continue with it only until, through lack of support, the people 
informed him that his undertaking was no longer worthwhile. Loyal 
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readers encouraged Medary by continually writing to affirm the im­
portance of the Crisis in their lives. One devoted subscriber said, "I 
would rather wear my old boots without soles than do without The 
Crisis."80 Medary reprinted similar messages in every edition. In a let­
ter from Delaware, Ohio, five men praised him. "The Crisis/' they 
wrote, "is the only paper through which men of intellect and states­
men of true patriotism can commune, and be heard without contract­
ing their ideas to please the straight-laced notions of private 
interests."81 Such accolades heartened Medary against regular con­
demnation from the Republican press. He needed the encouragement; 
although Peace Democrat fortunes were improving, events were mak­
ing his task ever more difficult. 
On September 24, 1862, Lincoln extended suspension of the writ 
of habeas corpus to the entire Union. Under Article 1 of the Constitu­
tion the president's action was illegal because Congress had not ap­
proved his authority to suspend the writ. Medary noted, "Mr. Lincoln 
admits that he has acted in violation of the law, but hopes that Con­
gress will legalize his illegal acts."82 Only the legislative branch of the 
federal government is allowed to suspend the writ "when in cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it."83 Congress fi­
nally did sanction the suspension six months later, on March 24, 
1863. During the intervening months Lincoln justified his action by 
asking rhetorically, "Are all laws, but one (the writ) to go unexecuted, 
and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?"84 
With his action—and others that had preceded it during 1862—the 
administration's message was that it would not tolerate flagrant civil­
ian dissent. 
Nevertheless, following their success at the polls, Peace Democrats 
were justifiably optimistic about prospects for reversing the course of 
events during the coming year. After all, many Middle Westerners had 
shown their renewed faith in them with their votes. According to 
James McPherson, as the year ended the Peace Democrats "com­
manded the support of a large minority of the [Democratic] party— 
perhaps even a majority."85 
"We Have Just Passed the Rubicon 
to the Season of Discussion" 
By the beginning of 1863 Samuel Medary considered the Crisis a suc­
cess. The Peace Democrats' 1862 election victory and the comments 
he received from subscribers had encouraged him to practice opposi­
tion journalism boldly. Typical of supportive readers' comments was 
a letter from Pennsylvania: "The Crisis is bound to flourish; its name 
is legion. I would not do without it for ten times the cost."1 Another, 
from Kansas, pronounced: "There is not a Democratic journal now 
published in the United States that I esteem as much." The writer 
concluded: "There is none other that develops the true and genuine 
principles of Democracy with equal energy and perspicuity as does 
The Crisis."2 
Medary said coast-to-coast circulation was ample reward for his 
efforts. Despite problems with periodic censorship of the Crisis by 
various postmasters, he continued to publish and distribute the most 
widely read Peace Democrat newspaper. He wrote, "Our paper seems 
equally well received wherever it is read From New Hampshire to 
the Rocky Mountains it appears to meet the wants of a very large por­
tion of our people." Medary's increased readership gave him hope 
that his editorials would generate a renewed "national sentiment fa­
vorable to a Union of the States at a future date."3 He made note of 
where his mail came from and what his readers did for a living. He 
regularly drew attention to farmers, who made up three-fourths of his 
subscribers. Most of the remaining readers were mechanics in small 
towns and villages. He told new subscribers that they could buy the 
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preceding two years' issues of the Crisis for four dollars, although he 
never said how many took him up on the offer. 
As the year began, Medary continued to hope discussion between 
the North and South could bring an end to the war, which he labeled 
"the mistaken strife." On January 21,1863, he wrote, "We have just 
passed the Rubicon, from Despotism and Military Bastilles, to the 
season of discussion. 1862 tried the nerve and courage of the military 
officer, 1863 will test the courage and ability of the statesmen."4 One 
of those statesmen, Abraham Lincoln, might have written the same 
words—but from a very different perspective. To him, men like 
Medary were part of the Union's problem. In January he told one 
Massachusetts senator, Charles Sumner, that he feared "the fire in the 
rear"—Peace Democrats in the Middle West—"more than our mili­
tary chances."5 Lincoln was responding to the 1862 elections, which 
showed that the Peace Democrats were gaining strength. The presi­
dent was not alone in his concern. Many other Northerners refused to 
wait for official policy to quell dissent. Zealous Unionists, spurred on 
by their distrust for anyone who challenged ardent patriotism, be­
came even less tolerant in 1863. 
Such Unionists quickly destroyed Medary's hope that 1863 would 
be the year in which cooler heads prevailed. On the night of March 5, 
during a fierce snowstorm, between one hundred and two hundred 
persons quietly made their way to Medary's office with the intent of 
stopping the paper's publication. Most were members of the Second 
Ohio Cavalry, which was reorganizing at Camp Chase (along the 
present Sullivant Avenue). They were recuperating after battling 
Southern sympathizers in Missouri and Kansas.6 
Union enlisted men believed papers like the Crisis were prolonging 
the war. Most of them were from the Western Reserve part of Ohio, 
and they had been influenced by the intolerant editorials that ap­
peared in the Ashtabula Sentinel and the Cleveland Leader.7 They 
maintained that Peace Democrat papers sent a message to the Confed­
eracy that it could win the war because the North was badly divided.8 
Confederate President Jefferson Davis did regard the Peace Demo­
crats as important in helping the Southern cause. He said he thought 
the movement was "large and strong enough . .  . to paralyze the war 
and majority party."9 The editor of the Cleveland Leader exercised 
little restraint in urging patriotic Ohioans to deal with Peace Demo­
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crats as they saw fit. He wrote, "Treat Copperheads as assassins, as 
men who, if they would not aim the knife at your breast, would, at 
least, not move a finger to arrest the blow."10 
Just before 10 P.M., the mob arrived at the Crisis office in the fall­
ing snow. They smashed windows, tore the front door off its hinges, 
and threw furniture and files into the street. The following day, the 
Ohio State Journal described the incident in detail. According to the 
Journal, "The gang of soldiers circled around the door with fixed 
bayonets and declared death on the man that interrupted."11 The 
Ohio Statesman said some of the men were "armed with swords, and 
revolvers . . . [and] destroyed whatever they could lay their hands 
on."12 After the attack on the Crisis, the group moved up the street, 
bent on wrecking the Statesman's offices as well. But just as they be­
gan battering that door, Columbus police and officers from Camp 
Chase arrived to halt further destruction. 
On the night of the attack, Medary was in Cincinnati visiting 
Washington McLean, editor of the Peace Democrat Enquirer. When 
he returned to Columbus the next morning, a cheering throng greeted 
him at the railway station. The crowd, which was accompanied by a 
brass band, numbered nearly three thousand. From his supporters' 
perspective, the previous night's mob action proved that Medary was 
making progress toward a negotiated peace. Some members of the 
crowd hoisted him into a carriage, which they then pulled up High 
Street, before taking Medary to his house.13 When he was informed of 
the reason for his unanticipated welcome, Medary reacted with mixed 
emotions. He thanked God that the "brave men who met him at the 
depot" were not rioters but free men. He judged that, "Knowing their 
rights, [they] dared, in the face of executive scowls and military sur­
roundings . . . [to] give public advertisement that they know how to 
defend them, and that they intend to do it."14 
The $600 to $800 damage to Medary's office was unsuccessful in 
closing down the paper because it was still being published at Richard 
Nevins's firm on High Street. In fact, the incident strengthened the 
Crisis's reputation and Medary's tenacity. The episode proved to him 
that his opponents chose to engage in activities Peace Democrats 
would not lower themselves to: "We have not touched a printing press 
of theirs. Can they say the same for themselves?"15 Because no one 
publicly claimed responsibility for the incident, Medary initially 
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accused the publisher of the Journal, Francis Hurtt, of instigating the 
mob. He charged Hurtt with "liquoring up the mob," and with pro­
viding abolitionists with uniforms so they could pose as soldiers. Al­
though a week later Medary wrote that he had discovered that soldiers 
from Camp Chase had actually made up most of the mob, he main­
tained that the abolitionist press had triggered the soldiers' hostility. 
Thus both sides accused elements of the press of causing violence. 
Colonel August Kautz, commander of the Second Ohio Cavalry, 
wrote Medary a partial apology. Kautz disavowed responsibility and 
claimed that he could not punish the guilty soldiers because he was 
unsure who they were. With his letter he returned four bound vol­
umes of the Crisis that he had "discovered" during a search of Camp 
Chase.16 But in a letter sent to a relative, Private Samuel Trescott, a 
member of the unit, acknowledged the soldiers' participation. He 
wrote a cousin, "The other night about 100 of the 2d O. went to Co­
lumbus and destroyed a secesh printing office, one of the worse [sic] 
kind." Trescott objected to Medary's assertion that an unruly mob 
had attacked the Crisis office. Rather, an orderly, disciplined group of 
soldiers, of whom Trescott was one, had executed a premeditated 
plan. Trescott's letter illustrated the earnest resentment Northern 
troops felt toward Peace Democrats: "It was a secesh paper and aided 
the rebels and as such should be put down."17 
Reaction to the event, predictably, followed party lines. Impas­
sioned Union civilians immediately heralded the soldiers' heroic act. 
Simultaneously, however, a faction of radical Peace Democrats for the 
first time called for retaliatory action. The comment of Wilbur Storey, 
editor of the Chicago Times, was typical: "We have been silent thus 
far, but . .  . in every occurrence like that at Columbus, a reprisal 
should be made."18 The Dayton Empire added, "For every Demo­
cratic printing press destroyed . .  . let an Abolition one be destroyed 
in turn." The Placer (California) Herald insisted, "No gang of soldiers 
. .  . [is] strong enuf, thank God, to effectively stop the expressions and 
thoughts of American freemen. If the unhappy time should ever come, 
farewell then to civil liberty."19 
Six days after the soldiers' action, Peace Democrats held a rally at 
the Franklin County Courthouse in Columbus. Among several resolu­
tions passed that evening was one condemning such illegal activities. 
"To suppress by force the Democratic newspapers of this city," they 
said, "was an outrage that demands the exemplary punishment of the 
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guilty."20 But words alone were not going to stop Medary's oppo­
nents. The following night, unknown antagonists set a fire behind the 
Crisis office in an attempt to burn it down. Columbus firefighters ex­
tinguished it before it did much damage. 
Attacks on the Crisis and other peace papers reflected the growing 
revulsion that staunch Unionists felt toward Peace Democrats. They 
viewed the dissenters "as members of a party that 'had sunk so low' 
that it seemed impossible to sink lower."21 They branded their oppo­
nents a "fifth column." This expression came easily to rabid North­
erners who viewed as traitors anyone who did not wholeheartedly 
support the Lincoln administration. They used every means available 
to persuade the populace that unyielding and unanimous support of 
the Union was the only way to end the war quickly. There was no 
room in the North for what the Peace Democrats called their "loyal 
opposition."22 
Peace Democrats initially supported the right of the Confed-
eracy—of any state, in fact—to maintain its sovereignty, but they 
could not condone armed rebellion against other members of the 
Union. They stopped short, therefore, of supporting the South's bel­
ligerence. But according to Peace Democratic thought, the Union's 
purpose in the conflict should not be "to crush and conquer the 
South," nor should the North attempt to destroy the South's social 
system. Instead, Peace Democrats called for only enough force to re­
press and scatter the rebel army.23 But reunion was of no interest to 
the South, whose leaders wanted peace only if it meant independence 
from the North.24 It quickly became obvious that the peace faction 
lacked any real alternative to the fighting. The Confederate leadership 
rebuffed Medary's notion of compromise because it did not address 
secession, while Lincoln rejected the idea of the South as an indepen­
dent nation. The Peace Democrats were, to a great degree, politically 
isolated from the rest of the country, both North and South. 
Peace Democrats' concern about President Lincoln's broadening 
of federal authority grew out of the two parties' prewar agendas. 
From the perspective of the Democrats, who were out of power, the 
national emergency should not have changed the ground rules. Re­
publican statements that the war presented circumstances unprec­
edented in American history and warranted restrictive policies and 
extraordinary actions to maintain a consensus war effort failed to 
move them. Republicans, who held power, felt that the war was 
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reason enough to halt the opposition party's disputes with official 
policy. They used the war to impugn the Jeffersonian vision of the Re­
public. By continuing in their traditional role of criticizing the party in 
power, Peace Democrats looked like conspirators against the resolu­
tion of a national predicament. A New York Peace Democrat, Samuel 
Tilden, summed up his party's dilemma. He said it was difficult being 
the opposition during the war because it was "necessary . .  . to guard 
against its [the war] denigrating into faction, and to keep its measures 
directed to attaining the utmost practical good for the country."25 
The historian Henry Hubbart finds an immense paradox in the 
Peace Democrat movement. He notes that although Peace Democrats 
constituted perhaps "the most democratic and tolerant section in the 
United States . . . [they] could not become interested in the prosecu­
tion of war for 'freedom and Union.'" He theorizes that many in the 
Middle West probably rejected the motives for the war because of 
their blue-collar mentality. In his view they were one of the less intelli­
gent populations of the country. Many individuals in Ohio, Indiana, 
and Illinois lacked the foresight to understand that war was the only 
way to deal with the South's intransigence.26 
The tension between Republicans and Peace Democrats extended 
to their interpretation of the Constitution. Throughout the war both 
parties portrayed themselves as defenders of the Constitution. Men 
like Medary thought of themselves as victims of the Republicans' 
broad interpretation. Peace Democrats were, in the Jeffersonian tradi­
tion, strict constructionists who believed they were the Constitution's 
special protectors. To Medary the document was a prescribed set of 
inalterable rules.27 
Republicans, on the contrary, saw the Constitution as "a living 
document that incorporated laws, customs and practices."28 They be­
lieved it had to be adapted to the current crisis to preserve the Union. 
But Peace Democrats could not countenance curbs on liberty—a di­
rect attempt to circumvent the Constitution in their minds—for any 
reason, let alone one of (to them) questionable merit. Medary argued 
that if the Constitution had been adhered to, there would have been 
no war: "Our Civil War was brought upon us by losing sight of the 
old marks of constitutional law."29 
The administration's attempts to enforce the draft and silence dis­
sent proved to Peace Democrats that the administration was willing to 
subvert the Constitution to win the war. Medary feared that people in 
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the North would become overwhelmed by fanaticism and would ne­
glect the basic principles of freedom and self-government that made 
the nation unique.30 For Peace Democrats, being an American meant 
having civil liberties. When government officials put curbs on dissent, 
the democratic experiment would die. The trampling of civil liberties 
was as threatening "as an invading army."31 
During 1863 fragmentation within the Peace Democrat Party di­
minished its potential. The reason for the disagreement was that Peace 
Democrats like Storey no longer agreed with Medary about the ap­
propriate response to attacks on Peace Democrat newspapers. 
Medary clung to his conviction that the rhetorical redress that had in­
spired Democratic victories at the polls was the best answer, but 
Storey and others were more aggressive. The radical elements of the 
party no longer believed Medary's editorial approach alone was the 
solution to modifying national policy. Medary attempted to convince 
his colleagues that if they struck back, they were no better than their 
attackers. He advised them to resist impulsiveness: "In moments of 
high political excitement we all become enamored of our cause; and 
our hope and feeling may very likely run away with our cooler, calmer 
juster judgements."32 But he was aware that he could not help the 
party reach its goals if he distanced himself from or openly con­
demned their activities. 
Despite Medary's calls for peaceful resistance, Democrats became 
more strident in their opposition to the Lincoln administration after 
enactment of the Enrollment Act on March 3, 1863. Medary wrote, 
"All conscription or other forced service of the citizen to the state is 
contrary to the genius and principles of republican government."33 He 
did not encourage violent draft resistance, but his questioning of the 
government's right to enforce general conscription aroused some 
Peace Democrats to action. To many the act constituted proof of the 
government's intent to control their lives, and draft resistance became 
common in Ohio. 
Just after the government made the Enrollment Act public, a group 
of a hundred Ohio Democrats attempted to protect a deserter against 
a provost marshal at Hoskinsville in Noble County. Upon the arrival 
of two companies of Union infantrymen from Cincinnati the protest 
disbanded, but officials fined or imprisoned fifteen men for their part 
in the affair.34 The incident was not as significant as Republican news­
papers claimed in their initial stories about the confrontation, but 
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Unionists used it for maximum political effect against peace propo­
nents. Medary wrote about the smear tactic, "If such scrapes are to be 
gotten up to make abolition votes in Ohio, it will be a dear election­
eering campaign for taxpayers."35 Even so, radical Peace Democrats 
persisted in their defiance, making Medary's protestations that Re­
publicans were exaggerating look like lies. 
In early June Democrats assaulted a draft official in Holmes 
County. When resistance continued in that area and the number of 
men involved grew, Governor David Tod sent in the militia. Nine hun­
dred men who opposed conscription, armed with shotguns and four 
small howitzers, barricaded themselves in a makeshift fort. The pres­
ence of the militia led to successful negotiations, and the resisters fired 
only a few shots. The troopers wounded two men. During the next 
two years it became necessary for the militia to put down a dozen draft 
riots in the north central and west central parts of Ohio. The state mili­
tia was kept on alert to watch for activity particularly in Holmes and 
Crawford Counties. Democrats referred to these two counties as the 
Backbone area because the large number of hard-working farmers 
who lived there were almost all ardent Peace Democrats.36 
Opposition to conscription also flared up in other Middle Western 
states during 1863. In the Indiana and Illinois legislatures, majority 
Peace Democrats passed bills that would have convened a peace con­
ference of all the states and established a cease-fire. They also at­
tempted to wrest control of the militia from the states' Republican 
governors. Both governors adjourned the legislatures before either 
could act on its plans.37 At one point General Ulysses S. Grant had to 
disband two Illinois regiments in Mississippi because so many men 
deserted. Additional soldiers let themselves be captured by Confeder­
ate troops in the hope of being paroled and sent home.38 
The Middle West was not the only area in which antidraft senti­
ment erupted into violence in 1863. From July 12 through July 16, ri­
ots led to more than one hundred deaths during antidraft, antiblack 
riots in New York City. The city's large population of working-class 
Irish instigated the violence. During the uproar the mob called for 
Horace Greeley to be hanged and twice sacked and burned the New 
York Tribune's offices. Many draftees throughout the Union hired 
substitutes or paid a $300 commutation fee, while others fled west or 
to Canada. Use of proxies continued the abuses that had character­
 113 "We Have Just Passed the Rubicon"
ized the earlier militia draft. Before the end of the war more than 
160,000 of 776,000 Northerners drafted refused to serve.39 
In March, Ohio's Dr. Edson Olds filed charges against Governor 
Tod for his earlier imprisonment, which he called kidnapping. Olds 
had been back in Ohio since December 15, 1862, when Lincoln had 
released him from prison because of his election to the Ohio General 
Assembly. Upon his return to his Lancaster home, an admiring crowd 
(estimated at 10,000) greeted Olds with a parade. With the help of a 
Fairfield County common pleas judge, Olds filed a warrant for Tod's 
arrest. When the governor posted bond and the court granted him a 
continuation, Olds filed a civil suit for $100,000 against him. Tod's 
attorneys were able to have the case transferred to federal jurisdiction. 
As the case dragged on, and the complexion of the war changed, 
Olds's suit against Tod never went to trial.40 
As outspoken opposition increased throughout the Middle West 
during 1863, the War Department decided to take more decisive steps 
to deal with it. General Ambrose Burnside, best known for his mut-
ton-chop sidewhiskers, had been commander of the Union Army 
when it suffered a disastrous defeat at Fredricksburg, Virginia, in De­
cember 1862. Lincoln relieved him of his command in January and re­
assigned him to direct the military Department of the Ohio. The area 
of his new command included the heartland of Peace Democrat terri­
tory: Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. The general determined to improve 
on his war record by dealing harshly with the traitors, as he called 
Peace Democrats, in the Middle West. On April 13, from his head­
quarters in Cincinnati, Burnside issued General Order No. 38 in 
which he served notice that he would no longer tolerate "treason, ex­
pressed or implied" in the area under his command. The order explic­
itly contained a warning that "the habit of declaring sympathy for the 
enemy will not be allowed in this department." Burnside said he 
would arrest persons who he determined were spies or traitors. He 
would then try them and send them "beyond our lines into the lines of 
their friends." The general also served special notice on "orators and 
presses" that they should be careful of their words and "must not use 
license and plead that they are exercising liberty. I shall use all the 
power I have to break down such license."41 
The mandates outraged Medary. Seeing Burnside's order as the 
most flagrant move yet by the Lincoln administration to suppress 
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freedom of the press, he forecast "the complete overthrow of public 
liberties. . .  . [It is] the darkest hour since the outbreak of the rebel-
lion."42 As for Burnside, he believed that suppression of dissent was 
the way to improve the North's chances of winning the war. Accord­
ing to Frank Klement, Burnside defined the issue too simplistically. 
"He interpreted criticism of the administration as sympathy for the 
rebels, and naively believed the treason charges bandied about by the 
Republican propagandists."43 Burnside established himself as de facto 
judge and jury of what constituted treasonous activities. He believed 
civil courts had failed to carry out their responsibility by not dealing 
with the problem. General Order No. 38 was no less than a military 
gag order on opposition sentiments. 
Also during April the administration named General William 
Rosecrans the Union military commander of Missouri. He immedi­
ately gave orders to stop circulation of opposition newspapers in that 
state. The postmaster in St. Louis halted distribution of the Crisisy the 
Chicago Times, and five New York Peace Democrat papers. In May, 
West Virginia's postmaster halted circulation of the Cincinnati 
Enquirer in that state. Union soldiers in Indianapolis met a train deliv­
ering the Enquirer and threw all the copies into a creek. Medary saw 
these incidents as additional evidence that the War Department had 
declared open season on press freedom. Despite the curtailment of cir­
culation, "The Crisis [would] maintain that in politics or religion, it is 
no crime to have honest convictions—mere opinions are not punish-
able."44 Many in the North did not agree. 
One man who did, but who intended to do more than write edito­
rials about the War Department's more aggressive policies, was 
Vallandigham. Although they agreed about the fundamental Peace 
Democrat concerns of securing peace and safeguarding civil liberties, 
Medary and Vallandigham differed in their approach. As a journalist 
who held to his belief that logic and arbitration could settle all differ­
ences, Medary persisted in being a political theoretician. The Crisis 
was a sounding board that he used to explain and justify the Peace 
Democrat cause, including freedom of the press. Because of his belief 
in the power of newspapers, he felt he could change public opinion 
through reason and alter the course of the nation through rational dis­
cussion. Vallandigham was an activist. Although less experienced 
than Medary, he was familiar with the prevailing mood in Wash­
ington because he had served as a congressman until the end of 1862. 
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His congressional experience had convinced him that it would take 
more than editorials to change Republican minds. Twenty years 
younger and a great deal more emotional than Medary, the impatient 
Vallandigham believed Peace Democrats could win only through 
confrontation. 
Vallandigham became conspicuous and disliked throughout the 
Union when he informed fellow congressmen in January 1862 that 
the North could not defeat the Confederacy militarily. At the end of 
1862 he forfeited his congressional seat. Medary was concerned 
about Vallandigham's inflammatory rhetoric and earlier had ques­
tioned his resolve, but he saw in the man a leader who could aid the 
Peace Democrat cause. Medary had been impressed with Vallan-
digham's opposition stance in Congress. He wrote in the Crisis that 
Vallandigham's farewell speech to the House was the most "remark­
able which ever overtook any nation or people" and that it had been 
made "by no ordinary man."45 Robert Harper calls Vallandigham 
"the most effective antagonist the government had to deal with during 
the war. .  . outside of the Confederate armies."46 
Burnside's order was a challenge that Vallandigham could not ig­
nore. He saw it as an opportunity to shed more light on the right of ci­
vilians to disagree with federal policy. On Friday, May 1, 1863, 
Vallandigham spoke before a large Democratic rally under a starlit 
sky in Mt. Vernon, Ohio, a Peace Democrat stronghold, and chal­
lenged Burnside's authority. Other Peace Democrats, such as Samuel 
Cox and George Pendleton, shared the podium and joined with 
Vallandigham in voicing their indignation. The real confrontation, 
however, was between Burnside and Vallandigham. Because of 
Vallandigham's charisma and penchant for militant rhetoric, 
Burnside already considered him the most dangerous Democrat in the 
Middle West. Two soldiers in civilian dress attended the rally and 
took copious notes on Vallandigham's comments. It pleased him that 
the soldiers were there; they helped fulfill his plan of defying 
Burnside's mandate. The insolent Democrat was fully prepared to of­
fer himself as a martyr, if necessary, to prove the preeminence of con­
stitutional free speech. 
During Vallandigham's address, he insisted that his right to dissent 
under "General Order No. 1—the Constitution" exceeded that of 
General Order No. 38, which he said he despised and wanted to "spit 
upon. .  . and trample under [his] feet."47 Four days later Burnside sent 
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a train loaded with 150 soldiers from Cincinnati to Dayton. They 
broke down the door of Vallandigham's house before dawn, woke 
him from his sleep, and arrested him. The soldiers took Vallandigham 
to Cincinnati, where Burnside ordered him held in Kemper Barracks 
until a military court could try his case. Lincoln wired Burnside up­
holding his action. The president said, "In your determination to sup­
port the authority of the government and suppress treason in your 
Department, you may count on [my] . .  . firm support."48 
The following evening, a crowd of two hundred Vallandigham 
supporters set fire to the Republican Dayton Journal's offices. An edi­
torial in the Peace Democrat Dayton Empire calling for retribution 
had inflamed the throng. The flames engulfed half a block of adjacent 
buildings, which burned to the ground because the mob cut 
firefighters' hoses. Burnside was forced to send more troops to Day­
ton. The soldiers soon restored order, but not before they had killed 
one belligerent rioter and jailed several dozen others.49 The show­
down between Vallandigham and Burnside bewildered Medary. In re­
porting Vallandigham's arrest he glossed over the Democratic-fueled 
violence in Dayton and blamed Unionists for the rising tension. In his 
eyes the administration had committed an injustice: "Vallandigham is 
under arrest as a traitor. Governor Tod is still at large. Judge ye of the 
Government that so judges men!"50 
A week later, in the Cincinnati court of Judge Humphrey H. 
Leavitt, attorney George Pugh attempted to defend Vallandigham. 
Burnside charged Vallandigham with "uttering disloyal sentiments... 
[and] encouraging unlawful rebellion against the government of the 
United States." His military court had already found Vallandigham 
guilty of violating General Order No. 38. Pugh argued that a military 
court had no jurisdiction over a civilian. He contended that prosecu­
tion in such a court violated a civilian's rights under the Constitution. 
But Leavitt ruled that the president's war powers allowed Burnside to 
enforce his order, and he turned Vallandigham over to Burnside for 
punishment. The general sentenced Vallandigham to be held at Fort 
Warren (in Boston) for the duration of the war. Lincoln, however, 
feeling that the case would only further inflame Middle Western an­
tagonism, commuted Vallandigham's sentence and exiled him to the 
Confederacy.51 
Lincoln used the incident to comment on the curtailment of civil 
liberties in the North. He claimed that the Southern rebellion had 
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been able to reach into the Union "under the cover of 'liberty of 
speech,' 'liberty of press/ and 'habeas corpus.'" It was necessary to 
stifle such dissent because the entire country had become a war zone. 
He summed up his difficulty in this way: "Must I shoot a simple­
minded soldier who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily 
agitator who induces him to desert?" The allowance in the Constitu­
tion for setting aside the writ of habeas corpus made his choice clear: 
"I think that in such a case to silence the agitator and save the boy is 
not only constitutional, but withal a great mercy."52 
Confederate leaders were uncertain what to do with Valland­
igham. His presence served no purpose of theirs, and he had not vio­
lated their laws. He was an embarrassment—not a help—to their 
cause. They put him on a blockade runner that carried him to Ber­
muda before the end of June, and a few weeks later his Confederate 
overseer told Vallandigham he could do as he wished. Desiring to be 
as close as possible to events in Ohio, Vallandigham boarded a ship 
that sailed north, and by mid-July he arrived in Niagara Falls, 
Canada. He could see the Union but could not return to it.53 
Vallandigham became a hero within the Peace Democrat Party in 
Ohio. Medary engineered a campaign in the Crisis to win Valland­
igham the party's gubernatorial nomination. He also began a Val­
landigham fund, soliciting donations to support the impoverished 
exile, and Crisis readers mailed in a large number of contributions. 
The Vallandigham case, harassment of Democratic newspapers, and 
conscription helped Peace Democrats build on the base they had es­
tablished in the 1862 elections. 
On June 11, 1863, Peace Democrats held their annual state con­
vention in Columbus. Because such a large crowd (between 5,000 and 
10,000) attended, proceedings had to be moved from a downtown 
hotel to the south lawn of the Capitol. Moderates in the party wanted 
Zanesville's Hugh Jewett nominated for governor, but the Peace fac­
tion, led by Medary and Pugh, succeeded in having Vallandigham se­
lected. Medary also convinced the delegates to form a group, the Ohio 
Committee, to ask Lincoln to allow Vallandigham to reenter the 
United States. 
On June 26 the committee wrote a letter to the president saying 
Vallandigham had been a gubernatorial candidate at the time of his 
arrest, so his exile violated the constitutionality of the electoral pro­
cess. They further protested Burnside's usurpation of authority, 
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charging, "If freedom of speech and of the press are to be suspended 
in time of war, then the essential element of popular government to ef­
fect a change of policy in the constitutional mode is at an end."54 Lin­
coln replied that he was amenable to Vallandigham's return to Ohio 
only if the Peace Democrats agreed to (1) recognize the war as a 
Southern rebellion; (2) agree that the use of force to suppress it was le­
gal; and (3) support and provide for Union troops. The committee re­
jected the proposal on the basis that it questioned their loyalty to the 
Union.55 The president then refused the committee's request. 
The Union Party also held its 1863 convention in Columbus dur­
ing the first week in July. It drew an equally large crowd. But because 
many in the party did not believe that Governor Tod had spoken 
strongly enough in favor of emancipation, he lost the party's nomina­
tion to "Honest Johnny" Brough, founder of the Cincinnati Enquirer, 
a lawyer, and a War Democrat. Brough, though an undiplomatic poli­
tician, was considered a palatable compromise candidate. 
If Vallandigham could win the race for Ohio's governorship, 
Medary knew, Peace Democrats could have a major impact on the fu­
ture of both Ohio and the Union. In addition, his victory would em­
barrass the Lincoln administration. The campaign generated 
widespread interest. Both parties staged rallies throughout the state, 
which were attended by thousands of passionate supporters. Medary 
did all he could in the Crisis and on the stump to convince Ohioans 
that the "gallant exile" was the solution to the problems war had 
brought to the Middle West. Even if Ohio could not change opinion in 
the rest of the nation, with Vallandigham as its chief executive, Peace 
Democrats could isolate the state from Washington politicians and 
Eastern business interests. A win would allow Ohio to lead in recon­
ciling North and South. 
Politics took center stage in the Middle West throughout the sum­
mer. Democrats held several large peace rallies in Ohio, Indiana, and 
Illinois. One big gathering took place in Springfield, Illinois, where 
nearly 40,000 participated in a demonstration that eventually had to 
be broken up by Union troops. At another, in Mattoon, Illinois, a 
three-mile-long procession of anti-Unionists carrying shotguns, rifles, 
and muskets argued for their constitutional right to bear arms. Union 
soldiers disbanded the rally by confiscating weapons and beating and 
jailing many protesters.56 In retaliation against Peace Democrat at­
tempts to arouse public support for Vallandigham, angry Unionists 
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assaulted marchers in a Democratic parade in Van Wert, Ohio, in Sep­
tember, seriously injuring several people. Medary called for modera­
tion on both sides but held Republicans responsible for precipitating 
the violence. "They are men of wealth and prominence—the oligar­
chy of our State and the North. They are the natural enemies of lib­
erty, [and] the Constitution. . . . The Negro is simply a means to 
accomplish their ends."57 
In July the war came to southern Ohio when Confederate general 
John Morgan, commanding 2,500 men, crossed the Ohio River near 
Cincinnati. Morgan's cavalry rode roughshod through much of south­
ern Ohio, randomly stealing or destroying property, scaring residents, 
and skirmishing with the state militiamen who pursued them. The 
town of Jackson was particularly hard hit during a two-week period in 
which Morgan's men wrecked the office of the Standard, the Republi­
can newspaper in town. When the militia arrived too late to capture 
Morgan's men, they in turn destroyed the Democratic Express. The 
militia finally captured the Confederates near East Liverpool. They 
were imprisoned at the Ohio Penitentiary in Columbus. 
Other Peace Democrat newspapers suffered during the summer as 
well. On June 11 Major General James Blunt, Union commander in 
Kansas, barred circulation by mail of the Crisis, the Cincinnati 
Enquirer, the New York World, and the New York Caucasian in that 
state. The editor of the Marietta (Ohio) Democrat had been harassed 
throughout the war; in 1863 a hostile crowd destroyed his printing 
plant. In August a mob that disagreed with his editorials severely beat 
the editor of the Brown County (Ohio) Argus, J. G. Doren. In Septem­
ber the office of the Cadiz (Ohio) Sentinel was ransacked and its con­
tents scattered in the street. Medary noted that many of his 
subscribers had become the targets of threats in their communities be­
cause they received the Crisis in the mail. It became common for post­
masters, all of whom were Republican, to identify those who received 
the Crisis and report them to the local provost marshal. But the big­
gest case of suppression of a newspaper during the summer involved 
General Burnside. 
Wilbur Storey's Chicago Times was the most aggressively antiwar 
big-city Democratic paper in the North. The volatile Storey carried 
sidearms and even hand grenades when he walked the streets of Chi­
cago, because, he claimed, he anticipated possible abolitionist attacks. 
On June 1 Burnside padlocked the doors of the Times. In ordering the 
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closure, he said, "On account of the repeated expression of disloyal 
and incendiary sentiments, the publication of the newspaper known 
as the Chicago Times is hereby suppressed."58 Burnside's action 
alarmed people across the Northern political spectrum. The Illinois 
legislature, controlled by Peace Democrats but repelled by Storey's ac­
tions, nevertheless immediately protested the action to the president. 
William Herndon, Lincoln's former law partner, and Supreme Court 
Justice David Davis wrote to the president advising him to revoke 
Burnside's order. The U.S. Senate also passed a motion of protest. 
Lincoln rescinded Burnside's order, and the Times reopened after 
three days.59 
The case of the Times was unique. For the first time during the war 
prominent Republican papers joined Peace Democrat publishers in 
denouncing federal newspaper suppression. Henry Raymond, editor 
of the New York Times, was a solid Lincoln supporter, but after 
Burnside's action, he wrote in an editorial, "It is very rarely that a 
military man can be found who is capable of understanding what 
public opinion is or who can be made to comprehend that the press 
has any other rights than those which he may be pleased to confer 
upon them." Raymond urged the president to stop Burnside from 
suppressing other papers.60 In addition, in a rare display of wartime 
unanimity, a bipartisan group of twelve of New York City's newspa­
pers sent a letter of protest to Lincoln, arguing that any restriction on 
the press should be limited to "areas where hostilities actually existed 
or were threatened."61 When he countermanded Burnside's order, the 
president, in a letter written by Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, for­
bade Burnside to use General Order No. 38 against newspapers with­
out presidential approval. Silencing Storey was counterproductive 
because "the irritation produced by such acts is . .  . likely to do more 
harm than the publication would do."62 Burnside, humiliated, sent the 
president his resignation, but Lincoln rejected it. 
If election day had fallen in late June, Vallandigham might have 
won. Between then and October, however, events eroded his advan­
tage. Vallandigham's biggest handicap was that he could not leave 
Canada. His exile made it impossible for him to use his considerable 
talents as a public speaker. Out of necessity he conducted his cam­
paign through correspondence published in the Crisis.63 The Peace 
Democrats used now-familiar antiadministration arguments. Pugh, 
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who was in charge of Vallandigham's campaign, said that if Valland­
igham won, 50,000 armed Democrats would march to Canada and 
escort the new governor to Columbus. 
Medary chose not to print Pugh's threats. The riot in Dayton and 
belligerent speeches by men like Pugh and Olds showed that many 
Peace Democrats no longer believed Medary's newspaper campaign 
could work. In addition, to Medary's consternation, Vallandigham 
failed to highlight governmental abuses of civil liberties as his primary 
campaign issue. In his letters to Ohioans Vallandigham said that his 
time in the South had convinced him that the Union could not defeat 
the rebels. Medary was not so concerned about who won on the 
battlefield as he was about which side would dictate the future of the 
nation in peacetime. Both men contended that the North should settle 
with the Confederacy, but for different reasons. Pugh's rhetoric repre­
sented a third faction that wished for more aggressive tactics. 
Medary no longer believed compromise with the South was an op­
tion. Instead, he felt Vallandigham could best convince voters to 
choose him by emphasizing the need for Northerners to preserve their 
civil liberties. Medary saw this as the most compelling issue for Ohio­
ans because his greatest fear was Republican management of the 
North, but Vallandigham disagreed. 
Despite their differences Medary saw a win by Vallandigham as 
offering the best chance for traditional Peace Democrat goals. On July 
29 Medary said he would, for the first time during the war, be taking a 
vacation because he was ill. Three weeks later he informed readers 
that instead of recuperating he had been in Canada with several other 
Peace Democrats visiting Vallandigham. He had found "'the gallant 
exile'... in remarkably good spirits. Buoyed up by the love of his fel­
low citizens . .  . he enjoys a confidence in the future which no tyrant 
can feel, no sycophant appreciate." Medary also said that during his 
travels he had visited New York's Democratic governor, Horatio 
Seymour. While in New York he had discovered that "Horace 
Greeley . .  . is the real president of the United States, and Lincoln is 
only Greeley's 'subservient tool."'64 Medary's abhorrence for Gree-
ley's influence was a thorn in his side. Medary firmly believed in the 
ability of the Crisis to shape public opinion. But Greeley's statements 
in the New York Tribune had an enormous impact on the public and 
the president that Medary greatly envied. 
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Medary continued to tell Ohioans that Vallandigham was the an­
swer to the problems of the war. "Every vote cast for Vallandigham is 
a vote for liberty, and every vote cast for Brough is a vote for despo-
tism."65 Other events also affected the gubernatorial race. The tide of 
the war was finally turning in favor of the North. In the first two 
weeks in July, Union troops repulsed the Confederates at Gettysburg, 
and Grant's forces finally captured Vicksburg. Possession of 
Vicksburg gave the North total control of the Mississippi River. To­
gether, the major wins—one in the west and one in the east—marked 
the military turning point of the war. They also badly crippled 
Vallandigham's chief argument: that the Union could not subdue the 
Confederacy militarily. And by this time much of the Middle West 
was benefiting from a war-driven economic prosperity. The boom un­
dermined Medary's claim that the conflict was destroying the Middle 
West economically.66 
During the campaign Unionists found ways to blame "The Great 
Unhanged"—their name for Vallandigham—for helping to bring 
about recent negative events. Brough, a convincing public speaker, 
frightened Ohioans by telling them that while Vallandigham was in 
the South, he had helped plan Morgan's raid and Robert E. Lee's ad­
vance into Pennsylvania. Unionists assured Ohioans that a vote for 
Vallandigham would bring the war to Ohio with vengeance. Union 
politicians in the legislature, reacting to pressure from Governor Tod, 
granted Ohio soldiers at war the right to cast absentee ballots in state 
elections. The move benefited Republican soldiers and the candidates 
they favored more than it did Peace Democrat soldiers. Peace Demo­
crat soldiers who were bold enough to acknowledge their political 
preference were already being denied access to peace papers by Union 
commanders. In addition, because of their involvement in a war that 
was lasting longer than anticipated and the abuse they received from 
fellow enlisted men, many Peace Democrats switched to the Republi­
can Party during their enlistment.67 
The South's leaders also were aware of what a Vallandigham vic­
tory could mean to their cause. At Chattanooga, Ohioans were 
among the Union troops patrolling defenses across from Southern 
pickets. Confederate soldiers repeatedly asked their Northern coun­
terparts about the progress of the campaign in the days preceding the 
election. 
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Election day, October 13, 1863, was a warm, sunny fall day in 
Ohio, and the state's polling places witnessed the largest voter turnout 
in state history. For Peace Democrats, however, the day was gloomy. 
Out of 475,000 votes cast, Vallandigham lost by over 100,000. The 
absentee soldier vote, overwhelmingly in Brough's favor, was not 
even necessary to win the election for him. The margin of victory was 
the largest in any gubernatorial race in the history of the United 
States. The landslide astonished both sides. Following Brough's vic­
tory, Lincoln telegraphed the new governor: "Glory to God in the 
Highest. Ohio has saved the Union."68 Refusing to believe that he 
could have so badly misjudged the sentiments of Ohioans, Medary la­
beled the loss the result of fraud. He wrote, "We are convinced that 
the people of Ohio have been . . . cheated out of the election of the 
Democratic ticket."69 But the facts were indisputable. The North was 
finally winning on the battlefield, and Vallandigham's reputation for 
intrigue and violence had made him too radical for Ohio voters.70 
7

"The Victory for Free Discussion 
Is Being Won" 
By 1863 Samuel Medary's health was deteriorating. In September he 
hired Thomas Massey, a veteran editor from Minnesota, to publish 
the Crisis while he attempted to recover.1 Medary told readers that his 
doctor had diagnosed his illness as "'inflammatory rheumatism,' 
brought on by two and one-half years without outdoor exercise." The 
doctor's prescription was time off relaxing and "inhaling the clean 
air" near Lake Erie. Acknowledging that he had not taken a vacation 
since founding the Crisis in January 1861, Medary obeyed his doc-
tor.2 The long hours, destruction of his office, election defeats, and 
curtailment of the Crisis's circulation had taken their toll on Medary's 
physical and psychological well-being. During the remainder of the 
year, Medary wrote only a few stories. 
Medary's health problems antedated the war. In January 1857 he 
and other Democrats had eaten at the National Hotel in Washington 
on the day of James Buchanan's inauguration. Several men, including 
Medary, became seriously ill. Suspicious Democrats alleged that abo­
litionists had poisoned the food, but they were unable to prove the ac­
cusation. After a difficult recovery Medary returned to Ohio, but one 
of his daughters, Flora Nevins, said, "He never appeared entirely well 
after the mysterious occurrence."3 
Because 1863 was ending on a sour note for Peace Democrats, the 
time was doubly difficult for Medary. Over the past three years he had 
pushed himself to the point of exhaustion trying to influence North­
ern opinion. And although Peace Democrats had scored a major elec­
tion victory in 1862, his best efforts had not been enough to help elect 
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Vallandigham in either of two campaigns. Medary believed in Val-
landigham's ability to make the party more influential. But Brough's 
win instead gave Unionists an even stronger base from which to sup­
port the Lincoln administration's policies. Medary, however, still re­
fused to deviate from his conviction that electing Peace Democrats 
remained the only good path toward change. In October he remarked, 
"The feeling is growing hourly that if the Democratic Party cannot 
save the country, all is lost."4 
Winning an even bigger prize, the 1864 presidential election, 
would certainly reverse Republican momentum. Medary was certain 
that he could, after three years of Abraham Lincoln's policies, bring 
Northerners to their senses by helping to elect a conservative Demo­
cratic president. According to him, "Mr. Lincoln called out immense 
armies . .  . drenching the peaceful fields with human blood, involving 
the people in debt untold and incalculable . .  . [and] disturbing the in­
terests of the civilized world."5 Medary reminded readers that, al­
though battered, the Crisis stood fast. He said it continued to support 
"the principles of Thomas Jefferson, the division of power in the gen­
eral government, their complete subordination to the Constitution, 
and a zealous regard for the sovereignty of states." These were the 
only ideals that could reunite the Union.6 
By January 1864 Medary was back in his editor's chair, with 
Massey continuing as his assistant. Somewhat improved health had 
renewed his resolve to practice dissenting journalism. Although Peace 
Democrats were doing poorly politically, Medary saw signs that his 
First Amendment battle was achieving success. Characterizing the na­
tion as a house, he wrote that though he had offended some during the 
last three years, "While the house was on fire, it was no time to read 
essays on sleeping apartments." He explained that "the victory for 
free discussion is being won . .  . we will put the fire out." For the first 
time, however, Medary conceded that the war had changed the na­
tion. It had made the ideal Jeffersonian America impossible. It was 
time to make the best out of what remained: "We will repair the 
charred damages. Liberty will be rebuilt on the old site—wiser if not 
better—more watchful if less ostentatious."7 
Despite this acknowledgment, Medary had no intention of writing 
more balanced commentary. Any political appointee who abused the 
public's trust—not just Republicans and abolitionists—was a fair tar­
get for caustic remarks. Criticism of state and national officeholders 
126 Chapter 7 
was not routine in widely circulated newspapers during the war, since 
during much of the nineteenth century state judges held that disparag­
ing newspaper editorials exceeded acceptable standards of appropri­
ateness. State judiciaries did not consider opposition editorials 
honorable journalism, according to Timothy Gleason. They believed 
that journalists who wrote sharp-tongued columns were inspired by 
motives other than sincere concern for public welfare. In the courts' 
view, "personal attacks and counterattacks in the political press did 
not meet judicial standards of propriety and rational discussion." Any 
publisher who invojced the First Amendment as a justification for 
writing adversarial material found himself in an untenable position. 
State courts "refused to grant publishers special status . .  . or to ex­
pand the existing narrow fair report privilege."8 
Other Columbus newspapers reflected this legal atmosphere and 
were conspicuous in demonstrating patriotism through lack of critical 
analysis. Medary, however, saturated the Crisis with political com­
mentary and relegated print advertising to the last two pages. His pri­
mary competitor in Columbus, the Ohio State Journal, differed from 
the Crisis in both appearance and content. Its publisher, Francis 
Hurtt, filled nearly fifty percent of his four-page daily with advertis­
ing, most of which focused on material and medicinal needs of sol­
diers and their families. The editor of the Journal, Issac Jackson Allen, 
made use of appealing artwork and displayed it throughout the paper, 
even on the front page. As the state Republican organ, the Journal's 
editorials consistently refuted Medary's arguments. Allen wrote, for 
example, that he would "not hesitate to strip the guise from traitors 
and sympathizers with rebellion." He said Peace Democrats were dis­
loyal because they "cloak their treasonable sentiments under the 
hypocritical cry for a peace that is to be obtained only by compromise 
with the call to arms."9 
The Journal did not, however, attack Peace Democrats with 
Medary's skill. While he supported his editorials with historical, 
philosophical, religious, and political citations, the Journal relied on 
optimistic Associated Press war dispatches and assurances from Re­
publican politicians that the Union was winning. Because it consid­
ered Union leaders exemplary, elected officials were acting in the 
country's best interests. Through extensive use of wire reports and 
short editorials, the Journal gave the appearance of being less partisan 
than the Crisis. But the bias of the Journal's stories, its unequivocal 
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support for the Union Party, and the tenor of its advertising left little 
doubt about its allegiance. It would not permit stories that might cast 
the Union administration or military in a negative light because Hurtt 
believed that faultfinding undermined the war effort. 
Medary did not feel similarly restrained. He continually criticized 
the Journal for its shabby journalism and "unobjective" reporting. He 
also charged that "the cause of good government has been more 
deeply injured by the daily journals that have professed to uphold it, 
than by all the other newspapers together."10 He admonished Repub­
lican editors for not exposing questionable government practices, 
contending that they were not doing so because they owed their alle­
giance to politicians and advertisers instead of to subscribers. In his 
opinion, if all newspapers fearlessly supported the constitutional prin­
ciple of free and open discussion, "men elected to office will fear them 
instead of use them."11 Medary also accused the Journal of filling its 
columns with rumors and padding. Northerners should consult the 
Crisis for accurate reporting and analysis of the "doubtful romance 
[i.e., news]" that the Journal printed.12 
Medary's charges seemed to be vindicated during 1863. Accusa­
tions circulated for several months that Hurtt, a captain in the Union 
Army, was also a thief and an embezzler. In December Northern offi­
cials brought formal charges against him. Hurtt was Ambrose 
Burnside's quartermaster and top aide in the Department of the Ohio. 
When the Journal's publisher was found guilty of diverting mili­
tary funds and supplies for personal use, the episode humiliated 
Burnside and Union officials. Hum's arrest confirmed what Medary 
had been telling his readers about Unionists using the war for selfish 
13 purposes.
One of Medary's most prominent themes had been that corrupt 
politicians had led the nation into war. He lamented that Northern of­
ficeholders had profited from the situation. He insisted that the 
nation's problems had grown "out of the wickedness and corruption 
of politicians. The whole atmosphere of Washington is bedimmed 
with error [and] mischief."14 Jean Baker says that Peace Democrats 
saw in the expanding federal bureaucracy a "'swollen' civil service full 
of patronage holders, 'shoddy' contractors, and stockjobbers, who 
swarmed over the land 'like locusts.'"15 Many dishonest Northerners 
did in fact profit from the conflict. Lincoln dismissed his first secretary 
of war, Simon Cameron, for illegally awarding contracts for military 
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materials. Suppliers of scarce goods for Union troops, taking advan­
tage of the military's needs, overpriced supplies or shortchanged buy­
ers. The trading of confiscated cotton became a major scandal in the 
North. Union politicians, many of whom retained their business inter­
ests while they were in office, also used inside information to increase 
personal profits. 
The ineptitude of Union generals, which according to Medary led 
to the unnecessary sacrifice of thousands of heroic soldiers, was an­
other subject for his wrath. Peace Democrats were willing to die for 
the Union, but "we surely have had enough of the generalship of these 
mere political favorites—not half as fit, many of them, to command as 
9/1 Os of the privates in their ranks."16 His remarks about the army's 
ineffectual leadership seemed to ring true, since Lincoln had to change 
the leadership of the Northern army six times before the war was won 
under the command of Ulysses S. Grant. 
Another favorite issue was the tremendous financial burden that 
the war imposed on the civilian population. The administration en­
acted the nation's first income tax on August 5, 1861. On July 1, 
1862, the Internal Revenue Act levied taxes on "almost everything 
but the air Northerners breathed." Congress taxed liquor, tobacco, 
patent medicines, and newspaper advertising and created the Bureau 
of Internal Revenue.17 The tax on newspaper advertising hit closest to 
home for Medary. In his view the Republicans had created an oppres­
sive array of "tax collectors who lived off the people" in many new, 
surreptitious ways.18 The passage of each excise tax and tariff, 
Medary remarked, brought new suffering to the Middle West. The 
war was not only costing Ohioans their lives but guaranteeing a life­
time of debt.19 
State officials were not exempt from Medary's biting criticism. He 
charged that Governor David Tod, in his capacity as president of the 
Cleveland & Mahoning Railroad, was unnecessarily transporting 
arms and troops around the state to make money. (The Unionist-con-
trolled legislature never investigated Medary's charges.) Medary 
wrote several stories criticizing the activities of Ohio general John Fre­
mont, who commanded the Department of the West early in the war. 
The War Department eventually dismissed Fremont after accusing 
him of corruption and fraud. Medary also charged that conditions at 
Columbus's Camp Chase were disgraceful. The military confined 
many Confederate prisoners of war and Peace Democrats there, 
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where they were "treated worse than ordinary criminals—like 
dogs."20 After the war, investigators learned that more than 2,250 
prisoners had died while confined at the camp.21 
Loyal readers were pleased with Medary's accusations. In a typical 
letter to the Crisis, one woman wrote, "Wherever there is wrong in 
the conduct of public business, you are prompt to point it out It is 
good to have a watchman on the heights."22 Such comments encour­
aged Medary in his efforts and heartened him as he became increas­
ingly critical of Lincoln. He regarded Lincoln as freedom's biggest 
enemy. After the Emancipation Proclamation, Medary believed the 
administration was moving to enslave Northern whites who opposed 
its restrictive policies. He justified making derogatory comments 
about the president and other politicians by citing their constitutional 
duty to the public. In July 1863 he wrote, "We have nothing to do 
with Jefferson Davis but fight him, but we have to do with Abe Lin­
coln and every other person who holds office in the Union; and for 
whose good or bad deeds we feel the effects."23 
By the beginning of 1864, Medary's fight for press freedom had 
become personal. In August 1863, following the Union Army's tri­
umphs, Lincoln issued an open letter to the nation's Republican news­
papers in which he thanked black soldiers and rebuked Peace 
Democrats. The president wrote that when victory finally came, 
"Some black men . .  . [will] remember that . .  . they have helped man­
kind on to this great consummation." He singled out Peace Demo­
crats for doing damage to the Union cause. He said, "I fear, there will 
be some white ones, unable to forget that, with malignant heart, and 
deceitful speech, they have strove to hinder it."24 Medary published 
no rebuttal. 
Medary was, however, very discouraged that he could not stop the 
war by influencing voters, or convince them to oppose threats to their 
civil liberties. Until 1864 he had been willing to accept the bipartisan 
rumor that Lincoln was a puppet who was not responsible for the 
constraints imposed in the North. He also was aware that although 
the War Department took action against peace newspapers, Lincoln 
had never openly opposed freedom of the press. But when Medary 
learned that the administration was allowing absentee-soldier voting 
and that the army was intimidating Peace Democrat enlisted men, he 
became convinced that the administration was behind Vallan-
digham's defeat. On January 27, 1864, he wrote, "Lincoln is using 
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troops to coerce elections in Republican favor at the tip of a bayonet. 
On such a basis of hostile action does Mr. Lincoln expect to elect him­
self President, Emperor or Dictator for four more years?"25 For 
Medary, this prospect was real; its realization would mean the end of 
freedom. 
After the Union Army's gains in 1863, Lincoln believed that 1864 
could bring victory to the North. On March 9 he appointed another 
Ohioan to lead the army as it attempted to finish off the Confederacy. 
Because of his success in the West, the president made Ulysses S. 
Grant lieutenant general in command of all the Union troops, pro­
moting a man Medary had befriended when he had first come to Ohio 
as a teacher.26 But even if the North did win, it would not change the 
future Medary foresaw for the Republic. Lincoln had all the compo­
nents in place to ensure absolute control of the nation: martial law, 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and a standing army. Even 
worse, in Medary's view, the president had most of the population 
convinced that their loss of civil liberties was part of the price of mili­
tary victory. In the Crisis Medary warned: "Lincoln is running our 
country to perdition—destroying 'life, liberty and the pursuit of hap­
piness,' [and] everybody not crazy with 'negro on the brain' knows 
and knows it well."27 The 1864 presidential election was Peace Demo­
crats' last chance to head off Lincoln's scheme to make himself king. 
In January 1864 Medary informed readers why he was continuing 
his campaign for an unrestricted press: "Having resolved to maintain 
the liberty of the press, we conceived the best way to do it was to prac­
tice it freely." He argued against the sentiment that men like him were 
just poor losers. "A jury can only return a just verdict when all the 
facts of the case are fairly presented for their consideration," Medary 
said, adding, "I ask but to be heard, and let judgement follow."28 Un­
like many Unionists Medary did not call for suppression of newspa­
pers that opposed his views. He told fellow journalists it was their 
duty to be accurate regardless of their political perspective. In 1861, 
before the first attacks on Peace Democrat papers, he had written, 
"Every man has the right to his own views. . . . We only ask him to 
quote correctly, state the facts as they exist, and then let him make his 
own comments." He also cautioned journalists against printing mis­
leading stories. He added, "If the newspapers could generally be 
brought to this wholesome condition [truthfulness] it would be a 
great blessing to mankind in general."29 Medary could not tolerate 
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journalists who, as he believed, supported the war without question­
ing its leaders' methods or the consequences of their actions. 
Few Republican publishers shared Medary's views about the press 
in wartime. Many, like Henry Raymond, editor of the New York 
Times, were more comfortable placing their faith in the Union's lead­
ers than in Peace Democrats. Raymond wrote that "freedom of the 
press and other 'minor rights and duties' may have to be curtailed in 
the presence of 'overwhelming public necessity.'" The Times's editor, 
who managed Lincoln's 1864 reelection campaign, said he did not be­
lieve restricting press opinion during the war would lead to enduring 
censorship. "The temporary surrender of these rights is a small price 
to pay for their permanent and perpetual enjoyment," he advised 
readers.30 The publisher of the New York Herald, James Gordon 
Bennett, also was willing to accept diminished press freedom, even 
though he often criticized the Lincoln administration on other issues. 
He commented, "In times of peace the rights of the press are deter­
mined by the Constitution, but in times of war, 'the laws of war pre­
vail.' "31 The Republican publisher of the Chicago Tribune, Joseph 
Medill, went even further. He said there was no such thing as "abso­
lute freedom of the press because in society, speech is always limited 
by the prevailing conditions." He argued that civil law worked in re­
straining the press during peacetime, but that at other times "the 
greater the danger, the narrower the limitations" on press freedom. 
Medill observed, "Until the war is over 'we must be content to accept 
whatever the altered conditions of the times and the country may de­
mand as a requisite of national salvation.' "32 National security ex­
ceeded Republican editors' concern that press freedom might become 
a casualty of the war. 
Republican publishers saw more of a middle-ground role for the 
wartime press than Medary did. Medill came closest to conceiving his 
role in Medary's terms when he described the press as "narrators of 
facts, exponents of policy and [the] enemy of wrongs." He affirmed 
the role of the press as a watchman on the walls when he wrote that 
editors "must not hold their peace when incompetence or rascality is 
in evidence. Nothing exempts the military from criticism or denuncia­
tion." He tempered this stance, however, when he wrote that he did 
not condone those who did not support the Union. "It was the duty of 
the press to denounce anyone inside or outside the government who 
stood in the way of victory."33 Bennett, whose Herald enjoyed the 
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largest documented circulation of any U.S. newspaper during the war, 
also agreed that the press should not criticize the government's han­
dling of the war. Newspapers' critical commentary became of second­
ary importance in wartime. "The press must necessarily assume the 
position of 'a voluntary department of government,' morally bound 
to sustain the government and to refrain from publishing 'dangerous 
and ill-timed criticism.'" He admitted, however, that there "must be 
some trade-off; the government should keep the press well-informed 
and under control."34 But he did not say who should oversee this me­
diation or determine acceptable press behavior. 
The federal government was uncertain about the best way to 
handle the press during the Civil War. Precedents for the situation 
were scarce in American history. Beyond censorship of reporters' dis­
patches that revealed military strategy, neither the president nor Con­
gress was willing to enact legislation that would gag the nation's 
newspapers. Part of this hesitancy grew out of a desire to avoid the re­
straints that existed under the Alien and Sedition Acts.35 Medary fre­
quently reminded readers of the "reign of terror" that had resulted 
from enforcement of the acts. During the Civil War the federal gov­
ernment passed no new seditious libel laws.36 Yet men in Lincoln's 
cabinet like Secretary of War Edwin Stanton took a hard line when 
dealing with the press. Stanton had imposed restrictions on corre­
spondents' telegraph usage early in the war and had assumed control 
of the postal service. "Newspapers are valuable organs of public intel­
ligence and instruction . .. but no matter how useful or powerful the 
press may be . .  . it is subordinate to the national safety," he said.37 
Members of Congress were as unsure as Lincoln about what to do 
with those who continually castigated Union policy. Most members 
of Congress criticized the president for his conduct of the war at one 
time or another. Lincoln feared that dealing harshly with the dissident 
press would further polarize civilian opposition in the North to the 
war. The president had great respect for the power of the press. "Lin­
coln knew that 'words had to complete the work of guns.'"38 "Rigid, 
across-the-board restraints might have [had] the effect of antagoniz­
ing some newspapers that were useful to the cause or of alienating seg­
ments of the population whose loyalties wavered," says John 
Lofton.39 And Lincoln was hardly a hero to the press, Republican or 
Democrat. He did not go out of his way to explain his policies to 
them, and not until the war was over did most editors acknowledge 
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Lincoln's positive impact during the nation's greatest crisis. In the 
words of one editor, "It is our great desire to sustain the president and 
we deplore the opportunity he has let go by, to sustain himself."40 
Because either his action or inaction always seemed to offend 
someone, Lincoln made decisions only when necessary. Throughout 
the war he maintained that each incident had to be considered on an 
individual basis. David Donald says the president "can be cited on all 
sides of all questions. His policy was to have no policy. He insisted on 
resolving conflicts only as they arose." This ambiguity, says Donald, 
is what made Lincoln great.41 
Some historians believe the president's ambivalent attitude toward 
the opposition press can be traced to his political heritage. Lincoln 
had belonged to the Whig Party for most of his political life and did 
not join the antislavery Republican Party until 1856. Whigs inter­
preted the Constitution liberally, believing it gave federal officials the 
authority to apply it according to the existing situation. Albert 
Beveridge says the president was slow to convert to Republicanism 
because he felt uncomfortable dictating the public agenda. He con­
tinually measured public opinion, moving slowly and making deci­
sions only after determining that broad consensus existed. Lincoln 
"neither set nor retarded mass movements—but actually reflected 
them."42 He purposely remained flexible on most issues and employed 
what William Carleton calls "a calculated shrewdness which parried 
dissidence."43 
Mark Neely argues that Lincoln's pragmatism diverted him from 
considering civil liberties issues on a constitutional basis. When diffi­
cult issues arose, the president did not automatically consider the con­
stitutional implications of his decisions. Ironically, Lincoln, when 
pressed on his right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, cited a case 
involving Medary's hero, Andrew Jackson, at the end of the War of 
1812. He noted that Jackson, in 1815, had imposed martial law in 
New Orleans and had rejected a writ of habeas corpus. The president 
continued, "The permanent right of the people to public discussion, 
the liberty of speech and the press . .  . suffered no detriment whatever 
by the conduct of General Jackson, or it's [sic] subsequent approval 
by the American Congress."44 
Lincoln seemed to draw a line between "legitimate party opposi­
tion that worked no palpable harm" and blatant disloyalty,45 a posi­
tion that allowed him to maintain the appearance of not sanctioning 
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press suppression while representatives of the federal government like 
Burnside undertook restrictive action with the president's tacit ap­
proval. In Lincoln's defense it must be said that he often became 
aware of military newspaper suppression only after it occurred, as he 
allowed commanders to use their discretion when it came to dealing 
with opposition papers. Likewise the president took no steps to en­
sure that similar incidents did not recur. Neely says that while Lincoln 
privately criticized individual cases of Northern press censorship as 
heavy-handed, he "publicly defended a policy that permitted sup­
pressing disloyal papers."46 
Harper's Weekly noted the problem the president faced in trying 
to uphold the Constitution while preserving the Union. "The press 
represents the people and must always be given the maximum of free­
dom." But "the question [is] 'whether newspapers, working for pri­
vate ends or in the interest of unpatriotic malcontents, should be 
suffered to weaken the hands of government during wartime.'"47 
Most Republican politicians readily supported Lincoln in his attitude 
toward dissident newspapers. Senator Henry Lane of Indiana said, 
"The administration has shown a forbearance beyond all parallel in 
history. No government on earth would tolerate [the] treason of these 
papers."48 In the words of James McPherson, "More than any of his 
contemporaries, [Lincoln] pursued policies that were governed by a 
central vision"—preserving the Union.49 The president believed the 
only way to do this was by winning the war while refraining as much 
as possible from antagonizing the Northern public. 
Civilian groups showed no such restraint in their actions against 
peace papers. Medary said states' rights forbade the federal govern­
ment to end slavery. Private citizens implicitly opposed the cause of 
states' rights by suppressing dissident newspapers in their states. Dur­
ing the war all Northern states had laws that addressed libel and slan­
der. State courts were unprepared, however, to prosecute publishers 
for editorials questioning national policy. But civilian violence against 
papers that expressed unpopular opinions dated from the Revolution­
ary War. Between the end of the Revolutionary War and the begin­
ning of the Civil War "the mainstream party press was generally 
immune from majoritarian violence." In American history "violence 
[against the press] is used only when normal inhibitions... fail to pre­
vent improprieties in public discourse. Boundaries to expression al­
ways exist."50 
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Medary was a member of an industry that was under no legal 
restraints and had grown to be "prosperous, aggressive and indepen­
dent" in the years immediately preceding the war.51 In these circum­
stances only community opinion exercised control on newspapers 
with extreme editorial positions. Private citizens even felt obligated to 
take action against Peace Democrat papers. "America during the 
nineteenth century was a society of island communities."52 Each lo­
cale set the limits of acceptable opinion, and members of the commu­
nity expected newspaper editors to stay within them. Because people 
respected the ability of an influential newspaper to mobilize public 
opinion, they feared the persuasive power of papers like the Crisis. 
The Middle Western public was divided passionately over the war, 
and Unionists felt no compunction about using harsh measures 
against extreme views that might detract from the war effort. Lincoln 
may have felt constrained by the Constitution or by fear of dividing 
the North further, but members of local communities did not. 
During the winter of 1864, before Grant mounted his spring cam­
paign against Lee's Confederate forces, the Union Army furloughed 
many Northern soldiers. Some who returned to Ohio joined with ci­
vilians in additional harassment of Peace Democrat newspapers. In 
January mobs ransacked both the Mahoning County Sentinel and the 
Lancaster Ohio Eagle. On the last day of February, soldiers of the 
Forty-fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry entered the office of the Day­
ton Empire. They had become infuriated at the Empire's publishing 
editorials attacking Lincoln personally for seven consecutive days. 
During the incident soldiers "threw type out the windows and set the 
building on fire." Although the city's fire department extinguished the 
blaze, the confrontation resulted in the death of one civilian and the 
wounding of two soldiers. The following day the Empire ran a story 
about the latest attack under the succinct headline "Another Riot."53 
Mobs ransacked or burned six peace newspapers in other Middle 
Western states during the same period, but Ohio's Peace Democrat pa­
pers bore the brunt of the attacks. In the first week in March, another 
group of soldiers wrecked the office of the Greenville Democrat. A 
week later civilians destroyed the Ohio Messenger in Fremont. At the 
height of the attacks, the editor of the Peace Democrat Boston Courier 
remarked, "The mobbing of Democratic newspapers has been revived 
as a pleasant pastime."54 Military suppression of peace papers also 
continued throughout the Middle West. On July 8, Captain Ewald 
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Medary had rejected the move to be appointed delegate for several 
reasons. The Crisis was in financial trouble—and so was its editor. He 
was forced to solicit readers for an increase in advertising to support 
the paper. The reason for his appeal was that "our circulation is 
largely among the farming classes of the country, and the mechanical 
class in the cities; the men who buy, instead of those who sell."59 This 
observation partially explained the Crisisfs difficulty in generating ad­
vertising revenue, but the paper's blatant partisanship also put many 
advertisers off. Damage to its office and reduced circulation had hurt 
Medary financially. In addition, although he did not say so, he was 
not feeling well enough to be a delegate. 
On April 6 Medary apologized to readers for being unable to print 
all the letters and exchange stories he received. He had spent several 
days in bed because of a severe recurrence of his illness and could not 
complete his work. Medary also put a note in his weekly column to 
fellow Peace Democrat newspapers that it had become necessary for 
him to cut down on his exchanges. Because of the cost and his inabil­
ity to read all the papers he received each week, he could no longer 
keep up. Two weeks later Medary reprinted a story headlined 
"Goodbye Sam" that had originally run in the Republican Cincinnati 
Commercial. His purpose was to refute the Commercial's advice that 
he should "take a vacation . . . [because] the Democratic Party has 
passed you by."60 Although he assured readers that nothing could be 
further from the truth, there is no doubt that sickness was making it 
difficult for him to maintain the pace he had set over the previous 
three years. 
A month later Medary suffered an even more significant setback. 
On May 20 two provost marshals from Cincinnati entered the Crisis 
office with a warrant for his arrest. A federal grand jury had indicted 
him on a charge of "conspiracy against the Union." Although the two 
marshals were evasive about exactly why they were arresting him, 
they immediately ordered him onto a train that took all three to Cin­
cinnati. The next day Medary appeared before Judge Humphrey 
Leavitt in U.S. district court. Leavitt informed Medary that he had is­
sued a warrant for his arrest because of his involvement in the 
Cathcart case. The Ohio General Assembly had appointed Charles 
Cathcart, a Peace Democrat, commissioner of Ohio public schools af­
ter the Democratic landslide in 1862. But in October 1863 he resigned 
under pressure after Governor Tod accused him of militant anti­
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Union plotting.61 The Cathcart case was minor compared with other 
Peace Democrat activities that Medary could have been linked with. 
The charge astounded Medary, who denied any involvement with 
Cathcart. He demanded to know who had accused him of the crime. 
Leavitt told him that he would learn that in October, when the trial 
began. The publisher of the Cincinnati Enquirer, Washington Mc­
Lean, posted a $3,000 bond to release Medary on his own recogni­
zance. For some reason Medary had not been indicted for dissenting 
editorials in the Crisis. The War Department was finally taking action 
against him, but not because of his newspaper crusade. McLean be­
lieved the case might be used to strengthen the Peace Democrats' 
cause, declaring that freedom of the press would be vindicated when 
the jury found Medary innocent. 
On his return to Columbus, Medary wrote about his arrest in the 
Crisis: "It is too vile a business to spend breath over. They dared not 
even try us." He said he did not know who had "dreamed up" his in­
volvement with the Cathcart case. Medary was convinced that the un­
derlying purpose of his arrest was to silence the Crisis. He speculated 
that the president was behind the accusation: "It is just the thing for 
the tools of Lincoln's despotism to injure our paper, and that is all 
they care about." But he would "abide the court of Judge Leavitt" 
and hope for a speedy trial so "some light could be shed upon the 
truth."62 Other Peace Democrat newspapers agreed with Medary that 
the Cathcart case was not the real reason for his indictment. The 
Freeman's Journal of New York called the charge outrageous and pre­
posterous. The Philadelphia Age speculated that the government had 
arrested Medary because he had "dealt many and heavy blows upon 
the heads of Lincoln, [William] Seward and Stanton." The New York 
Daily News said the conspiracy charge made Medary's friends laugh 
in scorn.63 
The grand jury had indicted Cathcart, Medary, and seven other 
Peace Democrats on three counts of armed conspiracy against the 
Union. The charges said the nine had planned and participated in an 
October 1863 plot to free Confederate prisoners from three locations 
in Ohio. According to the allegation, the conspirators intended to lib­
erate more than thirty-six hundred Confederate prisoners housed at 
McLean Barracks (in Cincinnati), at Camp Chase, and at the Ohio 
Penitentiary (both in Columbus). Union military leaders had become 
especially suspicious of all Peace Democrat activities in Columbus. 
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Anxiety about Northern aid to Southern prisoners had risen follow­
ing the daring escape of General John Morgan and several other Con­
federates from the Ohio Penitentiary in November 1863. The 
Southerners had tunneled out of the penitentiary and made their way 
back across Southern lines, where they were honored for their accom­
plishments. There was no proof that anyone on the outside was in­
volved in Morgan's escape, but the incident, which made headlines 
across the nation, embarrassed Burnside, and the general was eager to 
find a scapegoat. 
The Cathcart case also was another attempt to link Medary and 
the others with the supposedly seditious Knights of the Golden Circle. 
Although Medary was never tried, the case against the others contin­
ued for two more years. Attorneys for both sides called many wit­
nesses, but the case ended in April 1866 when the federal attorney in 
charge of the case told Leavitt he no longer wished to continue be­
cause of lack of evidence. None of the defendants was found guilty.64 
Circumstances not mentioned in the initial indictment contributed 
to suspicions about Medary and the others. In May the Union Army 
had suffered grievous losses in battles at the Wilderness and 
Spotsylvania Court House in Virginia. Ohioans knew that more draft 
calls were coming, and the administration feared renewed opposition. 
Many within the federal government became concerned about rumors 
that some Peace Democrats were plotting subversive activities against 
the Northern government. And Burnside in fact had not been mis­
taken in suspecting that some Northerners might be involved in at­
tempts to free Confederates from Ohio prisons. But he arrested the 
wrong people. In May 1864 the Confederacy had dispatched agents 
to Canada to try to convince Vallandigham to aid the Southern cause 
in any way possible.65 The agents told him they wanted to help bring 
peace to the nation; but in reality Jefferson Davis had sent them to 
Vallandigham hoping that they could convince him to help the South 
gain independence. 
The Knights of the Golden Circle had made Vallandigham their 
supreme commander in February. Unionists believed that this secret 
society of Peace Democrats, whose members wore a copper penny on 
their lapel as identification, intended to establish a Middle West con­
federacy by force and to assassinate Lincoln. As part of their plan, 
Confederate agents hoped to convince the Knights to join them in 
freeing Southern prisoners from Johnson's Island (on Lake Erie) and 
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at Camp Chase. In addition, they wanted to influence Northern opin­
ion by subsidizing Peace Democrat newspapers. From the beginning, 
however, Southerners had difficulty convincing Peace Democrats that 
the plans had merit. Because Vallandigham was primarily interested 
in achieving peace, the rebels were unable to interest him in joining in 
an armed uprising. On at least five occasions Southerners organized 
attacks on military depots and prisons in the North, but each time ap­
prehensive Knights backed out beforehand. 
Lincoln did not take the rumors of dissident activities seriously, 
branding the Knights "a mere political organization, with about as 
much of malice [as of] puerility."66 He persisted in his belief that 
Peace Democrats were unlikely to resort to violence. Republicans like 
Horace Greeley used the rumor as a scare tactic to alarm Northerners. 
Stories concerning subversive activities "were embroidered with 
many rumors and much hearsay, some incidental, most contrived."67 
At any rate, no one produced any evidence that Medary had received 
any subsidy from the Knights, condoned their plans, or even knew of 
their existence. 
In the June 1 edition of the Crisis, a reader attempted to cast 
Medary's plight in a more positive light. The letter writer said, "If you 
would be arrested once a week the circulation of your paper would be 
largely increased." In the same issue Medary printed a story from the 
Albany (New York) Atlas and Argus. The editor of that paper 
warned, "After the press shall have been abolished, there will be little 
of popular freedom left." The Atlas and Argus's editor added that 
Medary's arrest was "one of those errors into which the administra­
tion blunders from its mere want of intelligence and capacity." 
Medary decided that his indictment was part of a secret federal con­
spiracy. Other Peace Democrat newspapers agreed. A typical com­
ment appeared in the Iowa Courier. "It has always been a mania with 
Lincoln to arrest American citizens without warrant and to suppress 
American papers without authority."68 
The Crisis's financial troubles continued to increase after Medary's 
arrest, forcing him to do what he had previously avoided—raise sub­
scription prices. "Following our arrest, our receipts fell off heavily . .  . 
[because] such business is injurious to our paper."69 He told subscrib­
ers publication costs were forcing him to raise the yearly subscription 
cost of the Crisis from two dollars to three dollars. 
Despite Medary's predicament, Peace Democrats got a final 
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chance to succeed during the summer of 1864. Since Grant had taken 
command the Union Army had suffered 55,000 casualties, and Lee 
had Grant's army stymied at Cold Harbor. The War Department also 
was drafting more men, which intensified peace initiatives. Lincoln re­
alized he was facing a renewed crisis. Unless the Union Army did 
something dramatic, there was little chance for his reelection. This 
time the cries for peace came from a new direction. Many of Lincoln's 
supporters, as for example New York Republican Thurlow Weed, 
were cynical about his chances. "Lincoln's reelection is an impossibil­
ity unless he can bring peace or victory. . . . The people are wild for 
peace."70 Greeley also succumbed to war weariness, writing, "Our 
bleeding, bankrupt, almost dying country . . . longs for peace" and 
urging him to drop emancipation as a condition. Lincoln refused, 
however, because he knew the South still wanted independence.71 
Because of the problems Lincoln faced on the battlefield and from 
various political factions, his 1864 candidacy seemed hopeless. The 
president told advisers that it was unlikely he could be reelected. Yet 
despite a move by radical Republicans to nominate Ohio's Salmon 
Chase (Lincoln's secretary of the treasury), convention delegates re­
nominated the president in June.72 Many Republicans questioned 
Lincoln's strategy, but no one had a better plan for ending the war 
that was widely acceptable to Republicans. The Democrats saw 
Lincoln's renomination as a prime opportunity to win the White 
House. 
On June 15 Vallandigham, wearing a cape and a false beard, 
sneaked across the Detroit River in a boat. From Detroit he traveled 
by train to a hiding place near Hamilton, Ohio. Several of Valland-
igham's friends had assured him that if he returned he would be 
named a delegate to the Democratic National Convention. They be­
lieved public support for Vallandigham would be so strong that it 
would make it difficult for the president to have him arrested. Shortly 
after his return, Vallandigham publicly announced that he was back 
in Ohio. Republican newspapers welcomed his return, however, say­
ing he would prove to be an embarrassment to the struggling Peace 
Democrats. Lincoln apparently agreed and decided not to have Val­
landigham arrested. 
Because of the stalemate on the battlefield at Petersburg, Virginia, 
Democrats postponed their convention from July 4 until the end of 
August. War and Peace Democrats needed a compromise candidate in 
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order to compete effectively with Republicans. Most party members 
believed that the choice of a military man would convince voters the 
party had the North's best interests in mind. The Peace faction feared, 
however, that nomination of a War Democrat would prolong the 
fighting. Medary's son Charles, a Union artillery officer stationed in 
Virginia, shared his concern about the pending nomination in a letter 
to his father. "As the winds of peace are blowing favorably . .  . it is 
best not to nominate any man who has any war in him," he wrote on 
July 20. Charles added, "I just hear that a call has been made for 
500,000 more men. If so, Lincoln is deader than dead."73 
When Democrats finally held their convention, two Ohioans 
shared the compromise ticket. Delegates nominated a War Democrat, 
General George McClellan, for president and a Peace Democrat, 
George Pendleton, for vice president. Peace Democrats hoped the 
ticket would bridge the differences within the party. Vallandigham at­
tended the convention and attracted great curiosity but succeeded 
only in weakening public trust in the party's sincerity. He and several 
other Democrats, including Medary, could not support McClellan be­
cause he was unwilling to pursue peace unconditionally. The Peace 
faction wanted a prompt end to hostilities, but Eastern War Demo­
crats headed off the attempt. McClellan said he did not favor reunion 
with the South because agreeing to peace without total victory would 
betray his army comrades. He added that he would not make emanci­
pation a prerequisite for peace but favored continuing the war until 
the Confederacy dropped its goal of independence. His primary pur­
pose as president would be to restore the Union, and he could not ac­
cept a negotiated peace that fell short of that target. The compromise 
position so upset Medary that, for the first time in his long newspaper 
career, he refused to put the Democratic presidential ticket on the 
banner of the Crisis. 
Medary's health had prevented him from attending the conven­
tion. Throughout the summer, days of working at the Crisis were in­
terrupted by weeks off as he attempted to regain his strength. 
Medary's concern for freedom of the press was lost in the squabble 
over the Democratic ticket's peace program. Another more upsetting 
circumstance was that his trial would not take place until fall, and he 
still did not know who had accused him or why. Was the administra­
tion trying to silence his dissenting voice? If so, why was the military 
allowing the Crisis to continue publishing? No one was able to pro­
vide the answers. With these troubles on his mind, he summed up his 
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melancholy mood by writing, "Thus we drift along."74 As for the 
problems that had beset him during the past two years, he said, 
"Against all this we have wielded what force an independent press 
could bring to bear, not for ourselves and posterity alone . .  . [but] for 
all men . .  . for all must suffer alike in the end." He pleaded with 
Middle Westerners to help defend freedom of the press because "if a 
man cannot read a paper in favor of law, or civil and just government, 
what can he read?"75 
Though things looked bad for Lincoln's reelection through July, 
they suddenly changed for the better in late summer. At the same time 
that General William Sherman's Union forces overwhelmed Atlanta, 
General Phillip Sheridan's command gained control of the Shenan­
doah Valley in Virginia. Republicans could finally see that the end of 
the war was in sight. A few Peace Democrats distanced themselves 
even further from the hopeless McClellan ticket. On September 14 
Medary, Vallandigham, George Pugh, and Edson Olds met in Colum­
bus. Because the two parties' platforms were much the same, they de­
cided to break all ties with the Democratic ticket. They called for a 
convention in Cincinnati on October 18 and invited Peace Democrats 
from all the Middle Western states to join them. But when fifty del­
egates from across the Middle West showed up, Medary was too sick 
to attend. The publisher of the Cincinnati Enquirer, Washington 
McLean, refused to sanction the Peace Democrats' gathering because 
he supported hometown vice presidential candidate Pendleton. Val­
landigham also stayed away because Pendleton and McLean had con­
vinced him to back the McClellan ticket so the Democratic party 
could maintain the appearance of being united. The convention 
lacked leadership and consensus; it disbanded in confusion.76 
Two months before, on the evening of August 23, Columbus Peace 
Democrats had held a rally on the front steps of the Franklin County 
Courthouse. Amid Democratic tirades against the war and Republi­
can taunts from the crowd, several fights broke out. Medary was 
scheduled to deliver the keynote address, but just after beginning to 
speak he became seriously ill and had to be helped off the podium. His 
doctor again ordered him to bed. During his subsequent two-month 
absence from the Crisis, he apologized to readers for being weak and 
unable to do much writing. Massey filled the Crisis'* columns with ex­
change stories and short commentaries that lacked Medary's distinc­
tive depth. Leavitt postponed Medary's trial because the defendant 
was too weak to face charges. 
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On Election Day 1864, November 8, it was raining and chilly 
throughout most of the North, but bad weather did not keep voters 
away from the polls.77 When all the ballots were finally counted, Lin­
coln had won his second presidential term by a margin of nearly 
500,000 out of four million votes cast. The Democratic ticket failed to 
carry a single state in the Middle West.78 Party leaders blamed the de­
feat on several factors: battlefield reversals, the Republican treason 
campaign against them, and the soldier vote. All these reasons were le­
gitimate, especially the last. Following Governor Tod's lead, Secretary 
of War Stanton had granted leaves so that Union enlisted men could 
cast ballots. Three-fourths of them voted Republican.79 In Pennsylva­
nia Lincoln won by only twenty thousand votes—and without the fur­
loughed soldier vote would not have carried the state at all.80 But 
another big factor was that the Northern public had elevated Lincoln 
to statesman status. By fall 1864 "the majority of people were magne­
tized by his sincerity and integrity—so the Copperhead charges 
[against Lincoln] seemed out of character."81 The Republican victory 
effectively spelled the end of the Peace Democrat movement. 
One Union soldier Lincoln's victory failed to excite was Lieutenant 
Charles Medary. Stanton had released the younger Medary from an 
army hospital so he could be with his ailing father. Charles had been 
recovering from injuries suffered when his horse fell on him, but when 
he arrived in Columbus on November 8, he was too late to see his fa­
ther alive. After months of illness, Samuel Medary died on November 
7, 1864, the night before Lincoln's reelection victory, at the age of 
sixty-three. Charles said after his arrival that his father would not 
have voted if he could have. It is unclear what finally killed Medary. 
Some said he had a heart attack. Others speculated that exhaustion fi­
nally caught up with him. One thing was certain: the struggle of the 
previous three and a half years had taken their toll on him. 
The day after Medary's death, representatives from all the Colum­
bus newspapers gathered at City Hall to pay tribute to the Old Wheel 
Horse of the Ohio Democratic Party. They passed a resolution recog­
nizing him as "one of the best. .  . editors of the state . .  . whose native 
talent, [and] incorruptible integrity . .  . were most effective in bringing 
the Western press to its present high and noble position."82 Given the 
protracted partisan battles that had taken place between Medary and 
his capital city colleagues, it was generous of them to base their final 
judgment on his journalistic credentials. 
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Republican newspapers' comments after Medary's death ranged 
from guarded compliments to outright rejoicing. In Columbus's Ohio 
State Journal, Issac Jackson Allen eulogized: "Few men in our state..  . 
exerted more influence We have known him for more than a quar­
ter of a century During all that period we cannot now recall an in­
stance in which . . . our views have been coincident with his."83 The 
Nevada Gazette was considerably less magnanimous: "He was an ac­
complished political trickster, one of the vilest scoundrels that ever 
lived.... He ruined more young men through his wiles and false doc­
trines than any other man of his age."84 In the Democratic Cincinnati 
Enquirer, on the other hand, McLean wrote that no one had better 
understood the political crisis through which the country was passing. 
He added, "In Ohio, few of its citizens were more widely known, 
wielded a greater influence . .  . or whose reputation is more likely to 
be historical. His name has become a household word."85 The Demo­
cratic Ohio Statesman commented, "On the eve of the final struggle 
between freedom and despotism, when constitutional liberty seems 
about to go down . .  . its most ardent supporter, Sam Medary is 
dead." On the same front page, just under the death notice, was a 
story reporting Lincoln's reelection.86 The death announcement in the 
Democratic Ohio Sun in Batavia, read: "His greatest anxiety seemed 
to arise from the fear that he would outlive constitutional law."87 (The 
Sun was the paper where Medary had begun his newspaper career 
nearly forty years earlier.) At the burial service on November 9,1864, 
a minister pronounced Medary "the greatest journalist of the West 
and most distinguished citizen of Columbus."88 
Medary's controversial journalistic experiment was over. He had 
not been able to mobilize fellow Northerners to force Lincoln to end 
hostilities with the South, nor had he convinced them that a 
newspaper's right to publish dissenting opinion was as important to 
democracy during wartime as the pursuit of victory. He died believing 
he had accomplished little and that his dream for an independently 
governed nation made up of common men had perished with him. 
8

'We Have Told Some Unpalatable Truths 
.. and Time Vindicates Them" 
From the first issue of the Crisis in January 1861, Samuel Medary rec­
ognized that the public might not appreciate the value of what he was 
doing, and time proved him right. But even though the violence that 
greeted him and other Peace Democrat publishers must have as­
tounded him, Medary refused to retreat from his unpopular point of 
view. Late in the war he wrote, "We have told some unpalatable 
truths to some men, we have no doubt, but they were truths neverthe­
less, and time vindicates them."1 Perhaps he hoped that someday his­
tory would look favorably on his editorial perspective. 
Initially Medary's goal in publishing the Crisis had been to lobby 
for peace. But as the war progressed, his efforts increasingly turned to 
championing journalists' right to publish opposition commentary. In 
his prewar career a belief in Jeffersonian republicanism had guided his 
perception of the role of journalists in America. Later, his involve­
ment with Andrew Jackson's administration convinced him that pub­
lishers could help make Thomas Jefferson's locally governed, 
primarily agrarian society a reality. Medary believed self-reliant indi­
viduals and sovereign states were vital to ensure the realization of this 
potential. He concluded that a bold and uninhibited press was crucial 
to helping achieve that dream. But as a veteran of the most turbulent 
political period in American history, Medary feared that civil war 
jeopardized his vision for the country. By the time of his death, his 
anxiety had been justified. 
Medary's aspirations for America did not survive the war. The 
Crisis newspaper nonetheless helped make a contribution to the con­
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cept of press freedom that historians have previously overlooked. To 
assess any effect he may have had on the practice of journalism in 
America, it is necessary to evaluate Medary's career from two per­
spectives, the political and the journalistic. The substantial reputation 
he achieved as a politician in the prewar years was diminished, but his 
role as the crusading publisher of a dissenting newspaper helped illu­
minate a journalistic privilege that still endures. 
The result of the conflict between Peace Democrat editors and 
those who opposed the right to question the Union war effort has 
probably best been summarized by Donna Dickerson: "The Civil War 
years added a great deal to the debate over the boundaries of freedom 
of press and even increased people's understanding of the vital role 
the press could play in times of upheaval."2 As a prominent Peace 
Democrat publisher and an outspoken proponent of First Amend­
ment protection for dissenting newspaper commentary, Medary had a 
hand in provoking that debate. 
It is impossible to determine one man's contribution to the devel­
opment of freedom of the press. In war, generals win battles in terms 
of tangible ground gained, but journalists fight press battles on a 
largely symbolic basis. It is understandable that Medary died believ­
ing he had accomplished little. To determine the extent of First 
Amendment protection, journalists must challenge its perceived limits 
through practical application. They can celebrate victories in this 
realm only by assessing the increased latitude they gain in ability to 
disagree with majority opinion on controversial issues. To understand 
what Medary's struggle helped accomplish, one must examine both 
what did and what did not occur as a result of publication of the Cri­
sis. Medary's controversial endeavor poses a number of questions. 
For example, why did Northern military authorities never suppress 
the Crisis, in spite of its extensive circulation and apparent opposition 
leadership role? And while zealous civilian Unionists were viciously 
harassing less influential publishers, why did they permit the Crisis to 
proceed (relatively) unscathed for most of the war? Finally, why was 
Medary never charged with either conspiracy or treason for what he 
wrote? 
In 1791 the framers of the Constitution wrote, "Congress shall 
make no law . .  . abridging the freedom . .  . of the press." They could 
not anticipate that within seventy years the people they sought to 
bring together with these words would be irreparably divided by a 
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calamitous civil war.3 Given his knowledge of European history, 
Jefferson anticipated that Americans would eventually disagree with 
each other passionately over politically charged issues. He also recog­
nized that, in the life of a democratic nation, autonomous newspaper 
editors would be required to help oversee government officials, who 
inevitably abuse their authority. These two factors explain why 
Jefferson and the other Founding Fathers placed journalists in such an 
important position in the Constitution. They added the Bill of Rights 
to ensure that despotism would never subvert the delicate balance be­
tween elected officials and those who elect them. Medary's interpreta­
tion of the First Amendment was, therefore, that it unquestionably 
gave publishers special license to criticize any public issue or official— 
regardless of the national circumstances. 
But "freedom of expression is not a doctrine, it is a process. Its 
strength is not in its careful definition, but in its liberal interpreta-
tion."4 Before 1861 the First Amendment right of publishers to chal­
lenge the operation of the federal government during a controversial 
war had not yet been established. The lack of clarity on this point be­
came especially noticeable when editors like Medary sought to exer­
cise the right to dissent to its liberal extreme. Medary was as mistaken 
in believing that his prerogative to comment was unlimited as were 
Unionists in maintaining that the conflict gave them the latitude to 
shut down opposition newspapers. 
Abraham Lincoln could have silenced Peace Democrat newspa­
pers during the war and would have received both official and unoffi­
cial support throughout the North for doing so.5 He took many 
drastic steps under martial law to maintain peace in the North. But he 
recognized that government censorship of opposition newspapers 
was an extreme step that could be not just unpopular but unconstitu­
tional. Lincoln understood, as the writers of the Constitution had, 
that "while actions might be properly punished, mere words discuss­
ing political issues should not be criminal."6 It was his duty to save the 
Union, but as part of his presidential oath he had also promised to up­
hold the Constitution. The Civil War made it necessary for Lincoln to 
act decisively to thwart attempts by Southern sympathizers to under­
mine the Northern cause. But it is significant that despite the 
president's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and his institution 
of martial law, he allowed opposition newspapers unbridled freedom 
to comment. By his refusal to deal more harshly with dissenting pub­
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Ushers, he tacitly acknowledged that, although papers like the Crisis 
might fuel discontent and make the North's task more complicated, 
peace papers were still less than treasonous. 
Robert Wagman has even said that because Lincoln did not censor 
opposition newspapers, he should be considered a champion of press 
freedom.7 But that gives the chief executive a bit more credit than he 
deserves. Lack of action does not prove support. Lincoln refrained 
from ordering military censorship, but he also failed to take decisive 
steps to prevent it from happening. 
Analysis by several historians confirms Lincoln's reactionary man­
agement style and shows that he considered placing limitations on the 
opposition press too volatile a step to take. Although he put limits on 
the Bill of Rights to maintain order during the conflict, he knew if he 
went too far he would violate the very standard for which he was wag­
ing war. Lincoln acknowledged the dilemma he was in. In 1863 he 
wrote, "Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties 
of its people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?"8 His rhe­
torical question highlights his fundamental philosophical difference 
from Medary. Above all else, Medary preferred individual freedom to 
a strong central government; a government that in any way dimin­
ished personal freedoms was only one step away from assuming to­
talitarian control. But by his actions the president maintained that the 
importance of preserving the federal government had to surpass the 
significance of safeguarding individual rights. 
Not only did Medary practice dissenting journalism, he also coun­
seled readers that the Constitution guaranteed him the right to chal­
lenge the Northern government's actions. He warned Unionists that if 
he were silenced, all civil liberties would be threatened. Adamant 
Unionists doubted Medary's integrity in invoking the First Amend­
ment as a defense for his dissent because of his history of partisanship 
and their support for an emotional war. For an opposition journalist, 
freedom of the press remained an ideal that Northerners refused to 
sanction until a publisher proved that a newspaper like the Crisis 
served some worthwhile purpose. Medary attempted to do exactly 
that by explaining the need for journalists to show that one could look 
at the war from many points of view. 
Unfortunately for Medary, his credibility was hurt by the fact that 
his political platform was built on out-of-date notions. He distrusted 
Northern leaders because of the threat their management of the war 
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posed to civil liberties. Indeed, because he questioned even the initial 
reasons for imposing any and all restraints, he found ample evidence 
to substantiate his fears. During his prewar career he had shown that 
he was willing to compromise both friendships and ideals to maintain 
party harmony or gain political favor for himself. In this regard he 
was not unlike most politicians. But Medary took a different tack be­
tween 1861 and 1864. His wartime political agenda consisted of re­
storing peace at any price and supporting any Democrat who shared 
his goal. He was willing to make concessions with the Confederacy in 
the name of peace, but his anxiety about the loss of personal freedoms 
in the North prohibited him from compromising with fellow North­
erners on other political issues. 
Medary's years in Ohio had led him to believe that the Middle 
West was the most exceptional section of the country. But the war 
was diminishing the area's influence on the rest of the nation. He de­
tested rich Eastern industrialists because he believed they were ma­
nipulating the war for selfish interests at the expense of the rest of the 
country. His belief in the preeminence of states' rights directly op­
posed Lincoln's concept of a unified nation. The president believed 
that to win the war the Northern states had to act as one nation, not as 
separate entities; but as a lifelong conservative Democrat, Medary 
doubted the sincerity of the Republican-controlled Unionist cause. 
Rapprochement with them on issues on which they differed from him 
was unthinkable. His lack of adaptability to an evolving reality hurt 
his credibility even within his own fragmented Democratic Party. 
Many members of the party saw compromise, even on formerly sa­
cred constitutional issues, as necessary to win the war. 
Emancipation of the slaves was another issue on which Medary 
was unbending. His desire to protect his friends—Ohio's farmers and 
laborers—against former slaves blinded him to the morality of freeing 
the slaves. He could not see that slavery was more than just an eco­
nomic or a political concern. North and South had drawn the lines of 
demarcation concerning abolition long before 1861. The willingness 
of many on both sides to kill each other, even before the war, proved 
that most Americans saw something terrible in the institution of slav­
ery that Medary refused to acknowledge. 
He was never to accept the idea that reassessing and adjusting 
one's position could be admirable. Instead he persisted in believing 
that any alteration of a person's stand on various issues indicated a 
character flaw. Medary reacted with paranoia to nearly every change 
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during the war. That winning a civil war required the ability to adapt 
and to take extraordinary measures never penetrated his understand­
ing. As a result he was unable to visualize how the country could be 
unified to defeat an external threat while simultaneously allowing 
states to maintain local autonomy. He failed to acknowledge that al­
though nationalism was the antithesis of local decision making, it was 
an inevitable step for the threatened nation if it was to survive and ma­
ture. Why was a man who had been intimately involved with the po­
litical scene for many years so imperceptive? Perhaps because the 
changing times had passed him and other Peace Democrats by. Nar-
row-mindedness was characteristic of the Peace Democratic Party 
during the conflict and led to a universal inability within the faction to 
adjust to an evolving nation. 
When the war began in 1861, Medary was sixty-one years old. He 
had spent parts of four decades involved in passionate state and fed­
eral political battles. His health was deteriorating, and he was tired 
both mentally and physically. His dream for the realization of 
Jeffersonian America in the "Great Middle West" had vanished, 
though he could not admit it. The revolutionary European spirit that 
he had invoked ten years earlier to update Ohio's state constitution 
somehow eluded him, and the changes that the Civil War was bring­
ing to America scared and depressed him. He was a weary, disheart­
ened man, and he could not accept the new reality that was 
superseding his lifelong ideal. 
Eastern industrialism, westward migration, and railroad expan­
sion had irrevocably opened up and linked previously distant sections 
of the continent. Medary had even promoted several of these develop­
ments. But by the beginning of the war, traditional Jacksonian Demo­
crats had lost the political cause they espoused, and it is questionable 
whether the idyllic Jacksonian order had ever existed in the first place. 
And though Medary called for peace, he offered no practical alterna­
tive to war. His calls for reunion following secession were impossible 
for both the North and the South. His demand for any solution short 
of victory over a Confederacy that demanded independence made it 
logical for Unionists to brand him a traitor. Medary's belief in the Cri­
sis as an agent to overcome the highly charged patriotic spirit that had 
enveloped the nation was chimerical. He did not understand that only 
Lincoln's pragmatic approach was adequate to direct the Union to 
victory and eventual reunion with the Southern states. 
It is likely that Medary's editorials in the Crisis sowed the seed for 
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the vicious civilian retribution he so detested. Did this make Medary a 
traitor? Not really, for he never ceased to support the democratic pro­
cess, even as he attacked politicians' actions. Numerous less discern­
ing Peace Democrats, however, probably became more belligerent 
after reading his editorials. Medary's comments also likely spurred 
draft resistance and antiemancipation activities. As the war dragged 
on, radical Peace Democrats increasingly rejected Medary's state­
ments that election victories were the way to change the course of 
events. Passionate Unionists refused to acknowledge that Medary's 
dissent was moderate and responsible. At no point did he recommend 
the overthrow of the federal government. He was always willing to 
adhere to due process of law. In his references to impeaching the presi­
dent and establishing a separate Northwestern alliance of states, he 
relied on use of the ballot box—legal means. He never called for 
armed rebellion or for helping the Confederacy defeat the North. His 
idea of revolt was to encourage his readers to go to the polls, defeat 
Unionists, and elect Democrats. 
Northerners who opposed the war did so for a variety of reasons. 
The intensity and manner of their resistance also extended across a 
broad spectrum. From those with outright pro-Southern sympathies, 
to Peace Democrats like Clement Vallandigham and Wilbur Storey, to 
antiabolitionists, they made their point in very different ways. Unfor­
tunately for Medary, though, Unionists in general did not differenti­
ate between his style of written dissent and that of people who were 
intent on creating havoc to speed things along. Most Unionists inter­
preted any challenge to the cause, including Medary's scathing edito­
rials, as favoring treasonous action. But there was a difference. The 
reaction of Peace Democrats to the destruction of the Crisis and 
Medary's arrest, as compared to the reaction to Ambrose Burnside's 
apprehension of Vallandigham, accentuates the public's contrasting 
perceptions of the two men. Whereas Medary's difficulties earned him 
a sympathetic parade and editorial support, Vallandigham's incar­
ceration resulted in indignant rioting and violent revenge. Medary did 
not believe that Peace Democrats should publicly confront govern­
ment representatives, as Vallandigham had done with General 
Burnside. Nor did he think that going to prison would accomplish as 
much as continuing to reach out with his antiwar messages. And con­
trary to the sentiments of some fellow journalists, Medary knew calls 
for vengeance after assaults on peace newspapers would only cast 
 153 "We Have Told Some Unpalatable Truths "
Peace Democrats in a more negative light. As a man who wholeheart­
edly believed in the political process to achieve change, Medary main­
tained that the most judicious and patriotic means of affecting 
government decision making was through the electoral process. His 
perception that the Crisis could wield such power was a responsible 
but naively idealistic sentiment. 
At the same time that he was seeking peace, Medary was an un­
willing participant in an evolving wartime newspaper business. Be­
tween 1861 and 1864 two approaches to journalism vied for public 
acceptance. A more objective style of journalism was gradually sup­
planting Medary's technique. Once again he refused to acknowledge 
a revolution in progress. During the war newspapers increasingly re­
lied on frontline correspondents who reported breaking news. Patri­
archal editors who single-handedly interpreted and commented on 
events and policy were going out of style. The Civil War marked the 
beginning of the end of the type of partisan journalism Medary prac­
ticed. The public was less interested in partisan editorials and more 
preoccupied with what was happening to their loved ones, not to 
mention which side was winning and how soon the fighting would 
end. They "demanded facts about the war, deemphasizing the tradi­
tional opinion function of the party press."9 Newspapers became both 
more sensational and more objective. With increasing literacy came a 
populace that was less interested in depending on political leaders to 
tell them how they should think. People were moving toward learning 
to sample various versions of the truth, so they could form their own 
opinions. Medary's mistrust of wire services and reporters and his 
persistence in keeping the Crisis strictly partisan left him behind the 
times. The world of journalism was moving on; the popularity of the 
new style indicated that the public was ready to move with it. 
Medary's pugnacious commentaries set him apart as a journalist 
who criticized public officials while simultaneously citing the First 
Amendment as protection for his right to do so. Yet not until after the 
war did most publishers begin defending their "editorial and news-
gathering practices in terms of their duty to serve the public inter-
est."10 Unionists charged that politics motivated Medary's criticism, 
and to a great extent they were correct. But official investigations 
proved that his abuse-revealing editorials were often highly accurate 
and beneficial. 
Medary's use of editorials to affix blame underscores his contribu­
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tion to what recent historians see as the positive consequences of war­
time friction between Unionists and Peace Democrats. Medary's 
warnings helped head off some excesses of the War Department's in­
creasingly oppressive policies in the name of national security. The 
lively debate the Peace Democrats precipitated "contributed to the 
North's conduct of the war."11 Peace Democrats' questioning military 
justice and abuses of civil liberties tempered the War Department's ag­
gressiveness in dealing with the civilian North. Medary argued that 
national security was not an all-inclusive reason for restricting press 
or public dissent during wartime, particularly in noncombat areas. 
By doing so he helped set a precedent for upholding civil liberties. 
Peace Democrats, in effect, "helped keep the army and the Republi­
cans honest."12 
After the war, the U.S. Supreme Court supported to a great degree 
the Peace Democrats' objections to military abuses. In December 
1864 a military court convicted Lambdin Milligan and two other In­
diana Peace Democrats of treason in connection with the discovery of 
a cache of illegal arms by Union troops in that state. The War Depart­
ment sentenced the men to be hanged in May 1865, but Milligan's 
friends appealed the case to the Supreme Court. In April 1866 the jus­
tices ruled in Ex parte Milligan that the military could not try civilians 
when civil courts were functioning. The decision became a corner­
stone of American civil liberties defenses. In the opinion of Justice 
David Davis, "A citizen, not connected with the military service, and 
resident in a State where the courts are all open . .  . cannot, even when 
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, be tried, convicted, or sen­
tenced otherwise than by the ordinary courts of law."13 
But a court of law did not decide the issue of opposition press free­
dom. Only practical application could accomplish that. In U.S. his­
tory the mainstream press has not "stood in the forefront of the fight 
for freedom of expression." Only in a few instances have editors put 
principle above business interests. During the Civil War, editors who 
supported the Union had no reason to challenge Northern press cen­
sorship. After all, they were not threatened in the way their Peace 
Democrat colleagues were. Elijah Love joy is one example of a person 
willing to die for press freedom, but the public did not see him as a 
hero during his lifetime. During the 1830s most perceived Lovejoy as 
a "zealot and a stubborn, dangerous radical.... Yet who would dis­
pute that he simply recognized many truths before his contemporaries 
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did?"14 The same observation can be made of Medary. During the 
Civil War his motives in publishing an opposition newspaper were to 
restore national peace and to help preserve civil liberties. These were 
not self-serving ambitions. Medary spent most of his own money and 
worked himself to exhaustion to keep the Crisis afloat. There is no 
evidence that he sought political office, wealth, or fame from his un­
dertaking. His goals were ideals. 
The study of Northern politics during the Civil War is "a study of 
tensions."15 The varying distinctions made by the Lincoln administra­
tion, Northern citizens, and Peace Democrats about how far peace pa­
pers could go in criticizing the conduct of the war caused rising 
tension between the three conflicting entities. All can be viewed as im­
portant participants in a metaphorical tug of war in which each at­
tempted to prescribe the limits of freedom of the press. While Medary 
campaigned for unlimited editorial freedom, the Northern public and 
military officials wanted restraint. Each side looked to the president 
to validate its perspective, but he chose to attempt a cautious recon­
ciliation of the two. 
Medary maintained that if Northerners heard information from 
the perspective only of jingoistic Unionists, they would not know if 
the government was misleading them, and he insisted that the minor­
ity version of the controversial war issue had to be heard. Of course, 
conduct of the war became an issue only because men like Medary 
raised it in the public's consciousness. His conviction that the First 
Amendment's guarantee could survive even the most extreme test in 
the nation's history lent vigor to his refusal to back down. His un­
yielding defense of his right to disagree may have looked like just a 
partisan ploy to other Northerners, but it accomplished much more. 
By practicing dissenting journalism he established a symbolic prece­
dent, showing readers that constructive newspaper dissent during a 
national political crisis was possible and useful. Medary proved that 
even in the nation's most harrowing hour the democratic process 
could work if journalists were allowed to exercise their ability to ex­
pound both sides of the predicament. 
Unless some entity threatens their freedom, "established general 
circulation newspapers have tended to go along with efforts to sup­
press deviations from the prevailing political and social orthodoxies of 
their time and place rather than to support the right to dissent."16 The 
Civil War was typical in that only newspapers like the Crisis defended 
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their right to oppose majority opinion. But although he criticized their 
professionalism and disagreed with their editorial views, Medary 
never called for censorship of Unionist newspapers. Many Republican 
publishers could not have made the same claim about the Crisis. 
It is true that there was no official press censorship against opposi­
tion publishers during the war. But the perceived threat of suppres­
sion "indicated that there was a line, albeit fuzzy and smudged, over 
which the majority of newspapers—both loyal and opposition— 
dared not step."17 An abstract limit on permissible press opinion ex­
isted only for those who sought to enforce one, or others who 
understood the value of having such a limit. Medary's work demon­
strated that the narrow press limitations most Unionists supported 
were inhibiting the necessary checks and balances of democracy. The 
First Amendment is only as strong as the public's willingness to accept 
"the validity of the philosophical premise on which it is based."18 
Historically it has been the responsibility of "anti-establishment 
papers and magazines [to] test the limits of community toleration and, 
therefore, of free expression."19 In helping expand the limits of free­
dom of the press, Medary manifested an innate understanding, based 
on a lifetime of democratic free-press idealism, of just how far he 
could go with adversarial journalism. This kept him out of more seri­
ous trouble. Wendell Phillips wrote, "The work of the agitator con­
sists chiefly in talk; he is the counterweight of sloth and 
indifference."20 Although Phillips was referring to abolitionists, his 
description applies to men like Lovejoy and Medary as well. Patriotic 
spirit no doubt helped the Union win the Civil War, but it also sought 
to penalize honest dissent. Medary's challenge helped journalists 
more fully express their right to disagree with their government in 
wartime. 
Medary could earn greater press freedom only by defying popular 
opinion, by probing the cost of unpopular commentary, and by citing 
the First Amendment as his shield. His refusal to be intimidated led to 
his rejection of a more restrained definition of press freedom. Al­
though Lincoln recognized that Medary might indirectly have abetted 
civil unrest, the president understood that restraining newspapers like 
the Crisis would cause even more unrest. Lincoln's unwillingness to 
support General Burnside's censorship and his refusal to enact any re­
pressive press laws showed that he proceeded with extreme discretion. 
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The president understood that, despite the cost to his own agenda, it 
was necessary to allow minority opponents to present their side of the 
issue so the public could consider all options. 
Lincoln was confident that when the reality of the war issues be­
came clear to the Northern public, the veracity of his own and the fal­
lacy of the Peace Democrats' arguments would become clear. Unlike 
many in the War Department and the public, Lincoln and Medary 
shared a belief that the democratic process did not require coercion to 
arrive at the truth. And in fact, as the Civil War progressed, exposi­
tion of both sides of the issue showed that the Peace Democrats' 
agenda was outmoded and that Lincoln's unprecedented measures 
were justified. 
Medary and Lincoln both loved their country very much, but they 
had conflicting visions for its future. They met on common ground, 
however, concerning tampering with a free and open press. Each rec­
ognized that interference by the federal government would set 
America on the road to the end of the democratic experiment. 
Harold Nelson best summarized the results of the Civil War con­
frontation over press freedom when he noted that both the govern­
ment and journalists learned a great deal. Journalists learned that 
"total war meant some compromise of democratic forms, including 
even freedom of the press." The government began to realize that "a 
people tutored in access to news needed information when war came 
if its maximum support was to be elicited."21 Although American his­
tory has not witnessed a recurrence of Civil War circumstances, rede­
fining the limits of the opposition press has remained a question in 
every subsequent American war. A healthy, if usually combative, ten­
sion must exist in a democracy to ensure that the balance of power is 
appropriately maintained. The meaning of First Amendment press 
protection remains a continually disputed, evolving ideal. But jour­
nalists should remember Samuel Medary as one of the uncelebrated 
publishers who played a role in helping broaden the ability of the First 
Amendment to protect the opposition press. 
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